The Book: "Chile In Their Hearts"

CHILE IN THEIR HEARTS Chile in their hearts book New Book Revisits Murder of Two U.S. Citizens After Chilean Military Coup Archive Publishes Key Documents on Case of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi, Executed in National Stadium by Pinochet’s Forces Author John Dinges Challenges Premise of Oscar-winning Film, Missing, That Horman Was Targeted Because He “Knew Too Much” About U.S. Role Published: May 7, 2025 Briefing Book # 892 John Dinges and Peter Kornbluh For further contact: jcdinges@gmail.com peter.kornbluh@gmail.com Subjects Political Crimes and Abuse of Power Regions South America Events Chile – Coup d’État, 1973 Project Chile Dinges John Dinges Books John Dinges | Chile en el corazón Chile en el corazón by John Dinges Assassination on Embassy Row Assassination on Embassy Row by John Dinges Los años del cóndor Los años del cóndor by John Dinges The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents By John Dinges, The New Press (August 1, 2012) book The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability By Peter Kornbluh, New Press (September 11, 2013) Pinochet desclasificado: Los archivos secretos de Estados Unidos sobre Chile (Spanish Edition) Pinochet desclasificado: Los archivos secretos de Estados Unidos sobre Chile (Spanish Edition) by Peter Kornbluh Washington D.C. May 7, 2025 – On November 29, 2011, a Chilean judge stunned the world by indicting a retired U.S. Navy captain as an accomplice to the executions of two U.S. citizens in the days following the violent U.S.-backed military coup in Chile in September 1973. The judge, Jorge Zepeda, charged that the former head of the U.S. “Milgroup,” Navy Captain Ray Davis, knew of the detentions of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi and did not prevent their deaths “although he was in a position to do so.” As the only piece of documentary evidence of foreknowledge, Zepeda’s ruling stated that “the United States Embassy informed the Department of State about the disappearance of Charles Edmund Horman Lazar—according to declassified document 04565252528Z—at the very moment when the victim was still alive, in custody and being interrogated in the upper floors of the Ministry of Defense.” But, according to a new book published by investigative journalist John Dinges, that Embassy cable was dated eight days after Horman was taken by Chilean soldiers from his Santiago home on September 17, 1973, and transmitted a full week after Horman’s unidentified, bullet-riddled body was delivered to the morgue. Far from proof of foreknowledge, the cable stated clearly that the Embassy had received information about Horman well after he was disappeared and had “no firm info on his detention.” “The court,” Dinges concludes in Chile in Their Hearts: The Untold Story of Two Americans Who Went Missing after the Coup, “misread or misinterpreted the cable and used it incorrectly in an attempt to demonstrate [U.S.] foreknowledge of Horman’s death.” The National Security Archive today posted the cable the judge erroneously cited as evidence along with more than a dozen other documents and papers that Dinges used to revisit and revise the dark history of the disappearance and executions of Horman and Teruggi. Among the records are documents generated by an internal State Department inquiry in 1976 after a former Chilean intelligence officer, Rafael Gonzalez, told U.S. reporters that he had seen Horman being interrogated with an American official in the room and had been told that Horman “had to disappear” because “he knew too much”—presumably about the U.S. backing for the military coup. The selection of documents published today also includes a detailed formal retraction of that statement in an affidavit Gonzalez submitted to the Chilean court in 2003, which Dinges located in the judicial files on the case, as well as records of the Horman and Teruggi families’ pursuit of truth, justice and accountability for their loved ones. The disappearance and execution of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi were immortalized in the 1982 Oscar-winning movie, Missing, starring Jack Lemon and Sissy Spacek and directed by Costa-Gavras. The movie powerfully and poignantly depicted the protracted search by Horman’s wife, Joyce—she is named “Beth” in the film—and his father, Edmund Horman, to locate him after a Chilean military unit seized Charles at his home in Santiago. The movie portrayed the callous, malicious treatment the Hormans received from U.S. Embassy officials as they frantically searched for Charles; creating a compelling narrative that he had been killed with U.S. complicity because of revealing conversations he and a companion had with U.S. military officers and contractors on the day of the coup in Viña del Mar. Chile in Their Hearts explicitly challenges the theory that Horman was targeted because he “knew too much” and that U.S. officials had been involved in his death; at the same time, the book excoriates Embassy officials for deceiving the Horman and Teruggi families, colluding in a sham cover story invented by the Chilean military, and maintaining secrecy around its own internal investigations, which concluded the Chilean military had killed the two U.S. citizens. U.S. officials, Dinges concludes, covered up their fate to protect Washington’s relations with the new, U.S.-backed military regime which, with CIA support, had overthrown the democratically elected Socialist government of Salvador Allende. Teriaggi and Horman Frank Teruggi (left) and Charles Horman In his investigation, Dinges sought to determine whether Horman and Teruggi’s political efforts in defense of Allende’s experiment in peaceful revolutionary change led to their detentions and executions. “My investigation was focused on their political associations and actions that might be related to their death,” Dinges writes in his introduction. “In short, who were these two young Americans, how were they killed and why?” KEY CONCLUSIONS Dinges’ meticulous research focused on a thorough review of all relevant documents and files, including the personal papers of Charles’ father, Ed Horman, and the entire 17-volume, 6,976-page court record on the case in Chile. His investigation led to a number of key findings and revelations: As the military coup was looming in Chile, Charles Horman acted to assist the workers’ organizations known as the “Cordones industriales”— the districts of worker-controlled factories that were the heart of the Allende revolution. As the crisis deepened, Allende supporters considered the Cordones to be the strongest bulwark of defense of the embattled popular movement. Horman agreed to raise money in the United States to buy weapons for the Cordones’ resistance against a possible military coup. During a visit to New York a month before his death, Horman persuaded four American friends to give him money for that purpose. Horman was detained in the late afternoon of September 17, 1973, by an Army unit at his house, located in the heart of a Cordones factory area. His body and that of six labor leaders from a nearby factory were delivered to the morgue less than 24 hours later. Horman’s body was deliberately “disappeared.” A Chilean official intervened to block fingerprint procedures from being completed at the morgue, even after the family provided fingerprints from FBI records. The attempt to permanently hide his corpse was, ironically, thwarted by two Chilean military intelligence officials, Sgts. Raul Meneses and Jaime Ortiz, who had been assigned in mid-October to “find the whereabouts” of Charles Horman. They successfully pressured civilian administrators at the morgue to do a fingerprint comparison that identified body 2663 as Charles Horman, finally confirming his death. In a meeting with Ed Horman, they told him that his son “had been shot in the Estadio Nacional on September 18 and…his body interred in the wall of the Santiago Cemetary on October 3.” Teruggi was detained at his house, which was known in the neighborhood to be connected to the militant party MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary Left). Four other people living in the house were active in clandestine MIR activities, including one who was a member of the elite “Central Force” or military wing of MIR. The Chilean military issued a series of false reports on the fate of Horman and Teruggi. Under pressure to provide an explanation, the military eventually reported to the U.S. Embassy that both men had been killed by leftists masquerading in stolen military uniforms. This cover story was implausible and demonstrably false; but for years the Embassy accepted it at face value and conveyed it in briefings to journalists—even after internal State Department investigations concluded Horman and Teruggi had both been executed by the Chilean military. Three U.S. diplomats acknowledged that Embassy officials exerted no real pressure on the new military government because of instructions from Henry Kissinger to defend the regime that had overthrown Allende, whose progressive experiment was considered a dangerous “communist” model. In a memorandum included in this posting written three years after the deaths of Horman and Teruggi, one State Department official admitted that the U.S. government continued to withhold relevant information from the families and were deceiving them with claims to be actively investigating the deaths of their loved ones. In a 30-page summary of his son’s case, Ed Horman denounced what he called the “negligence, inactivity, and failure of the American Embassy” to hold the Chileans accountable for Charles’ murder. “Whether it was incompetence, indifference, or something worse,” Ed Horman wrote, “I find it shocking, outrageous and perhaps obscene.” In his final ruling on the Horman-Teruggi case, Judge Zepeda convicted Captain Pedro Espinoza, one of the officers in charge of interrogations at the National Stadium; and Rafael Gonzalez as an accomplice. (By the time of the final ruling in 2015, Ray Davis had died, two years before, in a nursing home in Santiago, Chile.) But Dinges’ investigation identified several other key Chilean officers who played a role in Horman’s detention and execution, among them Colonel Fernando Grant Pimentel who dispatched the military unit to detain Horman, and Lieutenant Enzo Cadenasso and Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Soto Mackenney who were also directly involved in kidnapping him. There is no evidence to support the charge that the U.S. government helped the Chileans target Horman and Teruggi and/or approved their executions. The theory of “the man who knew too much,” as advanced in Missing, was later endorsed by a Chilean court when Judge Zepeda indicted the former U.S. Navy captain, Ray Davis. Yet the civilian intelligence agent who—as a defector in 1976—originated the charge has admitted he invented the story. In interviews with both Dinges and Peter Kornbluh, Rafael Gonzalez said he concocted the story as a way to call attention to his efforts to flee Chile. In a five-page affidavit presented to the Chilean court in 2003, Gonzalez retracted his own story as “an absolute falsehood.” An examination of the nearly 7,000-page court record failed to reveal any other evidence of any kind to support the charge of U.S. involvement in the murders. Memorandum The title of the book, “Chile in Their Hearts,” derives from a famous Pablo Neruda poem, “Spain in Our Hearts,” written in 1936 about the Spanish civil war. “Charlie and Frank were internationalists,” Dinges writes, comparing them to the brigadistas who fought and died to defend Spain from Franco’s forces of fascism, “and they are in the noble ranks of so many others who traveled to another country to support and experience a revolution grander than themselves.” “Speaking for myself,” Dinges concludes his book, “Chile is a great love, and what happened there was a great wound in our hearts.” The Documents doc 1 Document 1 Frank Teruggi Jr., [Excerpts of Letter to his sister, Janis], April 30, 1972 Apr 30, 1972 Source Janis Teruggi Page During his time in Chile, Frank Teruggi wrote dozens of letters to his sister Janice; she provided transcribed copies to author John Dinges for his book, Chile in Their Hearts. After just four months in the country, Teruggi described in this letter how being in Chile had changed his thinking: “Being down here is the best thing that could have happened to me as far as my political formation. I’m with revolutionaries from all over the continent and learning theory and practice in a way that is probably not available anywhere in the States. … In retrospect, I didn’t know as much about the U.S. as I thought I did. At first, when people asked me about the panthers, or the weathermen, or Angela Davis I was proud to have a chance to give my rap. But now I’m shutting up a bit, reading like crazy and trying to find out what’s really happening.” doc 2 Document 2 FBI, Intelligence Memorandum, [Report on Frank Teruggi Connection to Anti-War Resisters which includes his Chilean Address], Secret, November 28, 1972 Nov 28, 1972 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project In 1972, the FBI opened a “Security Matter Subversive” file on Frank Teruggi because of intercepted correspondence between him and anti-Vietnam War activists in Germany who were aiding Resisters In the Armed Forces (RITA) and what the FBI called other “deserter organizations.” Those organizations supported U.S. soldiers who went AWOL from their bases in Europe in protest against the war. As John Dinges reports in Chile in Their Hearts, “U.S. Amy Intelligence was closely monitoring RITA activities with the assistance of German intelligence.” Letters to Teruggi intercepted by this spying operation recorded his address in Chile on Hernan Cortes street in Santiago, Chile; that address was included in this FBI summary, raising the troubling question of whether the FBI or any other U.S. agency passed this information on to Chilean authorities before or after the coup. doc 3 Document 3 Steve Volk, [ Notes Taken by Terry Simon on Conversations with Military officials in Valparaiso and Vina del Mar from September 11—15th, 1973, as typed by Volk], September 1973 Sep 1973 Source Steve Volk papers On the day of the military coup, Charles Horman was in Valparaiso with Terry Simon, a friend from New York City; she was present for all the conversations with the U.S. Milgroup officers they met with that day and over the next four days. Simon kept meticulous notes on the conversations, and after Horman’s death, she dictated the notes to Stephen Volk, an American academic who typed them on sheets of onion skin paper. Volk smuggled the notes out of Chile in an empty Chapstick tube. The notes recorded names and addresses of various U.S. officers and the various statements they made. All of them enthusiastically backed the military coup; one Navy contractor named Arthur Creter repeatedly suggested “it had gone smoothly.” But the notes contained nothing that could be construed as secret or that could indicate Horman and Simon had learned “too much” about a U.S. role in the coup. doc 4 Document 4 Department of State, Cable, “W/W AMCIT Missing in Chile,” September 25, 1973 Sep 25, 1973 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project This unclassified U.S. Embassy cable—number 4565—was cited by Chilean Judge Jorge Zepeda as evidence that U.S. Embassy officials were aware of Charles Horman’s detention but did nothing to save him from being executed. Judge Zepeda’s indictment of the U.S. Military Group (MilGroup) commander, Navy Captain Ray Davis, stated that before Horman’s murder, “the United States Embassy informed the Department of State about the disappearance [of Horman]—according to declassified document 04565252528Z—at the very moment when the victim was still alive, in custody and being interrogated in the upper floors of the Ministry of Defense.” But the cable is dated September 25, 1973, a full week after Horman’s body had been delivered to the morgue; nothing in it indicates Embassy knowledge of his whereabouts at any time. According to the book, Chile in Their Hearts, “The court, it must be concluded, misread or misinterpreted the cable and used it incorrectly in an attempt to demonstrate foreknowledge of Horman’s death.” doc 5 Document 5 Chilean Tribunal, Statement of Joyce Horman, November 10, 1973 Nov 10, 1973 Source Chilean Tribunal, Causa 2182-98 por el sequestro y homicidio de Frank Teruggi y Charles Horman [Episodio Estadio Nacional]” In this 30-page typewritten statement, Charles’ wife, Joyce, provided a day-by-day chronology of events as she experienced them from September 10-October 18, 1973. The document is the earliest and most complete accounting of her search for her husband after she learned he had been kidnapped by the military. In an entry for October 5, 1973, the day that her father-in-law, Ed Horman, arrived in Santiago, she recounted their meeting with the ambassador and the consul. Despite ample evidence, including eyewitnesses, that Charles had been seized at his home by a military unit, “Amb Davis said that the Embassy feeling was that Charles probably was in hiding,” she recalled. “My father-in-law replied that this seemed implausible, that even if Charles had been afraid to call me directly, he easily could have passed a message through one of our friends. Edmund Horman went on to ask what had been done to follow up on the probability that Charles had been seized by the Chilean Military Intelligence as had been indicated by the evidence of neighbors who witnessed his arrest, and of friends who subsequently had been called by the Chilean Military Intelligence Service. A reference was then made by Edmund Horman to the two calls received at the US Consulate reporting Charles' arrest. Amb. Davis looked at Mr. Purdy and asked if he knew anything about the telephone calls. Purdy said: ‘No sir.’ I then reminded Mr. Purdy that both calls were recorded on the Consulate note cards being kept on Charles' case.” doc 6 Document 6 State Department, Embassy memorandum, “Horman-Teruggi Cases,” Limited Official Use, December 6, 1973 Dec 6, 1973 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project In a short memorandum of conversation, U.S. Embassy officer Robert Steven reports on a conversation with Chilean foreign ministry official, Enrique Guzman, about the deaths of two U.S. citizens. To obfuscate the facts, Guzman tells Steven that “we may never know” how Horman and Teruggi died. Nevertheless, Guzman insists that “both Horman and Teruggi had not only been deeply involved in leftist activities in the ‘Communist Industrial areas,’” but “perhaps had been shot by their own comrades of the left for some unexplained reason”—which was the military’s cover story to absolve themselves for the summary executions. The reference appeared to be to the worker controlled “Cordones Industriales,” which included the Vicuña MacKenna industrial area to where Horman had moved just days before the coup. doc 7 Document 7 State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, “Deaths: Conversation with Father of Frank Teruggi,” Confidential, February 22, 1974 Feb 22, 1974 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project In February 1974, Frank Teruggi Sr. traveled to Santiago, Chile, to press both U.S. and Chilean officials for judicial accountability for his murdered son. In a meeting with members of the U.S. Consulate, including Vice Consul James Anderson—a CIA officer operating under diplomatic cover—Teruggi Sr. expressed strongly that “he was not happy with Embassy action to protect his son” and requested to see “all the files that you have on the case involving my son.” During the lengthy meeting summarized in this memorandum of conversation, Teruggi Sr. told U.S. officials that he had met with Chilean Interior Minister, General Oscar Bonilla, the previous day; Bonilla had given him the military’s fabricated account about what had happened to Frank Jr. In response, Teruggi Sr. had provided Bonilla with a letter from David Hathaway, Frank’s housemate, who had been detained with Frank in the National Stadium and who had witnessed Frank being taken away for interrogation. Bonilla professed not to have known about these details and promised to re-open the investigation into Teruggi’s execution. “Mr. Teruggi, if your son died in the hands of the Chilean military,” Bonilla stated, “I am terribly sorry.” doc 8 Document 8 State Department, Memorandum, “The Charles Horman Case,” Confidential, July 15, 1976 Jul 15, 1976 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project News coverage of the allegations made by Rafael Gonzalez—including a Washington Post article by Lewis Diuguid titled “The Man Who Knew Too Much”—generated inquiries to the State Department from various U.S. legislators, among them Senator Edward Kennedy. This cover memo to a draft response to Sen. Kennedy addresses how deceptive and inadequate the U.S. response to the murders of Horman and Teruggi has been. “We ‘withheld’ for almost two years any reference to a Chilean memorandum which accused Teruggi, and Horman, of leftist activities,” according to this memo written by State Department officer Rudy Fimbres to Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman. “We failed to pursue the basis for the GOC’s allegations” and “we have done nothing about it,” reads the memo from Fimbres. The fact that the vice-consul, James Anderson, was an undercover CIA official, would eventually be exposed, Fimbres warned. The State Department was deceiving the media and the families by stating “we are diligently pursuing every lead, doing everything to develop the circumstances surrounding the deaths of these Americans,” he reported. “This is overdrawn.” Fimbres pressed Shlaudeman to assign a veteran official, Fred Smith, to conduct a full inquiry of State Department files, although he warned that CIA cooperation would be needed to fully investigate the circumstances of Horman and Teruggi’s murders by the Chilean military. doc 9 Document 9 State Department, Memorandum, “Charles Horman Case,” Secret, August 25, 1976, with “Gleanings” chronology attached. Aug 25, 1976 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project The publicity from Rafael Gonzalez’s claims that Charles Horman had been killed because “he knew too much” and that there was an American in the room when he was interrogated generated two internal State Department investigations and assessments. The first was a review of the case by three officials in ARA, the Bureau of American Republic Affairs: Rudy Fimbres, Robert Driscoll and William Robertson. In this report to Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman, they advised that “this case remains bothersome.” There were “intimations” in the press, Congress and from the Horman and Teruggi families of “negligence on our part, or worse, complicity in Horman’s death.” Despite the public U.S. posture that the circumstances of Horman’s death remained unknown, the files showed that “the GOC sought Horman—and felt threatened enough to order his immediate execution. The GOC might have believed this American could be killed without negative fall-out from the USG.” These State Department officials recommended a “further thorough investigation” of the case and noted that the CIA’s “lack of candor with us on other matters only heightens our suspicions.” The strong but speculative language in the memo was intended to force Secretary of State Kissinger and his deputies to conduct a full inquiry, as Fimbres told author John Dinges. “I was trying to smoke something out,” he said. “We were trying to make the case for an investigation.” doc 10 Document 10 State Department, Report, “Death in Chile of Charles Horman,” Secret, December 10, 1976 [Smith Report with cover memo] Dec 10, 1976 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project At the urging of Rudy Fimbres, and the Fimbres-Driscoll-Robertson memorandum (Document 9), Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman assigned Frederick Smith Jr. to conduct a full investigation of internal State Department and Embassy files. Smith’s report, the result of a five-month investigation, remains the most complete internal probe of the Horman-Teruggi killings. His report concluded that the Chilean military “deliberately killed” the two Americans and that their denials to the Embassy are “dubious” and “difficult to credit.” He found “no evidence” of any role by U.S. government officials “apart from Gonzalez’s statements.” Smith’s report directly contradicted the Embassy and State Department public statements, which gave credence to Chilean military denials. Smith recommended that the Embassy re-interview Gonzalez who, with his family, was still receiving asylum in the Italian Embassy. He also recommended that “high level inquiries” be made of CIA and other intelligence agencies to determine if they had taken any action “that may have led the Junta to believe it could, without serious repercussions, kill Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi.” Chile in Their Hearts lists a series of CIA documents specifically denying any actions of that kind had taken place. doc 11 Document 11 Edmund Horman, Personal Memorandum, “The View After Three Years,” December 22, 1976 Dec 22, 1976 Source Frank Manitzas Papers In late 1976, in the wake of publicity surrounding the claims by Rafael Gonzalez, Edmund C. Horman typed a lengthy report, summarizing his personal investigation and the basis for his suspicion that U.S. officials may have targeted his son for execution. The document was found in the files of CBS reporter Frank Manitzas, who was one of the journalists who interviewed Rafael Gonzalez and did an early investigation of the case. In a section titled, “Scenario,” Horman extrapolates from facts he uncovered to connect the dots of what might have happened. He concludes that Charles “knew too much” about U.S. participation in the coup and asserts that the U.S. officer who gave him a ride from Valparaiso to Santiago asked the CIA to arrange for his arrest by the Chilean military. doc 12 Document 12 State Department, Cable, “Investigation of Horman Case: Interviews with Rafael Gonzalez,” Secret, February 18, 1977 Feb 18, 1977 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project Acting on recommendations in the Smith report to re-interview Rafael Gonzalez, U.S. Embassy officers tape record two interviews with him in late January 1977 and transmit their conclusion “that Gonzalez is not reliable.” They describe him as “intelligent, well informed, and well balanced on some matters,” but also willing to say anything that would get him out of Chile. “Thus, he told us in these conversations that he had talked about Horman with American journalists in June 1976 in order to catch outside attention for his family’s case.” doc 13 Document 13 State Department, Cable, “[Raul Meneses] Reports on GOC Involvement in Death of Charles Horman, asks Embassy for Asylum and AID,” Confidential, April 28, 1987 Apr 28, 1987 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project Almost 14 years after the execution of Charles Horman, Raul Meneses, one of the Chilean military officers who was tasked to investigate his disappearance and located his body , approached the U.S. Embassy to leave Chile and seek protection in the United States. Over the course of four meetings in March and April 1987, Meneses passed on information he had obtained in October 1973 about the circumstances surrounding Horman’s detention and execution. Although the dates are inaccurately presented in this cable—Horman was detained early evening of September 17, 1973; he was executed the next morning and his body was delivered to the morgue later on September 18—Meneses provided important information about the military unit that seized him, and where he was taken. Meneses also criticized the U.S. Embassy for failing to assist the family in locating Horman after he was disappeared, but stated that “to his knowledge, no U.S. official played any role in the death of Charles Horman since he was dead before anyone in the Embassy would have known of his detention.” doc 14 Document 14 Department of State, Cable, “Letelier Case: Mariana Callejas Calls on Political Section,” Secret, April 3, 1987 Apr 3, 1987 Source Clinton Administration Chile Declassification Project In the various U.S. Embassy reports on meetings with Raul Meneses, his name was redacted. But in this cable, which addresses a visit to the Embassy by Mariana Callejas, the wife of the DINA assassin of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, Meneses’s name was left uncensored—but is misspelled Menesas. This enabled investigative reporter John Dinges to identify Meneses as the former military investigator in the Horman case who had approached the Embassy in March and April 1987. In this cable, the U.S. embassy expresses some concerns that Meneses and Callejas are “plants” by the Pinochet regime to try and embarrass the United States. Rather than pursue the information on the Horman case and work out an arrangement with Meneses to help him leave the country, the U.S. Embassy turned him away and then professed to be unable to locate him when the State Department decided he might have valuable information on who killed Horman and why. doc 15 Document 15 Chilean Tribunal, Affidavit, [Rafael Gonzalez Recantation of CIA Connection to Horman’s Death], November 2001 Nov 1, 2001 Source Chilean Tribunal, Causa 2182-98 por el sequestro y homicidio de Frank Teruggi y Charles Horman [Episodio Estadio Nacional]” In a signed statement drafted in November 2001 and submitted as sworn evidence in the Chilean court case on Horman in 2003, Gonzalez stated that his June 1976 statements to U.S. journalists implicating the CIA in the death of Charles Horman was “an absolute falsehood” given under duress in an attempt to arrange safe exit from Chile for him and his family. Gonzelez wrote that he saw Horman in custody but that no American officer was present and “neither the State Department, nor the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, nor Mr. Kissinger had any participation whatsoever” in the murders. In his affidavit, Gonzalez recounted that Italian embassy officials had discovered that he had been involved in retrieving Horman’s remains in October 1973; they had given him a London Times article, written by William Shawcross, from which he took the description of Horman as “the man who knew too much.” According to Chile In Their Hearts, in his final ruling, Judge Zepeda ignored the Gonzalez recantation affidavit and convicted him as an accomplice in the death of Charles Horman.