Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Two Americans Murdered 38 Years AgoIn Chile-The Murderers Are Brought To Justice!


Capt. Ray Davis Indicted in Chile for alleged role in murder of Charles Horman, Frank Teruggi

Declassified U.S. Documents Used Extensively in Court Indictment

Archive Posts Documents cited in Indictment, including FBI Intelligence Reports Containing Teruggi's Address in Chile

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 366
Edited by Peter Kornbluh and Erin Maskell

Posted - November 30, 2011
For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh - 202/374-7281

The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and AccountabilityBy Peter Kornbluh
Los Angeles Times
Best Nonfiction Book of 2003

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Washington D.C., November 30, 2011 – Thirty-eight years after the military coup in Chile, a Chilean judge has formally indicted the former head of the U.S. Military Group, Captain Ray Davis, and a Chilean intelligence officer, Pedro Espinoza for the murders of two American citizens in September 1973. The judge, Jorge Zepeda, said he would ask the Chilean Supreme Court to authorize an extradition request for Davis as an "accessory" to the murders of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi.Both Horman and Teruggi were seized separately at their homes in Santiago by Chilean soldiers and subsequently executed while in detention. Their murders, and the seeming indifference of U.S. officials, were immortalized in the Oscar-award winning movie "Missing" which focused on the search by Horman's wife and father for him in the weeks following the U.S.-supported coup.
The indictment accused the U.S. MilGroup of passing intelligence to the Chilean military on the "subversive" activities of Teruggi that contributed to his arrest; it stated that Davis "was in a position" to stop the executions "given his coordination with Chilean agents" but did not do so.
In his indictment, Judge Zepeda cited a number of declassified U.S. government documents as the basic foundation for the case-although none of them tie Davis or Espinoza to the crimes. "These documents are providing the blocks for building a case in these famous killings," said Peter Kornbluh who directs the Chile Documentation Project at the Archive, "but they do not provide a smoking gun." To successfully advance court proceedings as well as a successful extradition request, according to Kornbluh, the judge will have to present concrete evidence of communications between U.S. and Chilean military officers regarding Horman and Teruggi prior to their detentions and their deaths.
The Archive today posted a number of the documents cited in the indictment, including key FBI memos that contained Frank Teruggi's Santiago address, as well as other records relevant to the Horman and Teruggi case. The documents derive from an indexed collection: Chile and the United States: U.S. Policy toward Democracy, Dictatorship, and Human Rights, 1970-1990. The collection, just published this week by the Archive and Proquest, contains over 180 documents on the Horman and Teruggi case.

Read the Documents:

Document 1
Department of State, SECRET Memorandum, "Charles Horman Case," August 25, 1976
This memo by three state department officers implies that the U.S. government could have prevented the murder of Charles Horman. The memo, written after a review of the files on the case, explains that there is "circumstantial evidence" to suggest "U.S. intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman's death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia." When this document was initially declassified pursuant to a FOIA lawsuit filed by the Horman family, this critical passage was blacked out. The document was released without redaction in 1999. It was not cited in Judge Zepeda's indictment, but appears to reflect the judicial argument he is pursuing.
Document 2
Department of State, SECRET, "Charles Horman Case: Gleanings,"(Undated but written in August 1976)
This detailed chronology, based on a review of files available to the State Department, contains key information on what the U.S. knew and did in the case of Charles Horman. It also evaluates the possible role of the U.S. in the murder. The document cites the admissions of a Chilean intelligence agent, Rafael Gonzalez, who told U.S. reporters the story of Horman being interrogated in General Augusto Lutz's office and then killed because "he knew too much." Gonzalez claimed there was an American in the room when the interrogation took place, but decades later he would recant that story. In January 2004, he was indicted by Judge Zepeda in the Horman case as an "accessory to murder" for his role in the interrogation, death and secret burial of Charles Horman.
Document 3
United States Embassy, Unclassified Notice, "Missing United States Citizen," October 9, 1973
This document cited in the indictment, states that the U.S. government has received a note from the Chilean Foreign Office dated October 3, 1973, recording that Charles Horman was detained at the National Stadium on September 20 for a curfew violation but had been released on September 21 for "lack of merit." The document includes a photograph of Horman, his date of birth, address in Chile, and fingerprint classification. Horman was actually detained at his home on September 17, 1973.
Document 4
Department of State, Memorandum (classification excised), "Film by Charles Horman," April 12, 1974
In this memo to Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman, State Department officer George Lister describes the film work of Charles Horman. A film that he apparently worked on before the coup was completed after the coup by friends titled "Chile: With Poems and Guns." (The document leaves the impression that Charles "made" the film, but clearly he did not work on it following the coup.) The film describes Chilean history, and the achievements of the Allende government, along with alleged atrocities of the coup and U.S. involvement. Lister goes so far as to imply that Horman's film making in Chile could have been what "led to his death."
Document 5
Chilean Armed Forces, Memorandum, "Antecedentes sobre Fallecimiento de 2 ciudadanos norteamericanos," Octobeer 30, 1973
Chief of Chilean Military Intelligence Service General Augusto Lutz reports on the death of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi. He asserts that Horman and Teruggi were political extremists attempting to discredit Chilean junta. While he acknowledges that they were both detained by the Chilean military, he maintains that they were later released and that the Chilean military was not involved in their deaths. The document is the only information known to have been provided by the Chilean military to the U.S. embassy after the disappearance of Horman and Teruggi.
Document 6
U.S. Military Group Chile, Memorandum (classification unknown), "Case of Charles Horman," January 14, 1975
Ray Davis forwards a list of documents on the interactions of the U.S. Military Group in Chile with Charles Horman to be provided to the General Accounting Office. The documents raise the issue of the role of embassy officials in the disappearance and death of Horman, and make "certain allegations and statements about members of the Navy Mission, in Valparaiso; comments about a ride given by COMUSMILGP, Captain Davis."
Document 7
Department of State, CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum, "Horman Case," April 20, 1987
This memorandum of conversation reports on an informant who has appeared at the Embassy to give testimony on the death of Charles Horman. According to this informant, Horman was seized by Chilean intelligence units and taken to the Escuela Militar for questioning. He was then transferred to the National Stadium, where they determined he was an extremist. He was forced to change clothes, shot three times, and his body was dumped on the street to appear he had died in a confrontation. The informant said that "the person at the stadium who made the decision on who was to die was Pedro Espinoza, of later DINA fame." The document is the first to tie Pedro Espinoza to the Horman case. He was involved in military intelligence and detainees at the time of the coup. However, the commander of the National Stadium at the time was another military officer named Jorge Espinosa Ulloa.
Document 8
United States Embassy Santiago, CONFIDENTIAL cable, '[Excised] Reports on GOC Involvement in Death of Charles Horman, Asks Embassy for Asylum and Aid,' April 28, 1987

In a report on the informant's information, the Embassy cables Washington with his account of Horman's death. Horman was picked up in a routine sweep, the informant suggests, and was found in possession of "extremist" materials. He was then taken the National Stadium where he was interrogated and later executed on the orders of Pedro Espinoza. Embassy officials note that his story "corresponds with what we know about the case and the [Chilean government] attempt to cover up their involvement," suggesting that the informant is probably telling the truth. In later cables, the Embassy begins to question the credibility of the informant who is never identified.
Document 9
FBI, SECRET Memorandum, [Frank Teruggi's Contact with Anti-War Activist], October 25, 1972
This FBI report cites information provided by "another U.S. government agency" on Frank Teruggi's contacts with an anti-war activist who resides in West Germany. The report also contains his address in Santiago. The document was generated by surveillance of a U.S. military intelligence unit in Munich on an American anti-war dissident who was in contact with Teruggi. The FBI subsequently decides to open a file on Teruggi. This series of FBI documents were cited by Judge Zepeda in his indictment which infers-but offers no proof-- that intelligence from them was shared with Chilean military intelligence in the days following the coup.
Document 10
FBI, SECRET Memorandum, "Frank Teruggi," October 25, 1972
This FBI memorandum requests investigation of Frank Teruggi and the Chicago Area Group for the Liberation of Americas of which he was a member nearly a year prior to his death following the Chilean coup.
Document 11
FBI, SECRET Memorandum, "[Excised] SM- Subversive," November 28, 1972

This FBI document again requests investigation on Teruggi based on his contact with a political activist in West Germany. The document mentions that Teruggi is living in Chile editing a newsletter "FIN" of Chilean information for the American left, and that he is closely affiliated with the Chicago Area Group for the Liberation of Americas.
Document 12
FBI, Memorandum (classification unknown), "Frank Teruggi," December 14, 1972
This FBI memorandum demonstrates ongoing efforts to gather information on Frank Teruggi in the year proceeding the Chilean coup. Here, the FBI reports on his attendance at a conference of returned Peace Corps volunteers and his membership in political organizations supporting socialism and national liberation movements in Latin America.
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Saturday, November 26, 2011

New Undersea Cable To Link Latin America To The Rest Of The World

New undersea cable to connect Africa with three continents
25th November 2011 
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A new Atlantic Ocean undersea fibre-optic cable project to connect Africa, South America, North America and Europe, has been launched.
Wasace Cable Company Worldwide will build and operate the new undersea cable, which was said to be the first trans-Atlantic system to deploy the next generation 100 G technology - ten times the capacity of previous systems.
The Wasace project, which comprised a total fibre length seven times the earth’s circumference, would enable access to a previously unavailable quantity of affordable Internet communication capacity. It would also connect the rapidly growing markets of Africa and Latin America with the commercial markets of North America and Europe, through the first-ever high-capacity cable to span the South Atlantic.
The new, diverse cable routes included Wasace North, connecting Europe to North America; Wasace South, connecting South America to Africa; Wasace America, connecting South America to North America; and Wasace Africa, connecting Nigeria, Angola and South Africa.
Private equity investment firm VIP Must would provide Wasace's financing and marketing and media strategy, as well as institutional support. Other investors included the African Development Bank and a number of Brazilian groups.
US-based international communication systems development group David Ross Group has been elected to manage the project development.
Wasace Cable Company Worldwide Holding, led by chairperson and CEO Ramón Gil-Roldán y Sansón, was formed to meet the rapidly evolving needs of developing markets in the Southern Hemisphere.
Edited by: Mariaan Webb

Friday, November 25, 2011

In Argentina Subsidy Cuts To Redress Government Spending

In Argentina, Subsidy Cuts To Redress Government Spending

In Argentina, Subsidy Cuts To Redress Government Spending
Workers on an energy tower in Mendoza, Argentina
Argentine officials have announced that the government will enact a series of subsidy cuts, slated to begin Dec. 1. The move, made in part to curtail the effects of heavy subsidization and government control of financial systems, is made possible by the political capital Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner gained in her electoral victory in October. The cuts are necessary if Argentina wants to redress its financial issues and trim spending in the future, but it may cost Fernandez her political capital.
Starting Dec. 1, the Argentine government will begin to cut subsidies to natural gas, electricity, water, mining, bank insurances, gambling institutions, airports and telecommunication services by anywhere from 24 to 37 percent. The Argentine government spent around $17 billion in 2010 — roughly 19 percent of the government’s total budget, or about 4 percent of gross domestic product — on subsidies for various sectors. The announced cuts are expected to save the government between $4.2 billion and $6.3 billion in 2012, according to high-level government sources quoted by newspaper La Nacion.
Prior to the Oct. 25 elections, the administration of President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner increased spending in several areas to help secure popular support for her re-election bid. But the high levels of government spending that have typified the last decade of Argentina’s populist politics have proved unsustainable, and, now that the elections are over, Fernandez has the political capital to redress these policies. Ultimately, the subsidy cuts were based on economic realities, but they will have political consequences — which Fernandez hopes will not come at the expense of the political support she currently enjoys — and will determine whether further fiscal cutbacks will be possible, or desirable, in the future.

Phased Cuts

Originally announced Nov. 2 by Argentine Minister of Economy and Vice President-elect Amado Boudou and Minister of Planning Julio de Vido, the subsidy cuts will occur in multiple phases.
The first cut will apply to natural gas, water and electricity and will begin Dec. 1. Subsidies that cover about 40 percent of the price for these services for businesses will be removed. On Jan. 1, the same subsidy cuts will take effect for households in the wealthier neighborhoods of Buenos Aires, including Barrio Parque and Puerto Madero. The government will then increase prices to the entire city and, eventually, to the rest of the country. While the wealthy neighborhoods will have no choice but to pay higher prices for these utilities, the government will continue subsidizing the bills for poor households that apply for an exception. This phase of subsidy cuts will save the government roughly $832 million.
Transportation subsidies in Buenos Aires are scheduled for removal in March 2012. Prices currently are fixed at 1.10 pesos ($0.26) for subway fare and range from 1.20-1.75 pesos for bus fare; these fares are expected to increase by anywhere from 100 to 300 percent. Buenos Aires’ poor may apply for an exception, which will grant prepaid Universal Electronic Ticket System cards. The details of this phase of subsidies have not been finalized, however, particularly with regard to the subway system, which the central government wants to turn over to city management.
Notably, the decision to enact substantial cuts on consumers is a significant shift in Argentine policy. The decision to remove subsidies is a result of longstanding policies that entailed spending increases based on internal borrowing and high tax rates on industrial and agricultural exports, policies that are proving unsustainable.

A Matter of Politics

In the lead up to the Oct. 25 general elections, Fernandez’s government ramped up its spending in several areas, including pension fund payouts and child welfare payouts. It also allowed greater access to subsidized food supplies. This, as well as an estimated growth rate of 8 percent for 2011, instilled in voters a sense of prosperity that generated enough support for Fernandez to win the first round of elections with ease.
Now that elections are over, the reality in Argentina is that market distortions caused by heavy subsidization and government control of financial systems are beginning to take a serious toll. While Argentina has seen an average growth of 8 percent over the past decade, government spending has grown to five times its 2004 amount. The government has expanded the money in circulation by 30 to 40 percent, and inflation is somewhere between 25 and 30 percent. Both the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the dollar and prices on key consumer goods, including water, natural gas and electricity, have stayed largely stable (though the peso has been gradually devaluing over the past year from 3.97 to 4.26 pesos to the dollar). Strict price controls have harmed productive capacity in these goods, most notably in energy, by limiting profits and discouraging investment. This resulted in Argentina’s becoming a net importer of energy across the board in 2011 after ceasing to be a net natural gas exporter in 2007.
Uncertainty about these policies within the Argentine public, coupled with growing concerns from Argentine economists of a serious slowdown in 2012, has led many Argentines to abandon the peso and invest in the dollar. Reaching an estimated rate of $3 billion per month, the flight to the dollar, as well as fears of a currency crisis, pushed the Fernandez administration to enact numerous exchange controls and to regulate more strictly the repatriation of earnings back to Argentina by mineral extraction companies. In response to the capital flight, the Argentine central bank spent an estimated $2.7 billion in reserves in August and September to control the value of the peso. The fear of political backlash forced the government to wait until after the elections to enact capital controls to help stem the outflow of central bank funds.
Indeed, these decisions ultimately come down to politics. After her decisive electoral win in October, Fernandez has enough political capital to make what would otherwise be risky moves. With the phased elimination of subsidies, the government hopes to limit the impact of higher prices on the lower and middle classes. Notably, she has managed to secure the support of Argentina’s most powerful union, the General Confederation of Labor (CTG). The CTG will support the Fernandez administration as long as the subsidy cuts do not affect its members’ income stability. The Fernandez government will take this into account as it tries to mitigate the impact of these subsidy rollbacks on laborers. Ultimately, there is no real guarantee that Fernandez can keep this level of political support, particularly as the policies begin to take effect.
Inflation in Argentina is already very high, and removing subsidies will lead to an immediate increase in prices. But it is unclear whether the government will allow prices to become more flexible across the board to encourage investment. Without a liberalization of prices, Argentina’s strict price policies will continue to undermine Argentina’s productive capacity. Paradoxically, liberalizing prices will compromise the support of labor organizations like the CTG. In any case, the success or failure of these subsidy cuts will play a key role in determining whether further liberalization will be possible in the future.

Peru's left scorns Humala for backing Newmont mine

Peru's left scorns Humala for backing Newmont mine:

'via Blog this'

Thursday, November 24, 2011

South Americans Fearful Of A Chinese Downturm

S America eyes Beijing prospects warily

The Brazilian fund manager rolled his eyes. He was tired of his country’s triumphalism. More than anything, he was jaded by the flashy consumerism of new Brazilian wealth. At a recent wedding outside São Paulo, he had been one of the few guests to arrive by car; the rest had flown in by helicopter.
“But it’s only about commodities,” he said. “Without China, none of this would have been.”




The fund manager was only slightly exaggerating. Much of South America’s prosperity over the past decade – and its sense of having arrived, including its significant contribution to global economic growth – has been due to the China-inspired commodity price boom.
In Bogotá, Brasília and Buenos Aires, the eurozone debt crisis is a sideshow by comparison. Total European bank loans are equivalent to about 15 per cent of Latin American gross domestic product – a significant but manageable level. Europe meanwhile accounts for just 11 per cent of the region’s trade. If Brazilian officials occasionally berate the policymaking of their eurozone peers, it may be because they can afford to.
No, China rather than the eurozone is the show that counts. Indeed, the effect of Chinese growth on South America’s economies is as large, or larger, than the rest of the world’s combined, calculates JPMorgan, the investment bank. That is why the possibility the Chinese economy might slow, rather than that eurozone might collapse, is the hotter topic in South America.
The effects are potentially severe. If China slows, the prices of the commodities that account for half of Latin American exports would fall. Current account deficits would widen. Fiscal policy would also have to tighten: commodity-related revenues account for one quarter of Chile’s budget and a quarter of Mexico’s.
China’s substantial financial flows into the region could also crumple. Chinese foreign direct investment in South America is already worth more than that into the US and Europe combined. State-owned Chinese companies have also made multibillion-dollar loans to countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador that have trouble accessing financial markets.
A reversal of that largesse would halt some of South America’s more free-spending extravagances of recent years – such as Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez’s pan-American projection of his “Bolivarian Revolution”. More generally, foreign investment would no longer flow so easily into natural resources. Instead, it would depend on structural reforms, and countries with sound institutions and governance.
A China-prompted slowdown would therefore separate the “wheat” of South America’s more dynamic reformers (usually taken to mean Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru) from the “chaff” of its heterodox laggards (often taken to be Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador.) It would also reveal how much of South America’s recent performance has been due to its own efforts and therefore might endure.
Some of the changes of the past 20 years have been structural, sui generis, and therefore probably permanent. The quelling of guerrilla movements in Colombia and Peru has helped spur their new economic exuberance. Liberal democracy and macroeconomic stability are also firmly established through much of the region: low inflation is no longer the sole concern of bloodless technocrats but a vote-winner that politicians respond to. Inequality has fallen, encouragingly.
Also likely to endure is the productivity growth in South America’s natural resources sector, especially agriculture. Here, since 1995, South American productivity growth has outpaced the rest of the world’s.
Sadly, that performance only highlights poor productivity elsewhere. Indeed, take the World Bank’s annual “Doing Business” rankings as a barometer, and Latin America’s seven biggest economies come in, on average, 84th out of 183 countries – an improvement of just one place in five years.
Of course, China may not slow to the extent that tests the durability of these reforms, or may force more. Even if Chinese economic growth decelerates next year to 7 per cent, that is still equivalent to an extra $490bn of output. To deliver the same, the European Union would have to grow by almost 4 per cent – eight times more than the EU forecasts it will.
“We’re much more observant about what’s going on in Asia than in Europe, though clearly we live in an interconnected world,” says Frank de Lima, Panama’s finance minister.
The jaded Brazilian fund manager would agree.
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Brasilians Are Causing A Property Boom In Miami Condos

November 22, 2011 6:48 pm

Brazilians lead Florida real estate boom

miami beach
Cash-rich Brazilians are leading a revival in South Florida real estate – one of the markets hit hardest by theUS property crash – underlining the diverging fortunes of the two largest economies in the Americas.
Brazilians, along with other Latin Americans and Canadians, have driven up prices of condominiums in the popular coastal neighbourhoods of Miami by an estimated 50 per cent from their lows in 2009, according to Condo Vultures, a Miami real estate consultancy.




One welcome feature of the boom is that Brazilians are paying in cash for 85 per cent of their properties, according to the US National Association of Realtors. Developers have responded by unveiling projects in Miami for the first time since the crisis.
“Right now everything’s all about Brazil,” says Peter Zalewski, principal of Condo Vultures, which tracks supply. “Brazilians are rock stars in Miami right now.”
Miami and other parts of Florida have for years attracted investment from abroad – from Latin America in particular. Along with the property markets of Texas, Arizona, New York and California, the Florida real estate market has tended to benefit from foreign investment during US downturns.
But the prolonged US property slowdown has occurred at a time when the Brazilian economy has shown a sharp improvement. Brazil’s currency, the real, although not at its high, remains sharply stronger against the dollar compared with the end of 2008.
The crash three years ago in the Miami real estate market, when condominium prices fell to about one-third of their peak levels, coincided with the start of a boom in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Property prices in those cities have more than doubled, leading Brazilians to look elsewhere for cheaper investments.
“We have seen a tremendous increase in Brazilians coming to Miami or Florida and buying property here,” said Frank Robleto, president of the Florida International Bankers Association.
He said his institution, BAC Florida Bank, had doubled its volume of real estate lending to Brazilians.
The National Association of Realtors calculated that Brazilians accounted for 8 per cent of foreign buyers in Florida as of August, up from 3 per cent a year earlier and the most of any nationality except Canadians.

Lure of the bright lights

50% Rise in property prices in popular neighbourhoods of Miami from 2009 lows
85% Percentage of Brazilians buying in Miami who pay with cash
8% Percentage of foreign buyers accounted for by Brazilians
$200,000 Median price of properties bought by Brazilians, higher than other foreign buyers
15% Fall in value of Brazil’s currency since August
But while Canadians were bottom-fishing for rental properties, Brazilians were buying luxury real estate, paying a median price of over $200,000, more than any other foreign buyers.
One São Paulo couple, Roberto and Adriana, who declined to give their surnames, said they bought in Orlando, Florida with a view to eventually retiring there.
“We bought because the prices had fallen so much,” they said. The weather is similar to that of São Paulo, security is better, car prices are more affordable and culturally Florida is a popular option because of large numbers of Brazilians, Latinos and other foreign citizens living or visiting there.
Condo Vulture’s Mr Zalewski said the oversupply in Miami was disappearing fast, and he predicted that in a year there would be no unsold units left from the last boom in seven popular coastal neighbourhoods, which include Greater Downtown Miami, South Beach, Sunny Isles Beach and others.
Average prices of these condos have risen from a trough of $200 per square foot to $300 per square foot – still short of the 2008 peak of $600 sq ft. Developers are beginning to respond, with plans for 17 new towers, including some by Latin American builders. 
Experts warn, however, that demand could disappear if the Brazilian real takes a tumble or Latin American economies begin to weaken.
After strengthening nearly 40 per cent against the dollar since 2009, the real has slipped about 15 per cent since August.
“If the real goes down another 15 per cent I think then the Brazilians might be incentivised to sell their properties because in [Brazilian local currency] terms there will be a huge incentive to make a large return in a short period,” said William Hardin, professor of finance and real estate at Florida International University.

Amglo American Corporation Will Have A Long Court Battle In Chile

Court will decide if Codelco, Anglo deadlocked – Chile President
By: Reuters
24th November 2011
Updated 1 hour 54 minutes ago
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SANTIAGO – Chile's courts will decide an option contract spat between state copper giant Codelco and global miner Anglo American if they fail to negotiate a deal, PresidentSebastian Pinera said on Wednesday.
Anglo shocked world No. 1 copper producer Codelco and investors this month when it sold a 24.5% stake in its southern Chilean copper properties to Japan's Mitsubishi Corp for $5.4-billion, undermining an option Codelco had to buy a 49% stake.
Codelco has appealed against the sale to Chilean courts, and the two sides are gearing up for a likely protracted legal battle.
"The government is aware of and supports the moves Codelco is making to defend its legitimate interests," Pinera said in a speech at an annual mining sector dinner. "The solution can come by one of two paths."
"If they do not reach an agreement, given Chile is a land with a rule of law, it will be the Chilean courts which must resolve these differences," he added.
Codelco's CEO Diego Hernandez last week warned that Anglo American had mortgaged its future in Chile with its preemptive stake sale, but both sides have since made overtures towards negotiating.
"We are not in a hurry," Hernandez said on Wednesday. "You never announce negotiations through the press unless you want them to fail."
Negotiation could be advantageous for both mining giants, legal experts say, though increasingly difficult as the firms have hardened their stances over the long-standing option.
Codelco insists it still has the right to exercise an option to buy a 49% stake in Anglo American Sur, which includes the flagship expansion project Los Bronces, El Soldado mine, the Chagres smelter and Los Sulfatos and San Enrique Monolito exploration projects.
Codelco said in October it had secured a $6.75-billion bridging loan from Japan's Mitsui & Co to allow it to exercise its option.
Edited by: Reuters

Here is what is at stake:

Anglo to more than double output from Chile copper mine
23rd November 2011 
Updated 1 hour 58 minutes ago
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JOHANNESBURG ( − Global mining giant Anglo American expects the output from its expanded Los Bronces copper mine to more than double in the first three years of full production from its existing output of 221 000 t/y.
Announcing the delivery of first copper production from the Los Bronces expansion project, CEO Cynthia Carroll said in a statement that the opencut copper and molybdenum mine would be the world’s fifth-largest copper mine at peak production levels.
Los Bronces has reserves and resources that support a mine life of over 30 years and with further expansion potential.
The miner expects to produce 233 400 t of copper this year, up from 2010’s 221 000 t.
John Mackenzie, CEO of Anglo American’s copper business, said there was a 12-month ramp-up period ahead until full production was reached.
During this time, he explained, the company would increase processing plant throughput from 61 000 t/d to 148 000 t/d of ore.
"We have delivered this major expansion of Los Bronces on schedule owing to the hard work and dedication of 16 000 people who have been working on the project over the last three years,” Mackenzie said.

Further, Carroll said apart from the existing copper operations in Chile, Peru and the US, exploration activities were under way in several other geographies.
Earlier this month, Anglo American sold a 24.5% stake in its subsidiary Anglo American Sur, which includes the flagship Los Bronces mine, to Japan’s Mitsubishi Corporation for $5.39-billion.
State-owned copper miner Codelco is gearing up for a legal battle as it planned to exercise its option to buy a 49% interest in the Sur mining complex in January 2012.
Anglo maintained that the transaction was fully compliant with the option agreement between Anglo American, certain of its affiliates and Codel