Panama's Canal Treat Declassified

The Panama Canal Treaty Declassified Panama Canal Treaty in the Pan American Union Building in Washington, September 7, 1977 Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos shake hands after signing the Panama Canal Treaty in the Pan American Union Building, Washington, September 7, 1977 Formerly Top Secret Records Shed Light on True History of Canal Negotiations Canal Negotiations Were Bipartisan Effort, Spanned Four Presidencies Kissinger Signed “Declaration of Principles” for New Treaty; Oversaw Diplomatic Advances on Ceding Control of Canal Zone in mid 1970s Kissinger Warning: “This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism.” Published: Feb 3, 2025 Briefing Book # 884 Edited by Peter Kornbluh For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or peter.kornbluh@gmail.com Regions Mexico and Central America Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Robert Anderson Robert M. Anderson served as special ambassador to Panama to negotiate a Canal Zone treaty from April 1964 to June 1973 Ellsworth Bunker Ellsworth Bunker, the former US Ambassador to Vietnam, served as a lead negotiator on the Panama Canal accords during the Ford and Carter administrations. Sol Linowitz In 1977, Jimmy Carter appointed Sol Linowitz to work with Ambassador Bunker to finalize the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. Washington, D.C., February 3, 2025 - Continued U.S. control of the Panama Canal “looks like pure colonialism,” Henry Kissinger advised President Gerald Ford during a National Security Council meeting in May 1975, 50 years ago. “Internationally, failure to conclude a treaty is going to get us into a cause celebre, with harassment, demonstrations, bombing of embassies,” Kissinger warned, according to a declassified memorandum of conversation posted today by the National Security Archive. The lead negotiator for a new Canal Zone treaty, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, reinforced that point: “I have no doubt that failure in these negotiations would entail unacceptable risks,” Bunker told the president, “including negative effects beyond Panama which would disrupt our relations with Latin America, lead to world condemnation, and hamper the operation of the waterway.” According to Kissinger, “This is no issue to face the world on.” The NSC ”memcon” is featured in a new Electronic Briefing Book published today by the National Security Archive as confrontation over the Panama Canal escalates into a central U.S. foreign policy and international issue. On February 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio held meetings in Panama to press the Trump administration’s claims that the presence of a Chinese company in the Canal Zone violates the neutrality clause of the 1977 Treaty. “Secretary Rubio made clear that this status quo is unacceptable and that absent immediate changes, it would require the United States to take measures necessary to protect its rights under the treaty,” the State Department said in a threatening summary of the meeting. During his inaugural address, President Trump said, “We didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back”—an ominous statement that prompted Panama to file a complaint to the United Nations that the U.S. is in violation of the UN Charter prohibiting “the threat or use of force” against the territorial integrity of member nations. But during Secretary Rubio’s visit to Panama, Trump reiterated that threat: “We’re going to take it back, or something very powerful is going to happen.” CIA memorandum The documents posted today include CIA reports, NSC briefing papers, White House meeting minutes, telephone transcripts and audio tapes dating back to the Kennedy era. Although the current Canal accords were signed by President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos in September 1977, negotiations for a new treaty ceding sovereignty of the Canal Zone back to Panama spanned a period of 13 years—from 1964 to 1977—during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. Almost a half century after complex and protracted bilateral diplomatic efforts finally removed the Canal Zone as a contentious and internationally repudiated symbol of U.S. hegemony in the Latin America region, these fascinating archival records provide a contextual, factual overview to understand and appreciate the historical foundations of the foreign policy crisis that is escalating today over Panama. Memorandum for the president Historical Takeaways The various phases of bilateral talks evolved during different eras and with a variety of approaches on both the U.S. and Panamanian sides. But as a collection, the documents provide several key takeaways that can inform the increasingly misleading and aggressive political discourse over Panama. Among them: **The Canal Treaty negotiations were bipartisan: Diplomatic negotiations to withdraw U.S. control of the Canal Zone and recognize Panama’s sovereignty over the waterway were conducted under two Democratic administrations—Johnson and Carter—and two Republican administrations—Nixon and Ford. Although the Carter administration receives due historical credit in the media for negotiating and signing the current Panama Canal accords, that historic agreement evolved from talks initiated under the Johnson Administration in early 1964, after anti-American protests in the Zone and the U.S. response cost the lives of 22 Panamanian students and four U.S. soldiers and left hundreds injured. In April 1964, Johnson appointed the first “special ambassador,” Robert M. Anderson, to negotiate a new treaty to replace the imperial 1903 agreement giving the U.S. carte blanche political, military, economic and administrative control over the Canal territories. Over the course of three years, Anderson negotiated a package of three treaties governing the administration and defense of the Canal Zone; for political reasons, the accords were never signed or ratified in either Washington or Panama. But Anderson continued as chief negotiator during the Nixon administration until June 1973. Kissinger signed a "Declaration of Principles" On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a "Declaration of Principles" with Panama's foreign minister, Juan Antonio Tack, creating a framework for a new Canal Zone treaty. During Henry Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary of State, negotiations between the U.S. and Panama gained significant momentum. In February 1974, Kissinger traveled to Panama for a signing ceremony of a “Declaration of Principles” that established an eight-point framework for negotiations to cede control of the Zone to Panama. Given the contentious domestic politics surrounding U.S. control of the Zone, the Ford administration planned to finalize and sign an accord after the November 1976 presidential election on the assumption that Ford would win. Instead, the new Carter administration quickly affirmed that it would finalize negotiations to replace the 1903 treaty with a two-treaty package—one on administrative control and one on the future defense of the canal. President Carter also committed himself to a major public relations campaign to educate U.S. public opinion on how the new treaties would advance U.S. interests and lobby swing senators from both parties to vote to ratify the two-treaty agreement. **U.S. policy motivations were to secure sustainable, peaceful access to, and defense of, the waterway: After President Carter died at age 100, President Trump accused him of “giving [the Canal] away.” But the documents show that Carter, like his three predecessors, sought to advance U.S. strategic and economic interests in redefining an enduring and unstable symbol of an imperious U.S. presence in Central America into a zone of mutual and harmonious collaboration. As early as 1962, as a declassified memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Panama’s President Roberto Chiari reveals, Panamanian officials warned the U.S. of “the intensity of the feeling of the present Panamanian generation with regard to the 1903 treaty” and demanded new accords that respected Panama’s sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Those warnings became reality when violent, deadly riots broke out in early 1964, convincing President Johnson that a new treaty was needed to stabilize the geostrategic and economically imperative waterway. In three different national security directives, President Nixon instructed his negotiators to continue treaty negotiations, at one point calling for a new draft treaty by the end of 1971. When President Ford faced hostile domestic opposition to a treaty and division among his own national security team, top aides led by Henry Kissinger advised him on the regional and international repercussions of terminating the Canal Zone negotiations: “There will be an uproar in Panama, with riots and harassment. It will become an armed camp and will spread rapidly to the Western Hemisphere. It will become an OAS issue around which they will all unite. Then it will spread into the international organizations,” Kissinger told him. Ford was convinced. “It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty,” Ford told his advisors during a July 1975 NSC meeting. “We don’t want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either. We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.” **Domestic politics were a critical consideration and obstacle: Changing public opinion about the Canal and securing a two thirds vote in the Senate to ratify a new treaty with Panama were ever-present considerations for U.S. presidents. President Kennedy flat-out rejected the entreaties of Panama’s president, Roberto Chiari, to negotiate a new treaty on political grounds because, according to the summary of their conversation, “he could not see the end of the road in sitting down to rewrite the treaty nor how he could demonstrate to two-thirds of the Senate that such a course had advanced the United States interest.” President Ford was advised that “a new treaty could constitute a striking foreign-policy achievement for the Administration. It will not be easy to move a treaty through the Senate. But the real problem derives more from ignorance than antipathy.” With Ronald Reagan challenging Ford in the 1976 primaries with the mantra “When it comes to the Panama Canal, we built it; we paid for it; and…we are going to keep it,” discussions on treaty negotiations during the Ford administration repeatedly addressed how to sustain the pretense of talks while not actually finalizing an agreement until after the November 1976 election. The very first policy review meeting on Panama during the Carter administration determined that the President should start the campaign to inform public opinion by including Panama in his fireside chats, and that he should authorize “a National Citizens Committee on the Panama Canal…to stimulate a national educational campaign.” The Carter administration did mount a major and ultimately successful public relations effort to win hearts and minds (and votes) that included recruiting Hollywood star John Wayne to specifically rebut Ronald Reagan for spreading falsehoods and “misinforming people” about the treaty proposals. Panama Canal **Diplomacy Produces Positive Results: In his first conversation with the President of Panama after the January 9, 1964, riots in the Canal Zone, during which U.S. security personnel shot and killed some 20 Panamanians, President Johnson portrayed himself as “cold and hard and tough as hell.” But by April, when he appointed a special ambassador to engage in treaty negotiations, Johnson had adopted a proactive diplomatic attitude which helped contain the dangerous and explosive threat of unrest targeting the Canal Zone for the duration of his presidency. Mitigating unrest through the promise of diplomatic negotiations for a new treaty was also a strategy of the Nixon/Ford administrations. Carter had far more empathy for Panama’s historical grievances than his predecessors—“It is obvious we cheated the Panamanians out of their canal,” he wrote in his diary—but according to Kai Bird’s biography, The Outlier, Carter was influenced by intelligence briefings of how vulnerable the Zone was to political unrest and that 100,000 U.S. troops would be needed to defend it. Diplomacy was far more promising than the use of force. Carter’s special ambassadors, Sol Linowitz and Ellsworth Bunker, quickly negotiated a two-treaty solution—one on jurisdiction and administration and the other securing the U.S. rights to defend the Canal against threats to its neutrality. At a White House meeting with General Torrijos one day before the September 7, 1977, signing ceremony, according to the summary posted today, Carter told him that “the treaty opened the way to a new era of mutual respect, equality and friendship between our peoples.” For almost half a century since the signing of those historic accords, that “new era” has more or less endured; notwithstanding the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 to seize General Manuel Noriega, the Canal Zone has functioned to the advantage of the U.S., Panama and the international community—until now. “As the U.S. threatens a return to an era of gunboat diplomacy in Panama,” notes Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh, “the historical record of the Canal Zone negotiations reflects the pragmatic promise of actual diplomacy to advance U.S. interests.” The Documents KENNEDY AND JOHNSON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 1 Document 1 White House, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting Between John F. Kennedy and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, “United States-Panamanian Relations,” Confidential, June 12, 1962 Jun 12, 1962 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Document 405 During a state visit to Washington, Panamanian President Roberto Chiari meets with President Kennedy at the White House regarding the status of the Canal Zone. Chiari presents the case for renegotiating the 1903 Canal treaty—arguments he has previously shared with Kennedy in a September 8, 1961, letter—suggesting that the original agreement has led to “misunderstandings” for many years. Chiari “asked in the name of Panama that the treaties be revised and not considered sacred just because they were signed 58 years ago.” According to this summary of their White House meeting, Kennedy’s response is diplomatic but negative. Kennedy “could not see the end of the road in sitting down to rewrite the treaty nor how he could demonstrate to two-thirds of the Senate that such a course had advanced the United States interest. He suggested that since sovereignty is the principal issue and we have recognized Panama as sovereign that we attempt within this framework to work out operation of the Canal along with mitigation of frictions.” The meeting summary notes that Chiari became “petulant and frustrated” with the conversation; his foreign minister, Galileo Solis, took over the presentation of Panama’s position. Solis “repeated that President Chiari cannot go back to Panama without agreement to discuss in a negotiation committee all the claims Panama may present; otherwise he will face a political crisis. President Kennedy replied that he was not in a position to give any commitment that the United States could at this time agree to, sign or ratify a new treaty.” Presciently, the former foreign minister, Octavio Fabrega reminded U.S. officials of “the intensity of the feeling of the present Panamanian generation with regard to the 1903 treaty.” 2 Document 2 CIA, Central Intelligence Bulletin, Daily Brief, “Panama,” Top Secret, January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source CIA Crest database The CIA Daily Brief reports on January 9th riots that have led to death and destruction in the Canal Zone. The report notes that the violence broke out over “the issue of flying the Panamanian flag in the Zone…with the Panamanians insisting on this dual display.” The anti-American sentiment generated by the riots and the shooting of Panamanians by U.S. Canal Zone guards, according to the CIA assessment, “is likely to be prolonged.” The riots, deaths and injuries of dozens of Panamanians mark a turning point in the history of U.S. control of the Canal Zone. President Roberto Chiari responds by cutting diplomatic relations with Washington and demanding negotiations for a new Canal treaty as a quid pro quo for restoration of bilateral ties. 3 Document 3 CIA, Memorandum for the Record, “White House Meeting on Panama, 10 January 1964,” Secret, January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Top Johnson administration officials convene to address the first foreign policy crisis of Johnson’s presidency. CIA Director John McCone provides an initial briefing on the violent riots and the prospect of their continuation. Officials agree on a series of crisis management steps, including a call from Johnson to the president of Panama, Roberto Chiari, and the immediate launch of a fact-finding mission to Panama led by Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Thomas Mann. 4 Document 4 White House, Tapes, [President Johnson Telephone Conversation with Senator Richard Russell on U.S. Response to Violent Riots in the Canal Zone, January 6, 1964], Recorded on January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source The Miller Center at the University of Virginia On January 9, 1964, violent riots in the Canal Zone and the heavy-handed U.S. response left four U.S. personnel and 20 Panamanians dead and more than 200 injured and led to Panama breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. The next day, President Johnson calls Senator Richard Russell to brief him on a phone conversation he has just had with President Chiari of Panama. Chiari told Johnson about the June 1962 meeting with Kennedy, complaining that “not a thing has been done” since then to address Panama’s demands for a new treaty. Johnson reports to Russell that he shut down Chiari’s efforts to press for treaty negotiations. “I told him that we couldn’t get into that,” Johnson states. “I was cold and hard and tough as hell.” Johnson appears to commend the toughness of the U.S. military commander who “had to order his people to start shooting,” killing 20 Panamanians. “I am not trying to unjustify it or justify it,” the President tells Russell. “I am just saying, it’s a hot [situation]—hot as a firecracker.” Audio file doc 5 Document 5 White House, Tapes, Conversation between President Johnson and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, April 3, 1964 Apr 3, 1964 Source The Miller Center at the University of Virginia Between January and April, President Johnson rethinks his “cold and hard” position and turns to diplomacy to address the Panama Canal crisis situation. On April 3, he places a call to Panamanian President Roberto Chiari to mark the restoration of diplomatic ties, and to inform him of the appointment of a “special ambassador,” Robert M. Anderson, to begin negotiations with Panama on the conflict over the Canal Zone. Chiari is recorded telling Johnson that it is time for “a complete revision of the treaty,” which has become “the source of dissatisfaction” for the Panamanian people. In the seven-and-a-half-minute telephone call, Johnson makes It clear that the U.S. is willing to negotiate but with “no pre-conditions.” Over the next three years, Ambassador Anderson negotiates a “package” of three treaties. But the treaty ratification process is aborted when the U.S. Congress rejects the accord and Panamanian President Marco Robles fails to sign the accord amidst political turmoil before the 1968 elections. In October 1968, Robles' successor, Anulfo Arias, is overthrown in a military coup that eventually brings a National Guard officer, Omar Torrijos, to power. Anderson continues as the special U.S. negotiator to Panama until June of 1973. Audio file 6 Document 6 State Department, Information Memorandum, “Panama Canal Treaties,” Confidential, June 27, 1967 Jun 27, 1967 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 439 One day after President Johnson and Panamanian President Marco Robles announce agreement on three new treaties—the Lock Canal Treaty, the Sea Level Treaty, and the Defense Treaty—this memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarizes the provisions in the new accords. The treaties replace the 1903 original agreement, establish a “Joint Administration of the Panama Canal” to operate the Panama Canal and administer the “Canal Area,” and grant the U.S. rights to construct a new sea-level canal within the next 20 years. Under the Defense Treaty, “the United States retains certain defense areas in which it may maintain its Armed Forces” and where it can act unilaterally to defend those areas. A breakthrough at the time, this package agreement was never ratified by the U.S. Congress; in Panama, it was overtaken by a military coup in 1968, which brought Omar Torrijos to power. NIXON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 7 Document 7 NSC, “National Security Study Memorandum 86,” Secret, January 2, 1970 Jan 2, 1970 Source Richard Nixon Presidential Library National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger requests an interagency study on prospects for negotiating a new Panama Canal treaty. Three issues are to be addressed: 1) Identifying U.S. interests in a new treaty, along with timing and options “to achieve those objectives;” 2) An evaluation of the treaties prepared in 1967, during the Johnson administration, and what changes should be made to them; and 3) evaluation of U.S. policy towards the government of General Omar Torrijos and the internal situation in Panama as it would relate to advancing a new accord on the Canal Zone. 8 Document 8 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 64, “Panama Canal,” Secret, June 5, 1970 Jun 5, 1970 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In response to an interagency study on prospects for a Panama Canal treaty, President Nixon issues National Security Decision Memorandum 64, ordering his national security team to begin “exploratory and preliminary talks” with Panamanian leaders. Nixon cites several “nonnegotiable” issues: effective U.S. control of canal operations; effective U.S. control of canal defense; and “continuation of these controls for an extended period of time preferably open-ended.” Ensuing meetings with Panamanian officials result in extensive negotiations on those very issues, which eventually become the core of the new treaty. 9 Document 9 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 115, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret/Exdis, June 24, 1971 Jun 24, 1971 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In this national security directive, President Nixon authorizes his emissary, Special Ambassador Robert Anderson, “to undertake formal negotiations with Panama with a view to obtaining agreement on the text of a draft treaty this year.” Nixon’s instructions also provide more latitude to Anderson to negotiate a shorter time period for phasing out U.S. jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, a demand Panama has made. 10 Document 10 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 131, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret/Exdis, September 13, 1971 Sep 13, 1971 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In a third national security directive on Panama, President Nixon authorizes Special Ambassador Robert Anderson to negotiate “the possibility of a termination formula” for the treaty, “provided that the duration negotiated is a long one and that other provisions of the treaty package are satisfactory to the U.S.” Nixon prefers an open-ended treaty but is willing to agree to a 50-year duration “with provision for an additional 30-50 years if Canal capacity is expanded.” Nixon also wants a joint guarantee that “the Canal will be open to all world shipping without discrimination at reasonable tolls and that Panama would take no action that would hamper the efficient operation of the waterway.” 11 Document 11 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum, “Panama: 1973—Year of the Treaty?” Secret, November 28, 1972 Nov 28, 1972 Source CIA.gov website The CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence produced a comprehensive 13-page assessment that reviewed the history of negotiations on the Canal and provided substantive insight into the negotiating approach of General Omar Torrijos. “Torrijos’ efforts to demonstrate to Washington that he could be tough have always been balanced by signals that he was really quite reasonable,” the CIA analysis concluded. “If Torrijos' basic objectives are met, if he can get fairly complete jurisdiction over the Zone in a relatively short period of time, and if he can significantly shorten the duration period that was embodied in the 1967 drafts, then a treaty agreement may be possible in 1973.” 12 Document 12 State Department, Declaration of Principles [signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Tack] February 7, 1974 Feb 7, 1974 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger met in Panama with Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack and, in a major ceremony, signed a framework for Canal negotiations known as the “Declaration of Principles.” The two countries agreed that the original 1903 Treaty, which the U.S. had essentially imposed on the Panamanian people, would be replaced by a new interoceanic canal treaty; the concept of “perpetuity” of U.S. control over the Canal Zone would be eliminated, and U.S. jurisdiction would come to an end. The territory of the Canal Zone would return to Panamanian sovereignty, and Panama would have “a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of the canal in its territory,” the joint agreement stated. “The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the protection and defense of the canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new treaty,” according to a key principle. Both countries would also participate in the expansion of the canal should such development be needed in the future. The “principles” framework becomes the foundation for a renewed three-year effort during the Ford and Carter administrations to negotiate a new Panama Canal treaty. FORD AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 13 Document 13 Department of State, “Issue Paper for the President: Panama Negotiation, ‘Roadmap,’ Secret, January 11, 1975 (with cover memorandum to Brent Scowcroft) Jan 11, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The State Department sends the White House a “roadmap” on the status of Canal treaty negotiations, identifying decisions to be made and actions to be taken. “Now there has been a negotiating breakthrough: a new treaty is in sight,” according to the secret memorandum. But there are significant political obstacles to overcome. “A new treaty could constitute a striking foreign-policy achievement for the Administration,” the memo advises. “It will not be easy to move a treaty through the Senate. But the real problem derives more from ignorance than antipathy.” 14 Document 14 Department of State, action memorandum, “Panama Canal Negotiations,” Secret, February 6, 1975 (with cover memo and attachments) Feb 6, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The lead U.S. negotiator, Ellsworth Bunker, sends Kissinger material for President Ford, including a public relations plan to educate the Congress and influence opinion polls on the treaty. The memo to the President provides a comprehensive update on the status of negotiations that “have progressed to a critical point at which certain tradeoffs are necessary to reach an agreement.” Ambassador Bunker seeks a “certain flexibility” in his presidential instructions in order to finalize the treaty. If the U.S. does not move forward, the memo warns, “serious confrontation, possibly involving violence against the Canal Zone, would ensue, plus a consequent deterioration of our relations in Latin America and mounting world censure.” 15 Document 15 White House, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, “Panama Canal Negotiations,’ Top Secret, May 15, 1975 May 15, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Gerald Ford convenes an NSC meeting to discuss negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty that would eventually cede control of the Canal Zone back to the Panamanians. The meeting not only covers key areas such as the duration of the treaty and U.S. defense rights to protect it, but also the conflicting domestic and international political pressures on Washington that, as Secretary of State Kissinger makes clear, necessitate the negotiations to conclude after the 1976 presidential election. The lack of support in the United States for returning the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty is also a subject of the NSC meeting. Kissinger states that “from the foreign policy point of view, I favor going ahead. However, domestically I’ve already encountered enough opponents to know what a barrier exists.” Kissinger points out that abandoning negotiations for a new treaty would generate turmoil in the canal zone, upheaval in the region and world-wide condemnation. “We would have [a] real uproar…demonstrations, violence, and we would be dragged into every international forum. This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism.” 16 Document 16 White House, Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, “Panama Canal Negotiations,” Top Secret, July 23, 1975 Jul 23, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Ford convenes his national security team to discuss the Canal negotiations, which have come to a stalemate as the two sides disagree on major issues. “Negotiations are stalled and everyone is getting itchy,” Kissinger reports to the President. “It is not difficult to foresee that unless we begin the negotiations again there will be increasing unrest and eventually all Latin Americans will join in and we will have a cause celebre on our hands.” The meeting to address the issue of whether the President should favor a new treaty, given its domestic unpopularity and the political risks for his election in 1976, exposed divergent opinions among top national security officials. “It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty,” Ford tells his advisors. “We don’t want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either. We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.” 17 Document 17 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 302, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret, August 18, 1975 Aug 18, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Ford issues a national security decision directive authorizing U.S. negotiators to “proceed promptly” to restart talks and address outstanding issues, among them the duration for both U.S. operational control and defense of the Zone before Panama assumes those duties. He also directs his negotiators “to obtain Panama’s agreement that the negotiations will remain confidential so that the Panama Canal issue will not be injected into the domestic political process in the United States in 1976.” 18 Document 18 NSC, Memorandum, “Panama Canal Negotiations: January Status,” Secret, January 28, 1976 Jan 28, 1976 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The NSC specialist on the National Security Council, Stephen Low, reports on the status of the treaty talks. His memo provides a brief overview of the history of the negotiations starting with the January 1964 riots in the Canal Zone which left four U.S. soldiers and 20 Panamanians dead. The memo also reports on the “threshold agreements” on U.S. jurisdiction, control and defense of the Canal that negotiations during the Ford administration have advanced. Key issues remain, among them the duration of time before Panama assumes control of the Canal Zone, the amount of territory the U.S. will cede back to Panama, compensation, and whether the U.S. will have a formal role in guaranteeing the future neutrality of the Canal. 19 Document 19 NSC, Memorandum, “The Sovereignty Issue in the Panama Canal Negotiations,” Limited Official Use, April 9, 1976 Apr 9, 1976 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library NSC Latin America specialist Stephen Low sends National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft an overview on the issue of whether the Canal Zone is actually U.S. property. “Whether we have full sovereignty or ownership over the Canal is not central to the issue,” he argues. “The argument can go on and become very complex, as well as sterile. The important point is that it is not central to continuing the negotiations which are based on an assessment of our national interests.” The public argument that should be made, he suggests, is that “We are continuing these negotiations because the last three Presidents have all examined the matter carefully and found that our national interest in preserving access to the Canal over the long term is better served by negotiating a new arrangement with Panama.” 20 Document 20 State Department, Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting, August 25, 1976 Aug 25, 1976 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976, Document 131 During his staff meeting, Kissinger and his top aides discuss whether to send Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker back to Panama for another negotiating session. The presidential campaign is in high gear, and any finalization of the treaty will complicate Gerald Ford’s chances of re-election as well as create problems for pushing a finalized treaty forward if he loses. Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman tells Kissinger that sending Bunker to Panama in September “would be a good step in keeping Torrijos quiet, more or less.” “I have no problem with the going,” Kissinger responds, “as long as he doesn’t do anything.” CARTER AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 21 Document 21 White House, Policy Review Committee Meeting Minutes, “Panama,” Top Secret, January 27, 1977 Jan 27, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One week after Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, his top national security aides hold a Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting meet to discuss renewing negotiations on a Panama Canal treaty. The meeting addresses preparations for a visit from Panama’s foreign minister, Aquilino Boyd, for “informal talks” on the Canal treaty and how to set the diplomatic stage for reviving negotiations conducted by the Ford administration. The PRC concludes that the new administration should reaffirm the “Tack-Kissinger Principles” (a general outline of an agreement signed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Panamanians) beginning with exploratory talks but with a goal to finalize a new treaty by mid-1977. The PRC also “suggested that a National Citizens Committee on the Panama Canal be set up to stimulate a national educational campaign” in order to shift public opinion in favor of returning the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty. After the meeting, National Security Advisor Brzezinski transmits a summary of the conclusions to President Carter, advising him that he should mention Panama in his fireside chat, and/or State of the Union address. 22 Document 22 State Department, Cable, “Letter from the President to General Torrijos,” Secret, March 10, 1977 Mar 10, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library This secret cable transmits President Carter’s first message to Panamanian chief of state, General Omar Torrijos, agreeing to re-open negotiations on a Canal treaty. Carter’s letter comes in response to a communique Torrijos sent the new U.S. president in late February asking to continue negotiations that had started during the Ford administration. “I can assure you that the United States wishes to proceed cooperatively to meet the proper concerns of both Panama and the United States,” Carter writes. “My purpose lies in assuring that the Canal will remain permanently open and of use to the ships of all the world. The treaty should provide for an arrangement which allows the United States to meet its responsibility to operate the canal during the treaty's lifetime and which recognizes our security interest in the continuing neutrality of and access to the canal after the termination date of the treaty.” Carter’s letter concludes that “I will be pleased if we can agree on a new treaty and meet personally to sign it on behalf of our two countries.” 23 Document 23 White House, Memoranda from National Security Adviser Brzezinski to President Carter, “Panama Canal Treaty—Last Decisions,” Secret, ca. July 28, 1977 Jul 28, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library In this dramatic memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski advises President Carter on the “momentous” decision he faces to finalize the Panama Canal treaties. The Panamanians want a significant financial “package” of U.S. payments as part of the accord. But if Carter accedes to this demand, Brzezinski argues, it is unlikely that the Senate will ratify the treaty, with serious consequences for U.S. security and Carter’s own political interests. “A defeat in the Congress on this issue will not only jeopardize the Canal and our relations with Panama and Latin America; because you will have to invest so much of your political capital in this effort, a defeat might strike a significant blow at your overall effectiveness.” But denying the Panamanians the sizeable economic payout they sought also carried major risks of the negotiations breaking down. “With equally high probability,” Brzezinski counsels, “there will be rioting in Panama, which will spill over into the Zone. The Canal would be jeopardized and relations with Panama and all of Latin America and the developing world would be seriously, perhaps irreparably, harmed.” As Carter prepares for a meeting with General Torrijos’ emissaries, Brzezinski suggests he “convey directly to them and indirectly to Torrijos your strong commitment to a new treaty and your equally strong feelings about what the United States can do economically to help Panama and more importantly what the U.S. cannot do.” 24 Document 24 State Department, Memorandum from Secretary Vance to President Carter, “Your Meeting with Panamanian Representatives, July 29 at 9:30 a.m.,” with attached draft of letter from Carter to Torrijos, Secret, ca. July 28,1977 Jul 28, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library To seal the deal on the Canal treaties, President Carter agrees to meet with two emissaries of General Omar Torrijos to explain his administration’s final proposals after more than a decade of negotiations on the future of the Canal Zone. In preparation for that meeting, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance provides Carter with this briefing memorandum on the remaining issues to be resolved. Vance also provides a draft of a letter for Carter to give to the emissaries for General Torrijos. In his letter, Carter advised Torrijos that U.S. negotiators would soon return to Panama with final proposals on annual payments to Panama that “we truly believe to be fair and just,” even if they were “less than you had expected or wished.” Carter asked Torrijos to understand the political pressures and widespread opposition the treaties faced in Washington that threatened ratification by the U.S. Senate. “With understanding and patience,” Carter concludes, “I believe we can move quickly forward and achieve the goal that has eluded past governments and leaders in both our countries.” 25 Document 25 White House, Memorandum for President Carter, “Status of Canal Negotiations,” Secret, August 6, 1977 Aug 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library U.S. negotiators Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz report on a five-hour negotiating session on final points of contention on the treaty. At issue is the language that would prevent Panama from drawing on third countries to help it construct a second Canal—a provision the U.S. opposes—and restrictions on the U.S. from building a second canal through another Central American nation. Despite disagreement on this issue, Bunker and Linowitz predict that “barring quite unforeseen problems, we will be able to reach conceptual agreement early next week” and “final texts will be ready before long.” 26 Document 26 White House, Telcon, “Panama Canal Treaty: Telephone Call from President Carter to General Omar Torrijos,” August 24, 1977 Aug 24, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Just two weeks before the formal signing of the canal treaties in Washington, President Carter places a call to General Torrijos to discuss final arrangements for the ceremony. The discussion focuses mostly on how invitations will be made to all the heads of state in Latin America. Torrijos suggests inviting Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. It was only with great moral courage that our ends could be achieved,” Torrijos tells Carter at the end of the conversation. “I am proud of the progress we have made,” Carter responds. 27 Document 27 White House, Memorandum of Conversation, “President Carter/General Omar Torrijos Bilateral,” Confidential, September 6, 1977 Sep 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One day before the treaty-signing ceremony, President Carter holds a bilateral meeting with General Torrijos at the White House to discuss coordinating statements during the campaign in both countries to obtain ratification of the new accords and to evaluate the importance of this international accomplishment. Torrijos, according to the memorandum of conversation of their meeting, expressed “profound admiration for the President's honesty and political valor.” He compared Carter’s “act of valor” to bring a decade of negotiations to fruition to “jumping from an airplane without a parachute to take on this battle.” For his part, President Carter called the treaty “the right, fair and decent thing to do” and predicted “it would eventually prove to be a popular accomplishment for him and his Administration.” Carter said “the climate would improve as the American people came to understand the terms of the treaty and to realize the unfairness of the past.” According to Carter, “the treaty opened the way to a new era of mutual respect, equality and friendship between our peoples.”