Peru's Presidential Runoff Too Close To Call

Peru’s Presidential Runoff Remains Too Close to Call PERU Peru Peru’s presidential runoff remained too close to call Tuesday, with leftist candidate Roberto Sánchez holding a razor-thin lead over conservative rival Keiko Fujimori as officials continued counting ballots and awaited votes from Peruvians living abroad. With roughly 95 percent of tally sheets processed, Sánchez had about 50.1 percent of the vote compared with 49.9 percent for Fujimori, a margin of around 30,000 to 40,000 votes depending on the stage of the count. The outcome remains uncertain because most overseas ballots have yet to be counted. More than one million Peruvians were eligible to vote abroad and expatriate voters have historically favored right-wing candidates. Analysts, investors and pollsters said the foreign vote could ultimately decide the election and potentially overturn Sánchez’s narrow lead. One analyst noted that the votes still outstanding are “mostly in Keiko’s favor.” Only a small share of overseas ballots had been counted as of Monday, while thousands of tally sheets from remote regions and foreign polling stations were still being processed. Fujimori, seeking the presidency for a fourth time after losing runoff elections in 2011, 2016 and 2021, urged patience and said “every tally sheet” would be important. She also pledged to respect the final result. The election authority has warned that officially declaring a winner could take weeks because of legal challenges and Peru’s vote-counting procedures. The race has highlighted Peru’s deep political divisions. Sánchez, of the Juntos por el Perú alliance, is an ally of jailed former president Pedro Castillo and has pledged to pardon him if elected. Fujimori is the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, who was convicted of crimes against humanity and corruption. The uncertainty has already generated political and market reactions. Colombian President Gustavo Petro prematurely celebrated a Sánchez victory, while financial markets appeared to be pricing in a possible Fujimori comeback once overseas votes are counted. The winner will take office on July 28 and inherit a country struggling with insecurity and political instability. Peru has had nine presidents in the past decade.

Venezuela: Nearly Six Months After Maduro's Ouster, It's All About Oil

Nearly Six Months After Maduro’s Ouster, It’s All About Oil VENEZUELA Venezuela The coastal city of Cumaná in eastern Venezuela once pumped out Toyota Land Cruisers and metal cans for the tuna and sardines that local fishermen caught. Today, after years of socialist rule that started with Hugo Chávez in 1999, the former economic powerhouse is a shadow of its former self. “Drinking water in Cumaná is running extremely low,” wrote the New York Times. “Daily blackouts plague the city. Wind howls through the looted remains of its once illustrious university. Scavengers sift through garbage dumps for scraps of food.” The decay in Cumaná captures the crisis now confronting Venezuela’s leader, acting President Delcy Rodríguez. Maduro’s former vice president was installed after US forces seized Maduro and his wife in January. Now, her central challenge is whether she can revive the economy by courting the US and foreign oil companies without losing the Chavista base that brought her movement to power. That is an awkward turn for Rodríguez, once a dyed-in-the-wool socialist whose movement spent years denouncing Washington. That balancing act is already testing the new government. “Rodríguez confronts an unprecedented challenge for a Venezuelan leader: She must satisfy Washington’s demands while maintaining sufficient Chavista coalition support to prevent an internal fracture or a military coup,” wrote the Atlantic Council. “Rodríguez making such an agreement with Trump would alienate the regime’s hardliners, who would view her accommodation as a betrayal. Thus, Rodríguez may be unable to guarantee the stability required for the business operations Trump wants to run in Venezuela.” Those tensions are now openly splitting the movement. Observers say that longtime loyalists are currently openly and loudly disagreeing with the Rodríguez administration and even discussing publicly rumors that an insider betrayed the government and helped the US depose Maduro, the Associated Press wrote: “They are criticizing her overtures to the US and her efforts to attract foreign investment, saying she is betraying the socialist principles and anti-imperialist rhetoric that defined Chavismo for more than two decades.” For Chavistas who supported alliances with China, Russia and Iran as a counterweight to Washington, Rodríguez’s cooperation with the US looks like a sharp break from the movement’s anti-US posture. And her decision to send former officials to the US to face prosecution and approve American military exercises in Venezuela has made that shift even harder for Chavista loyalists to accept. But Rodríguez might be wise not to fight the tides, analysts say. In the wake of the US actions in Venezuela and a spike in energy prices worldwide due to the wars in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf, oil companies are taking another look at Venezuela’s oil riches. Washington has also eased sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sector, allowing major oil companies to resume operations and other firms to negotiate new energy contracts. The move followed changes to Venezuela’s oil law giving foreign producers more autonomy, though dealings with Russian, Iranian or Chinese entities remain barred. Companies could spend billions investing in the country’s infrastructure, a windfall that could turn the Venezuelan economy around. While ConocoPhillips CEO Ryan Lance told Bloomberg News that Venezuela still has “a long way to go” before its state-heavy economy can attract major investment, ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods has softened his bleak view of Venezuela as a place for investors. “I feel positive about what’s happening, the opportunity there,” he told investors last month, according to Quartz. “(There is) more work to do, but I think we’ll be uniquely positioned and play an important role in bringing those barrels to market.” Energy giants like ExxonMobil are now negotiating with Rodríguez’s government to return, but they are concerned about a revival of anti-corporate policies, such as when Chávez nationalized parts of the Venezuelan oil industry in 2007. The Venezuelan people, meanwhile, are waiting to see what happens. Life is still a struggle for most people who are grappling with inflation rates as high as 618 percent. Many are also wondering about when elections will be held. Regime officials, analysts say, prefer to work on the economy first, believing that if the situation improves, they might have a chance in elections. Still, they fear prosecution by the opposition should it win, making elections an unappealing prospect. Meanwhile, since the Maduro ouster, Rodríguez has ousted some officials and replaced them with technocrats, but most of her administration is still made up of Maduro insiders. She has released about 700 political prisoners. Almost 500, however, remain in jail. Still, the regime is tolerating protests for the first time: Hundreds of demonstrations have been held since January. A recent poll showed that while 58 percent said life had not improved over the past six months, 85 percent expected things to get better within a year. “Clearly, Venezuelans have experienced what today would be called a ‘vibe shift,’” World Politics Review wrote. “But much of the reality on the ground is remarkably unchanged, considering that the US mounted what was essentially a successful regime-decapitation operation.”

Peru's Election Runoff Offers Voters A Bad Choice

Peru’s Election Runoff Offers Voters a Choice Between a Rock and a Hard Place PERU Peru Peru’s June 7 presidential runoff has become a race pitting one candidate under legal threat and another shadowed by an authoritarian family legacy. Voters are deeply wary of both. Left-wing congressman Roberto Sánchez was confirmed for the runoff vote even as prosecutors were already seeking to disqualify him from the race and imprison him for campaign finance irregularities. His opponent, conservative Keiko Fujimori, is making her fourth presidential run on a law-and-order platform while trying to escape the shadow of Fujimorismo, the movement built around the authoritarian rule of her father Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s. The case against Sánchez has increased turmoil in a race already testing Peru’s fragile democracy. But his legal troubles are only part of the problem. Neither candidate came close to winning broad support in the tumultuous first round, when more than 70 percent of voters chose someone else. Peru’s first round was marred by logistical failures, delayed results and allegations of fraud. “Both candidates face strong rejection from parts of the population,” Le Monde wrote. “Sánchez will likely be portrayed, as (former President Pedro) Castillo was, as a ‘communist’ hostile to investors. Fujimori, on the other hand, reassures the business community. But anti-Fujimorism remains even stronger, especially among those who suffered human rights abuses during her father’s presidency.” Fujimori won 17.19 percent of the vote, while Sánchez took 12.03 percent. Because voting is mandatory, both finalists must compete for supporters of defeated candidates and reluctant voters. A recent Ipsos poll found that 26 percent of respondents said they would not vote for either candidate or would cast a blank ballot. Many voters are not just weighing candidates from the left against the right, but two political groupings rooted in fights over who gets to wield power and how far they can go to keep it. “Both candidates (have) a political legacy marked by ‘coup traditions,’” Alberto Vergara, a professor at the University of the Pacific, told Peruvian news outlet Ojo Público. “Everyone is democratic as long as election results do not endanger their position.” Meanwhile, a judge began evaluating on May 27 whether Sánchez must stand trial, but the hearing was continued to June 4. It is unclear whether such a ruling would automatically remove him from the runoff. Sánchez is accused of falsifying information about campaign contributions, diverting them into his personal accounts and making false statements in financial reports tied to party contributions and filings from 2018 to 2021. Prosecutors are asking for a five-year sentence and permanent disqualification from running in any presidential race. He denies wrongdoing. If Sánchez remains in the race, his electoral strength lies in the anti-establishment anger that powered Castillo’s rise. He served as trade minister under Castillo, the leftist president impeached and arrested in 2022 after trying to dissolve Congress and rule by decree. Many Castillo supporters saw his impeachment and the deadly crackdown on the protests that followed as proof that the Peruvian ruling class would not respect poorer and rural Peruvians. Fujimori, meanwhile, can cast Sánchez as a risky choice in a country already exhausted by instability. Supporters see her as a candidate of order in a country frightened by a startling rise in crime. But her party’s clout in Congress is also a liability. Critics say Fujimorismo has used Congress to fuel impeachment fights and weaken checks and balances, helping trap Peru in a cycle of unstable presidencies – Peru is about to elect its ninth president in a decade after years of presidents resigning, being ousted or serving only interim terms. Analysts told El País the runoff is another election driven less by hope than by fear of the alternative. “Unfortunately, the vote has been so divided that we will once again end up with two candidates for whom the vast majority of Peruvians would not vote,” said Julio F. Carrión, a professor at the University of Delaware. Some analysts say there is a chance the election may set Peru on a new path regardless of the turmoil in the election itself. “This election may help end the chronic political instability,” Americas Quarterly wrote. “What is less clear is whether it will improve public policy in a country where this has become the preserve of special interests, some of them illegal.”

Colombians Go To The Pools As Terror Rises

Colombians Go to the Polls as Terror Rises COLOMBIA Colombia Two weeks before Colombian voters were scheduled to go to the polls to elect a new president, gunmen on motorcycles killed two campaign staffers who worked for right-wing candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. The murders took place in southeastern Colombia, where rebel movements and cocaine trafficking are widespread. According to Al Jazeera, de la Espriella extolled his workers on social media, writing they “walked the streets defending democracy, freedom, and the hope of millions of Colombians. Their only crime was believing in the Fatherland and not kneeling before the violent.” The shootings were only the latest example of the bloodshed that has sharply escalated in the South American country as voters prepare to replace Gustavo Petro, the country’s first leftist president, in elections on May 31. In late April, a spate of attacks against civilians and military installations took place, including at least 26 explosive and drone attacks and a bombing on the highway between Cali and Popayán that killed at least 20 people. That’s because rebels and criminal gangs are turning to violence to improve their negotiating positions with the next leader of the country, the Latin Times wrote. “The recent murders echo a long history of political assassinations in Colombia, but they come at a particularly fragile moment, when President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ policy is under pressure, and multiple armed groups are jockeying for leverage in negotiations and territory,” it said. “These attacks, involving dissident (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel factions) and criminal organizations, are raising fears that public security and crime will dominate Colombia’s coming presidential campaign and could suppress participation in areas already scarred by conflict.” American officials claim the violence has also escalated because Petro has taken a radically soft approach to drug cartels that have long financed leftist rebels fighting against the government. Colombian voters, however, don’t seem to care. Left-wing Senator Ivan Cepeda, a Petro ally, is the frontrunner in the presidential race. A human rights advocate who, like Petro, wants to negotiate with the rebels, Cepeda’s father was a Communist Party politician who was killed by right-wing paramilitaries in 1994. Landowners and other Colombian elites commonly financed those paramilitaries to defend their property and interests from rebels. Other leading candidates include de la Espriella, a lawyer who draws inspiration from libertarian Javier Milei, the president of Argentina. In the center-right is Paloma Valencia, an ally of former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, who served from 2002 to 2010, wrote the Americas Society/Council of the Americas. With American military and financial assistance, Uribe launched a massive attack against rebels in the country’s interior. He also sought to dismantle the right-wing paramilitaries and triggered scandals involving civilian deaths. He was sentenced to 12 years of house arrest on bribery and witness-tampering convictions that an appeals court overturned last year. The presidential election takes place in two rounds, so de la Espriella and Valencia have been attacking each other in an effort to garner sufficient votes to face off against Cepeda in a runoff. Whoever prevails could benefit from regional trends that have tilted the region rightward over the past few years. In the past year alone, voters in Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, and Honduras have elected conservative presidents. Meanwhile, analysts worry that the violence will hinder the elections. Over the past year, FARC dissidents have regularly staged attacks against the central government despite the peace deal that led most of their comrades in arms to stop fighting. At least 61 political leaders have been killed, including leading presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, who was assassinated by a 15-year-old boy last year, shocking the country. All the presidential candidates have received threats. Analysts say that some citizens are now avoiding political rallies and campaign events. Large areas of the countryside have in effect become no-go zones for politicians, where campaigning without permission from armed groups can be extremely dangerous. “They’re seeking to limit the degree to which people participate in the electoral process,” Francisco Daza, a coordinator of the Colombian Peace and Reconciliation Foundation, told the Guardian. “Murder and kidnapping serve as a warning.”

Argentina: Why Peter Thiel Is Decamping To The End Of The World

Why Peter Thiel Is Decamping to the End of the World The billionaire’s new roots in Argentina are said to be partly motivated by concerns about the future of the United States and shared beliefs with Argentina’s right-wing leader. Listen · 10:38 min Share full article 247 A person in a dark suit and blue tie stands next to another person in a dark suit stepping up white stairs. A reddish-brown building is in the background. Peter Thiel, right, arriving for a meeting with President Javier Milei at the Casa Rosada Presidential Palace in Buenos Aires in April.Credit...Matias Baglietto/Reuters Emma BubolaRyan Mac By Emma Bubola and Ryan Mac Emma Bubola reported from Buenos Aires, and Ryan Mac from Los Angeles. May 28, 2026 Updated 8:22 a.m. ET Leer en español See more of our coverage in your search results. Add The New York Times on Google The Saturday tournament at the Buenos Aires chess club hosted its usual lineup of players, including an accountant, a college student and schoolchildren. But this time, hunched over the club’s tiny wooden tables with them, was a new entrant: Peter Thiel, the right-wing tech billionaire and Trump donor. Mr. Thiel — who, according to one of the participants, “did not play badly” and came in third — had recently decamped from his homes in Los Angeles and Miami to establish a foothold thousands of miles away in Argentina’s capital. Over the past two months, Mr. Thiel has met with the country’s president, Javier Milei, and his ministers; purchased a mansion in one of Buenos Aires’ most exclusive neighborhoods; and hosted a dinner with local economists where he discussed the Antichrist, one of his favorite conversation topics, according to Argentine officials and people familiar with Mr. Thiel’s activities. Mr. Thiel, who has a history of collecting backup countries as he hedges his bets against the United States, is considering making Argentina another Plan B, according to two people familiar with his thinking. Born in Germany and raised in the United States, he received citizenship in New Zealand in 2011, and applied for a passport in Malta in 2022. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT His new roots in Argentina are partly motivated by his concerns about the direction of the United States, the people familiar with his thinking say, particularly California, where an initiative on November’s ballot could lead to a significant tax on billionaires. Argentina, a nation relatively insulated from potential conflicts in the Northern Hemisphere, also fits as a potential escape hatch from other risks that Mr. Thiel has publicly warned about — nuclear war and runaway artificial intelligence. But Mr. Thiel has also been energized by what he’s discovered in Argentina, finding harmony with Mr. Milei’s libertarian slash-and-burn governance and becoming enamored with Buenos Aires’ vibrancy, the people said. They, and others familiar with the billionaire’s activities and discussions about the country, spoke on condition of anonymity to share private conversations. Mr. Thiel did not respond to a request for comment. Underscoring his belief in the country, Mr. Thiel, 58, has temporarily relocated his family to Argentina and enrolled his children in a local school, two of the people said. The Argentine government has also explored offering the billionaire permanent residence or even citizenship, a person familiar with Mr. Thiel’s plans said, though it’s currently unclear whether he would accept. A spokesman for Mr. Milei denied such an offer had been considered. The Argentine government is currently working to establish a “golden passport” program that would allow people who make large investments in the country to obtain citizenship. Editors’ Picks You Barely Need a Recipe for This Weeknight Dinner. That’s What Makes It Timeless. Did You Know a Total Solar Eclipse Is Coming? Here’s How to See It. A Tiny Los Angeles Kitchen Is Making Three-Star Magic with Masa SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT “All billionaires of the world who want to flee countries increasingly regulated, with higher taxes and governments that persecute their citizens, are welcome in the Argentine republic, the new land of freedom,” Manuel Adorni, Mr. Milei’s cabinet chief, said last month before congress, answering a question about Mr. Thiel. Mr. Thiel, he added, was “interested in the deep reforms that we are bringing forward.” An ideological ally Argentina may be an unlikely place for a billionaire looking for stability. The country has careened through nearly a century of instability, marred by military coups and spectacular financial collapses epitomized by triple-digit inflation. But in Mr. Milei, Mr. Thiel has an ideological ally. The two men share an aversion for taxes, socialism and “wokeness” — a negative label critics use to describe progressive politics. Since becoming president in 2023, Mr. Milei has sought to overhaul Argentina’s economy, pushing sweeping deregulation and government spending cuts. He has sought to attract foreign investment in the country’s natural resources, including oil, lithium and rare earth minerals. Image Mr. Milei in a black suit and blue tie smiles and waves. A crowd of blurred hands holding cellphones are prominent in the foreground. President Javier Milei of Argentina in Buenos Aires on Monday. A top aide said billionaires, like Mr. Thiel, are welcome in Argentina.Credit...Natacha Pisarenko/Associated Press Mr. Thiel and Mr. Milei first met in person in 2024 in a meeting brokered by Alec Oxenford, a former tech entrepreneur who is now Argentina’s ambassador to the United States, according to a person familiar with the meeting who requested anonymity to share private details publicly. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Mr. Oxenford, whose online marketplace company, OLX, received funding from Mr. Thiel’s venture capital firm more than 15 years ago, had been encouraging the then-new Argentine president to meet with influential American business people. Mr. Thiel, who has vehemently opposed taxes in the United States, grew more interested in Argentina after California political groups began discussing a voter initiative that would apply a 5 percent tax on the assets of the state’s billionaires. By the end of last year, Mr. Thiel was considering cutting ties with the Golden State, and started exploring living outside California. Mr. Thiel first started seriously considering Argentina as a place to live, at least temporarily, about a year ago and began looking at Buenos Aires real estate, the two people familiar with his thinking said. They said he also hired a local art dealer to furnish his home. Image A dense cityscape under an orange sky at sunset. A prominent white obelisk rises from a street bustling with vehicles and bright advertisements. Downtown Buenos Aires in 2023.Credit...Sarah Pabst for The New York Times Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Since arriving in Buenos Aires in April, Mr. Thiel and his husband, Matt Danzeisen, have dined at the home of Argentina’s deregulation minister, Federico Sturzenegger, a person familiar with the dinner said. Mr. Thiel met separately with the economy minister, Luis Caputo. The billionaire and an associate from his venture capital firm, Founders Fund, also spent time with Mr. Milei last month at the presidential house. In an interview with a streaming channel following that meeting, Mr. Milei said that the meeting was one of two like-minded individuals and that Mr. Thiel asked how he would ensure that libertarianism endures in Argentina beyond his presidency. “It was an anarcho-capitalist who met another anarcho-capitalist who is bringing things to life,” Mr. Milei said. A backup country Mr. Thiel’s interest in Argentina is not solely because of his alignment with Mr. Milei’s policies. Mr. Thiel also appears to be enjoying Argentine life. He attended Argentina’s most storied soccer game — between Buenos Aires rivals River Plate and Boca Juniors — and traveled to Bariloche, a lakeside mountain resort in Patagonia. Last month at a candlelit dinner at Mr. Thiel’s Buenos Aires mansion, influential economists and Argentine intellectuals gathered with the billionaire to discuss the country’s history and economy, before the conversation turned to the Antichrist, according to three people familiar with the gathering. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT Some in attendance were unsure of what to make of their host’s apocalyptic musings, on an entity which he has warned in lectures could establish a totalitarian world government, but they listened intently. The chess tournament this month in the Buenos Aires neighborhood of Almagro was a more upbeat affair. Mr. Thiel, who was the highest-rated player in the competition, posed for photos while wearing his third-place medal and stayed to play chess with a child, said Rafael Jabie, a therapist, who finished second. Mr. Milei and his supporters have been quick to embrace the billionaire as one of their own. “He is already more Argentine” than left-wingers, Juan Pablo Carreira, who runs the Argentine presidency’s digital communications, wrote on X, using an offensive term for his political opponents. Image A packed stadium crowd, many people wearing red and white. They hold red and white umbrellas with the number 14 and have open mouths. Fans chanting at a soccer match between Buenos Aires rivals River Plate and Boca Juniors last month.Credit...Sarah Pabst for The New York Times Daniel Parisini, a right-wing pundit close to Mr. Milei, posted an A.I.-generated picture of Mr. Thiel sitting in front of a parrilla, the quintessential Argentine barbecue, while others online created images of Mr. Thiel eating milanesa, a traditional breaded meat cutlet, inside an Argentine home. Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT In a polarized nation, rapidly changing under Mr. Milei, Mr. Thiel’s presence has been viewed starkly differently across the political spectrum. Government supporters see the venture capitalist’s presence as proof that Mr. Milei is successfully turning Argentina into a haven for foreign investors. Mr. Milei’s critics, however, see it as another example of the country being sold out to unbridled capitalism. “What Peter Thiel is doing is terrible,” Elisa Lilita Carrió, an Argentine politician, wrote on X, mentioning Palantir, the big-data firm he co-founded and now chairs. “His settling in Argentina is even worse,” she added. Others have spread theories that he was coming to meddle in next year’s presidential elections, build large data centers or seize Argentine’s personal data with Palantir, which has deep relationships with the U.S. government. Mr. Thiel’s only known investment so far has been in personal real estate. Aside from the Buenos Aires home, across the street from a house owned by one of Argentina’s most famous actresses, Mr. Thiel has also bought a plot of land in neighboring Uruguay, a person familiar with the purchase said. Image Mr. Thiel, seen here in Buenos Aires, has also bought property in neighboring Uruguay.Credit...Matias Baglietto/Reuters Advertisement SKIP ADVERTISEMENT The Uruguayan property, on sprawling grasslands studded with ranches, is near Punta del Este, a glamorous tourist destination on the Atlantic Ocean that people call the Hamptons of South America. Some observers have speculated that it could include a bunker to shelter from nuclear apocalypse. He would not be the first member of the global elite to think about the southern cone as a place to shelter from nuclear Armageddon. Martin Varsavsky, a Spanish-Argentine tech entrepreneur close to Mr. Thiel, has built a ranch in the Argentine city of Mendoza, which he has said he sees as a potential shelter in case of World War III. Mr. Varsavsky has hypothesized that Argentina would be completely unaffected if the northern hemisphere were wiped out by nuclear war. “The moment China takes Taiwan or Russia takes Lithuania, I’m in Buenos Aires,” he said. “It’s good to have a Plan B for civilization.” Lucía Cholakian Herrera contributed reporting. Emma Bubola is a Times reporter covering Argentina. She is based in Buenos Aires. Ryan Mac is a Times reporter who covers corporate accountability across the global technology industry. See more on: Founders Fund, Donald Trump

Bolivian Protestors Attack Minister's Convoy

Bolivian Protesters Attack Minister’s Convoy as Unrest Intensifies BOLIVIA Bolivia Anti-government protesters attacked the convoy of Bolivia’s public works minister over the weekend as mass demonstrations demanding the resignation of center-right President Rodrigo Paz intensified amid nationwide blockades and unrest. The incident occurred Saturday while Public Works Minister Mauricio Zamora was overseeing an operation to clear highway roadblocks set up by demonstrators seeking to slow the movement of goods into the administrative capital, La Paz, and the nearby city of El Alto. Officials said the operation aimed to establish “humanitarian corridors,” but protesters responded with fierce resistance, reportedly attacking the convoy with stones and dynamite. Zamora’s vehicle became separated from the group during the clashes, although authorities later said he was found safe afterward. The unrest comes roughly six months after Paz took office promising to resolve Bolivia’s worst economic crisis in decades. His administration’s policies, including a shift toward the United States and the removal of long-standing fuel subsidies, have sparked public anger and demands for his resignation. The protests have included repeated clashes between demonstrators and police, while trade unions and supporters of former leftist President Evo Morales have organized widespread roadblocks across the country. Officials said blockades were active at 59 locations across six of Bolivia’s nine administrative regions. The disruptions have severely affected transportation and the delivery of goods into major cities, prompting regional and US aid efforts. Meanwhile, authorities said that at least 120 people have been detained since the protests began nearly three weeks ago. Paz said his government remained open to dialogue with protesters but warned there were limits to negotiations and that he could invoke constitutional measures, including a state of emergency, if necessary. Morales has called on Paz to resign and demanded new elections within 90 days “to calm the country.” Paz’s administration has accused Morales and his supporters of fueling the unrest.

Gunmen KIll Two Campaign Workers Before Colombia's Presidential Election

Gunmen Kill Two Campaign Workers Before Colombia’s Presidential Vote COLOMBIA Colombia Two campaign workers for right-wing presidential candidate Abelardo de La Espriella were killed in southeastern Colombia over the weekend, intensifying concerns about political violence less than two weeks before the country’s election. De La Espriella said four gunmen on motorcycles shot the victims in a rural area of Cubarral, in Meta Department. His Defenders of the Homeland party identified the men as Rogers Mauricio Devia Escoba, a former mayor of Cubarral and local campaign coordinator, and logistics assistant Eder Fabian Cardona Lopez. Authorities have not blamed any armed group for the attack, but de La Espriella accused a dissident faction of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels. Violence and rising crime have become central issues in the race to replace President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s leftist leader. The ombudsman also reported another attack against a former mayoral candidate in the area and warned that the violence could affect the election. Leftist Sen. Iván Cepeda leads the polls with between 37 and 40 percent support and has pledged to continue Petro’s policy of negotiated solutions to the armed conflict. De La Espriella, who is polling in second place with more than 20 percent, has promised a hard line against guerrillas, criminal gangs and drug trafficking. If no candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote on May 31, a runoff will be held on June 21.

As Uruguay Fights Crime, It Battles To Retain Its "Democratic Soul"

As Uruguay Fights Crime, It Battles to Retain Its ‘Democratic Soul’ URUGUAY Uruguay For years, Uruguay stood out in the region for failing to make headlines. Its voters chose center “safe” politics. Crime remained low. The economy was stable. Moderation was a key value. More recently, however, things have begun to take a turn, particularly regarding security, as increased drug trafficking, organized crime and economic jitters have compelled many Uruguayans to call for more drastic action. Crime in Uruguay remains relatively low for Latin America but left-wing Uruguayan President Yamandú Orsi has been responding to the situation by channeling right-wing populist Nayib Bukele, president of El Salvador, who has imprisoned tens of thousands of alleged drug lords, gang leaders, thieves and murderers in a bid to clean up his nation. But in moderate, cautious Uruguay, where many remember the cruelty of the authoritarian government that ran the country from 1973 to 1985, that is a problem, analysts say. They add that the challenge for Orsi, unlike Bukele, is to secure the country while upholding civil liberties and protecting Uruguay’s “proud left-wing democracy.” “The question is whether those answers will help tear down democracy or build up the rule of law,” wrote Benjamin N. Gedan, deputy director of the Wilson Center’s Latin American program, in Foreign Policy. Uruguay’s institutions may offer some protection, he added: “… the failure, so far, of ‘Bukelismo’ to take hold in Uruguay is also a vote of confidence in the capacity of the country’s democratic institutions to step up to the challenge of organized crime.” That is the institutional test. The political pressure is more immediate. A recent poll showed crime dominating public concern, with 49 percent of Uruguayans calling it the country’s top problem, far ahead of unemployment at 29 percent. Although still below the 64 percent peak recorded in August 2024, that figure has risen lately, while voters have grown less satisfied with the government’s response. Orsi’s popularity has dropped from 41 percent to 36 percent since he assumed office a year ago. Orsi has tried to show he is responding. He has proposed creating a Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, reforming the criminal code to strengthen security, hiring more police and prison guards, and installing 20,000 surveillance devices to help catch criminals, wrote MercoPress. The government says that crime declined in 2025, including a slight decrease in homicides – 369 for the year compared to 382 in 2024. Progress was less clear on the economy, however. Wages rose by less than 2 percent in 2025 compared to 2024, employment remained level but didn’t necessarily count recent large-scale business restructurings, and poverty remained level at around 18 percent. Fuel prices are also increasing due to market instability stemming from the US-Israeli war against Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. As he has struggled domestically, Orsi’s international policy has remained distinctly left-wing. His political coalition, Frente Amplio, recently condemned US President Donald Trump’s aggressive stance toward Cuba, for example. The country is also seeking to reduce the amount of debt it holds in US dollars. Instead, Orsi is seeking to issue debt in the country’s peso while trying to boost beef, soybean and other exports to China and other big buyers. Orsi signed a series of economic agreements with China last year. Orsi’s success or failure in tackling issues within his country will likely determine whether he can continue those diplomatic policies, analysts say. Meanwhile, Uruguayans say that they want things to change sooner rather than later. “On the streets, ordinary Uruguayans say life feels more precarious: more visible homelessness, more petty theft, more open drug consumption, and more scattered but spectacular acts of violence,” wrote the Latin American Post. “For a society that has long seen itself as calm and orderly, this was a jarring reminder that past success offers no protection.”

Hundreds of Thousands Of Argentines Protest Milei's Cuts to Public Universities

Hundreds of Thousands of Argentines Protest Milei’s Funding Cuts to Public Universities ARGENTINA Argentina Hundreds of thousands of Argentines took to the streets of Buenos Aires and other cities this week to protest President Javier Milei’s funding cuts to public universities. Argentina’s tuition-free public university system – established in 1949 and credited with producing five Nobel Prize laureates – is widely seen as a source of national pride. Protesters accused Milei’s libertarian government of trying to dismantle it through austerity measures aimed at reducing state spending. Demonstrators marched across the capital carrying banners reading “Milei, comply with the law” and “Without public universities, there is no future.” Organizers said more than 1.5 million people demonstrated across the country. Congress last year passed a law to fund universities’ operational costs and raise teacher salaries in line with inflation, but Milei vetoed it and later sought to repeal it in the 2026 budget. Lawmakers overruled both efforts, but the government has still refused to release the funds, prompting legal action and injunctions now under appeal before the Supreme Court. “Funding transfers to the university system have fallen by 45.6 percent from 2023 to the present,” said Franco Bartolacci, president of the National Interuniversity Council. The government has claimed that the law threatens its fiscal surplus and has portrayed the demonstrations as politically motivated. The protests came as Milei is also facing declining approval ratings amid falling wages, rising unemployment and corruption allegations surrounding his cabinet chief, Manuel Adorni. Some demonstrators carried signs targeting Adorni, with one reading, “How much does Adorni cost us?”

Peruvian Prosecutors Charge Presidential Candiadte Roberto Sanchez Ahead of Runoff Vote

Peruvian Prosecutors Charge Presidential Candidate Roberto Sánchez Ahead of Runoff Vote PERU Peru Peru’s top prosecutor filed financial crime charges against leftist presidential candidate Roberto Sánchez, hours after election authorities confirmed he would advance to next month’s presidential runoff against conservative rival Keiko Fujimori. Prosecutors on Tuesday accused Sánchez, a candidate from the Juntos por el Perú party, of making false statements in administrative proceedings and filing false financial disclosures with the National Office of Electoral Processes related to campaign contributions from 2018 to 2020. Authorities are seeking a prison sentence of more than five years as well as his “permanent disqualification” from serving as president of the Juntos por el Perú party. Sánchez’s lawyer rejected the accusations, arguing that the party’s treasurer – not Sánchez – was responsible for the financial filings. The charges were announced shortly after Peru’s electoral commission said Sánchez and Fujimori would advance to the June 7 runoff vote. With nearly all ballots counted, Fujimori, the daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, led with 17.17 percent of the vote, while Sánchez followed with 12 percent. Election authorities are expected to certify the final first-round results by Friday. The presidential race has unfolded amid weeks of political tension following a contentious first round marked by allegations of fraud, logistical problems and the resignation of Peru’s top electoral official, who is also under investigation. Despite the accusations, international observers said they found no concrete evidence of fraud in the April vote. Advertisement

Venezuela's Acting L:eader To Appear Before World Court Over Territorial Dispute with Guyana

Venezuela’s Acting Leader To Appear Before World Court Over Territorial Dispute With Guyana VENEZUELA/ GUYANA Venezuela Venezuela’s acting President Delcy Rodríguez arrived in the Netherlands this week for hearings at the International Court of Justice to defend her country’s claim to a resource-rich region in western Guyana, part of a decades-old territorial dispute between the South American neighbors. The case at the United Nations’ top court centers on Essequibo, a nearly 62,000-square-mile territory rich in gold, diamonds, timber and other natural resources, located near a major offshore oil deposit. The dispute, rooted in the colonial era, has intensified in recent years following major oil discoveries offshore and repeated Venezuelan naval patrols near waters claimed by Guyana. Guyana brought the case to the ICJ in 2018 seeking confirmation that an 1899 arbitration ruling – which established the border largely in favor of what was then British Guiana – remains legally valid. Venezuela counters that the ruling was fraudulent and says a 1966 Geneva agreement effectively nullified it and requires bilateral negotiations instead. Rodríguez said Caracas has “demonstrated at every historical stage what our territory has meant since we were born as a Republic.” Guyana’s Foreign Minister Hugh Hilton Todd told judges on May 4 at the opening of the hearings that the dispute “has been a blight on our existence as a sovereign state from the beginning” and said 70 percent of Guyana’s territory was at stake. Venezuela has continued to reject the ICJ’s jurisdiction, despite participating in the proceedings. The court is expected to take months to issue a final and legally binding ruling.

Guyana Is Having A Petrostate Moment

As the Gulf War Causes Energy Woes Around the World, Guyana’s Having a Petrostate Moment GUYANA Guyana The US recently seized the oil tanker Majestic X in the Indian Ocean, saying the Guyanese-flagged vessel was carrying Iranian oil. Guyanese officials claimed the ship fabricated its registration. But the incident underscored Guyana’s rising profile as a player in the global oil trade. Following ExxonMobil’s massive 2015 discovery of over 11 billion barrels of recoverable oil in the Stabroek Block, Guyana rapidly became one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, with crude production propelling unprecedented GDP growth. The Stabroek Block, about 120 miles offshore, is operated by ExxonMobil with Chevron and the Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and holds most of Guyana’s reserves. This newfound wealth now dominates Guyana’s economy, turning the country into one of the top oil producers per capita in just a few years. Its gross domestic product growth has been among the highest in the world over the last five years, according to Rice University’s Baker Institute. Guyana’s oil revenues are now on track to hit $33 billion annually, which is 75 percent more than forecasters expected before the US-Israeli war against Iran and the shutdown of oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Add the premium that Guyanese oil exporters receive from their main clients in Europe, and returns have surged far beyond earlier forecasts. But the boom is also pushing up costs at home. Guyana faces a significant risk of the resource curse, where abundant natural resources paradoxically lead to poor economic development, high income inequality and corruption. Even as Guyana exports crude, it remains exposed to global prices, importing refined fuels whose costs rise with international markets. Higher fuel prices feed into transport and electricity, pushing up food costs in a country reliant on imports, while surging demand outpaces housing and supply. As a result, inflation is rising even as growth accelerates, with oil accounting for three-quarters of GDP and the price shock set to deepen that reliance, said Radhika Bansal of Rystad Energy. “The cost of food and housing has increased by 75 percent since 2021. The oil industry poaches the best workers. … A flood of petro dollars has encouraged waste, if not outright clientelism,” the Economist wrote. To ease these pressures, Guyana’s President Irfaan Ali has announced cash grants of $100,000 to more than 240,000 people as part of his policy to share the wealth directly with citizens. Ali has also invested heavily in social programs. He plans to build a refinery so the country can produce its own fuel and potentially export finished products, arguing that national security requires Guyana to achieve energy and economic independence. Meanwhile, Guyana is locked in a long-running territorial dispute with Venezuela over the Essequibo region, a vast area administered by Guyana that is rich in natural resources and has gained fresh strategic importance with recent oil discoveries. “Strengthening military, economic, and diplomatic support for Guyana aligns with US national security interests given Guyana’s growing role as an energy producer, its strategic location, and its leadership among democratic nations in the Caribbean,” wrote the Council on Foreign Relations. For now, however, the domestic picture tells a different story. Despite the country’s oil boom, many Guyanese say the gains have yet to reach those on the margins. Data from the Inter-American Development Bank indicates that 58 percent of the country’s roughly 800,000 people live on less than $6.85 a day, with 32 percent surviving on under $3.65. Rajesh Singh, a 46-year-old painter and maintenance worker, said the oil boom has done little for ordinary people like him. “People must live comfortably now that we have big oil money, but it is clearly not happening yet,” he told the Guardian. “The big boys are looking after themselves too much.”

Peru's Electoral Court Requests Audit of April Elections

Peru’s Electoral Court Requests Audit of April Elections PERU Peru Peru’s electoral court this week requested a “comprehensive and exhaustive IT audit” of the April 12 general elections as uncertainty and mistrust persist over the incomplete vote count. The court, formally known as the National Jury of Elections (JNE) said Saturday the audit is necessary “to strengthen the transparency, integrity, and reliability of the election results.” The request comes weeks after the outcome of the first round remains unresolved, with 97.5 percent of votes counted and authorities still reviewing disputed tally sheets from more than 1 million ballots. The election was marred by logistical failures that forced officials to extend voting by an additional day, prompting accusations of fraud and manipulation. The disruptions led election chief Piero Corvetto to resign last month. He had acknowledged problems in the process but denied any wrongdoing. Authorities have since launched an investigation into the irregularities. Preliminary results show conservative candidate Keiko Fujimori leading the race, but it remains unclear who she will face in the June runoff. Left-wing congressman Roberto Sánchez and ultraconservative Rafael López Aliaga are locked in a tight contest for second place. The JNE said the planned audit would not interfere with the ongoing review of contested ballots. Officials had previously indicated that final results would be announced no later than May 15.

Colombia: Highway Blast Kills At Least 21

Colombia Highway Blast Kills At Least 21, Insurgents Blamed COLOMBIA Colombia A powerful bomb blast on a highway in Colombia killed at least 21 people and injured 56 others over the weekend, with authorities accusing guerrilla insurgents of the attack ahead of next month’s presidential elections. The explosion occurred Saturday on the Pan-American Highway in the southwestern Cauca department, a region long affected by armed conflict. Authorities said attackers blocked traffic using a bus and another vehicle before detonating an explosive device, leaving a crater more than 7,000 cubic feet in size. Security officials described the incident as a “terrorist attack” and called it Cauca’s “most brutal and ruthless attack against the civilian population in decades.” President Gustavo Petro blamed the bombing on Iván Mordisco, the alias used by Colombia’s most-wanted criminal and leader of a dissident faction of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Mordisco’s group operates in the southwestern region and is involved in illegal mining, extortion and drug trafficking. On Saturday, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez accused “Marlon” – a rebel leader affiliated with Mordisco’s group – of orchestrating the attack and offered a $1.4 million reward for information leading to his capture. The attack follows a series of recent incidents in the Cauca region, including a bomb attack on a military base in the city of Cali on Friday. The violence comes a little more than a month before the May 31 presidential election, when voters will choose a successor to Petro. Security has become a central issue in the campaign, particularly after the assassination last year of conservative frontrunner Miguel Uribe Turbay. Left-wing Sen. Iván Cepeda, a key figure behind Petro’s policy of negotiating with armed groups, currently leads in the polls. He is followed by right-wing candidates Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia, both of whom have pledged a tougher approach to rebel groups. Police have increased protection for the three leading candidates after they received death threats.

Peru Raids Homes Of Election Officials Over Voting Irregularities

Peru Raids Homes of Election Officials Over Voting Irregularities PERU Peru Peruvian police raided the homes of six election officials over the weekend, including former election chief Piero Corvetto, as part of an investigation into irregularities in the April 12 presidential vote that have deepened mistrust in the country’s electoral process. On Friday, anti-corruption officers searched the residence of a legal representative of Galaga, the company responsible for transporting ballots to polling stations, as well as Corvetto’s home. The former election chief resigned last week, taking responsibility for problems during the election and saying he wanted to “generate more confidence” ahead of the June 7 runoff. He has denied any wrongdoing. The raids follow logistical failures that forced authorities to extend voting by a day after election materials were not delivered to more than a dozen polling centers in Lima. More than 52,000 voters were unable to cast ballots as scheduled. The disruptions triggered accusations of fraud and manipulation, including from ultraconservative contender Rafael López Aliaga, who called Corvetto a “criminal.” With more than 95 percent of ballots counted, Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, leads the race with at least 17 percent of the vote. Leftist former lawmaker Roberto Sánchez follows with 12.03 percent, while López Aliaga has 11.90 percent. Despite calls to hold supplementary elections in affected areas, Peru’s Electoral Tribunal rejected the proposals and urged candidates to act “responsibly,” noting that the electoral process remained ongoing. The tribunal has set a May 15 deadline to confirm which two candidates will advance to the runoff. The election takes place amid prolonged political instability: Peru has had nine presidents in the past decade, including four former leaders who have been jailed. The country has also faced persistent corruption scandals and rising violence from criminal gangs. Observers noted that the latest controversy has further eroded public confidence in Peru’s governing system, where many politicians already face low approval ratings.

El Salvador Begins Trials Of 500 Gang Members And Leaders

El Salvador Begins Trial of Nearly 500 Alleged Gang Members and Leaders EL SALVADOR El Salvador on Monday launched a mass trial of 486 alleged members and leaders of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang, accused of tens of thousands of crimes, including murders, in one of the largest proceedings under President Nayib Bukele’s sweeping anti-gang crackdown. Prosecutors said the defendants are collectively charged with more than 47,000 crimes committed between 2012 and 2022, including around 29,000 homicides, as well as extortion, drug and arms trafficking, femicide and disappearances. Authorities alleged the group sought to “establish a parallel state,” charging them with rebellion. Among those on trial are individuals linked to a surge of violence in March 2022, when 87 people were killed in a single weekend. Those on trial include senior and street-level gang leaders and coordinators. More than 400 suspects are already in custody, with 73 others being tried in absentia. Prosecutors said they have “ample evidence” to seek “maximum penalties,” though they did not specify sentencing details. The trial is part of Bukele’s “war on gangs,” launched in March 2022 under a state of emergency that expanded arrest powers and suspended some constitutional rights. Since then, more than 91,000 suspected gang members have been detained, with authorities crediting the campaign for a sharp drop in crime. MS-13, a transnational gang founded in Los Angeles in the 1980s and now largely based in Central America, has long been blamed for widespread violence. However, rights groups have criticized the crackdown, citing arbitrary detentions, lack of due process and more than 500 deaths in custody. Critics warned that mass trials risk punishing innocent individuals alongside the guilty.

Brasil: Another Bolsonaro Runs Against Lula

As Brazil Votes, Another Bolsonaro Seeks Power Amid Backlash Over Alignment With Trump BRAZIL Brazil Recently, as his father languished in prison for planning a coup, right-wing Brazilian Senator Flávio Bolsonaro appeared as a speaker at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Texas. He told the audience that the charges against his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, who sought to violently overturn the election won by leftist former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2022, were politically motivated. Flávio Bolsonaro is now considered Lula’s main rival as Brazilians prepare to elect a new president on Oct. 4, with the two men neck and neck in the race. At the conference, Flávio Bolsonaro made his pitch. “Trump 2.0 is being much better than Trump 1.0, right?” he said. “Well, Bolsonaro 2.0 will also be much better.” Meanwhile, Lula is running for his fourth term, having previously served from 2003 to 2010 before his current stint. He, too, served time in prison after being convicted of corruption. However, the country’s top court annulled the charges, paving the way for his comeback. The two men are engaged in a lively campaign. Lula recently circulated a video of himself boxing and exercising, a clear dig at his 44-year-old opponent, who famously fainted on television during a 2016 debate. A socialist, Lula came to prominence in the wake of the collapse of the so-called Washington Consensus, a policy framework promoted by American thinkers centered on free enterprise and trade as the basis of economic growth, according to the Hoover Institution. Rejecting this view, he expanded the state’s role in the economy and pushed to redistribute wealth. He lifted millions out of poverty, but also clashed with Brazil’s conservative elites. Today, record tax revenues due to the country’s strong economy have helped Lula maintain his expensive spending plans, Bloomberg noted. Still, the opposition and the business community say the country is a disaster waiting to happen. “We’re not in the intensive-care unit, but we are moving towards that,” Armínio Fraga, a former boss of Brazil’s central bank, told the Economist. The problem, adds the British magazine, is unsustainable debt, especially from a generous pension system. The younger Bolsonaro, in contrast, would shrink government benefits while also cracking down on crime, which Brazilian voters say is one of their top issues. The candidate has called for the construction of “many, many prisons.” Meanwhile, he has also accused Lula of failing to cooperate with US President Donald Trump’s efforts to attack “narco-terrorists” across the region. Recently, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira spoke by phone about potential US plans to designate Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho, major organized crime gangs, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which would subject their members and supporters to sanctions. Brazil had rejected the move last year. Now the US is upping the pressure. Brazil’s resistance stems from concerns that the designation carries consequences that extend beyond law enforcement, wrote Americas Quarterly. “It could alter the legal and diplomatic context in which Brazil manages its own security while widening the reach of US sanctions, prosecutorial pressure and financial compliance into the Brazilian economy,” it said. “It could, in fact, carry greater consequences for other actors, including banks, companies and Brazilian politicians, than for the gangs themselves.” By contrast, Flávio Bolsonaro supports the FTO designation and closer coordination with the US’ new “Shield of the Americas” initiative, which involves joint military offensives against violent criminal gangs. However, analysts say the close association with Trump is what might cost Flávio Bolsonaro the election. Last year, Lula’s approval ratings rose after the Trump administration placed steep tariffs on Brazil and sanctioned officials in an unsuccessful attempt to keep Jair Bolsonaro out of prison. The measures were backed by the former president’s sons Flávio and Eduardo. Analysts say the move has fueled a backlash against the Bolsonaros. “There is growing popular anger directed at the Bolsonaro family for having advocated for US economic sanctions that harmed Brazil’s economy in a bid to protect their father,” World Politics Review wrote. “For those middle-ground voters, this is less about the general question of improving relations with the US, which many Brazilians would like to see happen, and much more about the specifics of how the Bolsonaros have gone about doing it.”

El Salvador Adopts New Law Allowing Life Sentences For Children

El Salvador Adopts New Law Allowing Life Sentences For Children EL SALVADOR El Salvador passed a law this week that allows judges to sentence minors as young as 12 to life in prison, part of a years-long crackdown on criminal gangs that has drastically reduced gang violence but has led to accusations of severe human rights violations. The measure, passed by the legislature controlled by President Nayib Bukele and his Nuevas Ideas party, will apply to sentencing for severe crimes such as homicide, terrorism and rape. The new law lifts certain legal protections for youth offenders and allows for periodic sentence reviews after decades served. The law is to take effect on April 26. Critics, which also include United Nations officials and human rights groups, say that the measure is abusive, inhumane and violates international human rights standards. However, Bukele casts those critics as soft on crime. Since March 2022, El Salvador has been under a state of emergency that has suspended certain civil liberties in favor of greater police and military powers to combat gang violence. Initially designed to last 30 days, the state of emergency has been renewed dozens of times. And since then, the government has carried out a campaign of mass arrest and imprisonment. More than 90,000 have been jailed in the notorious mega prison, the Terrorism Confinement Center, or CECOT, which houses prisoners in inhumane conditions, rights groups say. They add that some of these detainees were arbitrarily arrested and have been held without charges. Others have been processed in mass trials, a process approved in 2023 to allow up to 900 people to be tried at once. Lawyers say they lose track of their clients. Last month, the International Group of Experts for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations under the State of Emergency in El Salvador (GIPES) published a report, which accused the government of crimes against humanity. The report pointed to comments by Bukele acknowledging that “at least 8,000 detainees were innocent.” Meanwhile, the president has also been criticized for weakening checks and balances, repressing the media and dissent and undermining El Salvador’s fragile democracy. Last year, the legislature eliminated presidential term limits, paving the way for Bukele to remain in power indefinitely. Still, Bukele is highly popular with voters because his policies have sharply decreased homicide rates in a country long terrorized by gangs.

Peru: Keiko Fujimori Leads In Peru's Delayed Vote-Runoff Likely

Keiko Fujimori Leads in Peru’s Delayed Vote, Runoff Likely PERU Peru With over half the votes counted in Peru’s extended presidential election, conservatives Keiko Fujimori and Rafael López Aliaga led with 16.88 percent and 13.88 percent of the vote, respectively, assuring a June runoff. A candidate must secure more than half the vote to win outright, a threshold made difficult by a fractured electorate and a record 35 contenders in the race. Peru’s presidential election on Sunday was extended by a day to Monday, after logistical failures prevented tens of thousands of people from voting, sparking nationwide protests over concerns about the transparency of the vote. The extension of voting was announced after counting began Sunday evening, when it became clear that ballots had not reached 15 polling stations, election officials said. Among those who voted on Monday were more than 52,000 residents of the capital Lima, as well as Peruvian voters living in the United States. Peruvians between the ages of 18 and 70 are required to vote, with those who fail to do so facing fines. “I’m fed up,” Iris Valle, 56, told the Associated Press while waiting to cast her ballot Monday at a public school in Lima. She expressed concern that her employer could reduce her pay for not arriving early due to her voting obligation. Peruvian investigators have started an investigation into the delays, carrying out searches at the country’s election headquarters. Officials said the inquiry centers on the breakdown of deliveries of election-related materials to polling stations. A private company involved in the process was also raided. Despite repeated assurances from election officials that the results will reflect voters’ choices, protesters said the disruption had heightened concerns about transparency and participation in an already closely fought race. The election is unfolding in a country grappling with rising violence and corruption, driving deep voter frustration and a widespread perception that candidates lack both integrity and readiness for office. Repeated removals and impeachments of presidents have also increased calls to dissolve Congress, which critics say has untrammeled power, along with demands for systemic political reform. In February, José Jerí became the latest Peruvian president in a decade to leave office before completing a full term. He was removed by lawmakers for failing to disclose meetings with wealthy Chinese businessmen he was legally required to report. Pre-election polls indicated no candidate had support above 15 percent, far below the threshold of more than 50 percent needed for an outright victory, which will likely result in a two-candidate runoff in June. They showed a tight race among conservative candidates, led by Fujimori, Aliaga and Carlos Álvarez. All three campaigned on tough-on-crime and pro-market policies, while left-leaning Alfonso López Chau trailed at around 6 percent. Still, analysts believe the contest remains fluid, pointing to the 2021 election when Pedro Castillo surged from near obscurity to victory.

Indigenous Protestors In Brasil Pressure Lula Over Land Protections Ahead Of Elections

Indigenous Protesters in Brazil Pressure Lula Over Land Protections Ahead of Elections BRAZIL Brazil Thousands of Indigenous protesters marched in Brasília this week to demand stronger protections for their ancestral lands, highlighting tensions over environmental policy and development ahead of October’s presidential elections. Demonstrators marched through the Brazilian capital, denouncing what they described as growing encroachment on Indigenous territories by agricultural, logging and mining projects. They accused the predominantly conservative legislature’s members of being “enemies of the people” due to their alignment with the powerful agribusiness sector, which is held responsible for a large part of the region’s deforestation. Protest organizers said participants would remain camped in Brasília until Friday to press for their demands. The demonstrations follow a broader wave of Indigenous protests across the Amazon, where communities and environmental groups have opposed a range of projects. The protests also reflect mounting pressure on leftist President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who is seeking re-election in October. Indigenous groups largely supported Lula in the 2022 election, when he defeated his far-right predecessor Jair Bolsonaro, whose administration curtailed recognition of Indigenous lands and was associated with increased deforestation in the Amazon. Since taking office, Lula has pledged to protect both the environment and Indigenous communities. His government has overseen a decline in deforestation rates and committed to ending illegal tree felling by 2030. Authorities have also formally recognized 20 Indigenous territories and created a new Ministry of Indigenous Peoples, appointing Sonia Guajajara, a leader from the Guajajara-Tenetehara ethnicity, to head it. However, Lula has also backed certain oil, gas and mining initiatives, arguing they are necessary for Brazil’s economic interests amid rising global demand for energy and critical minerals. At the same time, conservative lawmakers have pushed legislation to weaken or reinterpret constitutional protections for Indigenous land rights. In 2023, Congress approved a law limiting those rights, though Brazil’s Supreme Court later struck it down. Indigenous leaders and rights groups warn that ongoing legal uncertainty leaves their territories vulnerable to agribusiness and mining expansion. Despite these concerns, many Indigenous voters have indicated they still plan to support Lula’s re-election bid. Lula will face Sen. Flavio Bolsonaro – the son of the far-right former president – with recent polls pointing to a closely contested second round between the two candidates.

Peruvians Worry That The Election Won't Stabilize The Country

Peruvians Worry That Election Won’t Stabilize the Country PERU Peru For years, Peruvians have elected a president only to see their leader ousted by Congress and often land in jail. In February, José Jerí became the 7th Peruvian president in a decade to leave office before completing a full term, ousted after he failed to disclose meetings with wealthy Chinese businessmen he was legally required to report. He had been in office for just four months, after assuming power following the impeachment of his predecessor Dina Boluarte in October amid public anger over soaring crime, harsh crackdowns on protesters and a corruption scandal known as Rolexgate. So it’s no surprise that as Peruvians prepare to go to the polls to select a president and members of their new Senate on April 12, most say that no matter whom they choose, it won’t make any difference: It won’t stop the rising violence perpetrated by criminal gangs, solve the country’s economic issues or improve services for the public, they add. “I’ve gotten used to this crisis, because we’re really in a crisis where Congress only dedicates itself to changing the president and looking out for their own well-being,” Javier Osorio, a self-employed worker in Lima, told Reuters. “They’re a bunch of criminals.” As a result, a majority of voters say they are undecided over the more than 30 candidates running in the race. None of the candidates are currently polling above 15 percent of the electorate. Still, polls show that right-wing candidates Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, has a slight lead over comedian Carlos Álvarez of the right-wing Country for All party, with Rafael López Aliaga, one of Peru’s richest men, trailing slightly behind. All three promise tough-on-crime policies and pro-market reforms. Left-leaning contender Alfonso López Chau, an economist and former university rector, is coming in fourth with about 6 percent and a campaign focused on government spending on services. Some analysts believe, however, that Peru may see a repeat of 2021, when far-left candidate Pedro Castillo surged to victory from near-zero support just weeks before the first round of presidential elections. To win outright, a candidate must secure more than 50 percent of the vote. If that doesn’t occur, the top two vote-getters advance to a June 7 runoff. And they believe that this surge will likely be in favor of “Porky” as Aliaga calls himself because of his round face and rosy cheeks, who says he wants to make Peru great again and save it from “lying, murderous and thieving” leftists. Aliaga says he will do that by expelling immigrants, slashing the government bureaucracy and spending, privatizing the state-owned oil company and sending criminals to the Amazon where they will be killed by snakes. He has also proposed allowing US forces to help Peru stop criminal gang operations. Even if Aliaga is elected, it’s not likely to solve Peru’s perennial political instability which is rooted in a steady erosion of institutional checks and balances since 2016, according to former finance minister Alfredo E. Thorne, writing in Americas Quarterly. He says that is when Congress assumed a dominant role, sidelining the constitutional separation of powers and asserting control over the executive, including the ability to install or remove presidents in ways that bypass safeguards meant to ensure a stable political landscape. Peruvians are now hoping that a constitutional change that will take effect this year, one that returns Peru to a bicameral legislature, will help. The existing 130-seat legislature will become the Chamber of Deputies and voters will elect a 60-seat Senate for the first time since 1992. Restoring the Senate could improve oversight and legislative quality, but its impact will depend on how politicians behave, analysts say. “Peru returns to bicameralism with pending issues and with political stability relying more on its politicians than on the reform,” wrote Latinoamérica21. As a result, some believe the election is a crossroads for the country. “Peru’s democracy is in a tough spot,” said an analysis by GIS Reports Online. “As the 2026 elections approach, the question is no longer who will be president, but whether the office itself still matters.”

Argentina: Russian Spy Network Ran Disinformation Campaign

Russian-Linked Spy Network Reportedly Ran Disinformation Campaign Against Argentina’s Milei ARGENTINA Argentina An international media investigation has found that a Russian-linked spy network ran a disinformation campaign in 2024 aimed at undermining Argentine President Javier Milei’s administration and influencing public opinion. The report, released Friday by a media consortium including the UK-based openDemocracy and South Africa’s The Continent, detailed how the network known as “La Compañía” (The Company) infiltrated Argentine media and funded the publication of more than 250 articles across at least 23 outlets between June and October 2024. The network reportedly spent at least $283,100 on media content, paying between $350 and $3,100 per article. The campaign placed stories to discredit Milei’s administration, sow divisions within the ruling coalition, support opposition figures and stir tensions with neighboring countries. One false report claimed Milei sent a sabotage team to attack a gas pipeline in Chile. Many articles lacked bylines or were attributed to fake authors using AI-generated images. The network’s operations in Argentina were led by Russian nationals Lev Andriashvili and Irina Iakovenko, who were based in Buenos Aires. Observers suggested the campaign was driven by Argentina’s foreign policy shift toward the United States after Milei’s election, including his support for Ukraine and invitation to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to his inauguration. The disinformation campaign lost momentum after Argentina distanced itself from Kyiv following the election of US President Donald Trump. Milei described the leak as one of “institutional gravity rarely seen in history” and vowed to “go all the way” to identify those responsible. His La Libertad Avanza party said “‘journalists’ and ‘media outlets’ linked to this are only the tip of the iceberg of something much bigger.” Argentina’s domestic intelligence agency said it uncovered the operation last year and referred it to the judiciary in October. The Russian Embassy in Buenos Aires dismissed the findings as “anti-Russian material,” while several editors named in the report denied involvement. The documents also showed that La Compañía was operating similar campaigns at the time in Bolivia to support then-President Luis Arce, as well as in Venezuela to boost now-ousted President Nicolás Maduro’s image after the disputed July 2024 presidential elections.

Argentina: Milei's Cabinet Chief Charged In Corruption Probe

Milei’s Cabinet Chief Charged in Corruption Probe ARGENTINA Argentina Argentinian prosecutors this week formally charged Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni with illicit enrichment, intensifying a political controversy that adds to mounting legal and ethical challenges facing President Javier Milei’s administration, MercoPress reported Sunday. Federal prosecutor Gerardo Pollicita pushed criminal proceedings forward this week, requesting evidentiary measures from a judge to reconstruct Adorni’s asset history since 2022. The case follows a complaint from lawmaker Marcela Pagano, who cited a 500 percent increase in the senior official’s declared wealth within a single fiscal period. According to the complaint, discrepancies include undeclared financial assets and foreign deposits exceeding $11,500, as well as $24,500 in cash attributed to loans from relatives. Authorities are also examining the possible existence of an undeclared property in a gated community in the capital Buenos Aires. Pollicita has requested property registry data, bank records, migration history, and corporate records involving Adorni, his wife Julieta Bettina Angeletti and relatives. Adorni has denied wrongdoing and insisted that he has “nothing to hide.” He claimed his assets were accumulated during 25 years in the private sector before entering government. Adorni, a close ally of Milei and a key government figure, has described the allegations as part of a “political and media campaign” against the administration. The charges come as Milei’s government faces other corruption allegations, including fraud investigations linked to the promotion of the “$LIBRA” cryptocurrency and a separate case involving an alleged bribery network in the procurement of medicines. Opposition figures have called for greater transparency, with lawmaker Maximiliano Ferraro urging Adorni to step aside.

Bolivia Is Undergoing A Tectonic Shift

Bolivia Is Undergoing a ‘Tectonic Shift’ Under Its New Conservative President BOLIVIA Bolivia In 2008, then-Bolivian President Evo Morales – his country’s first indigenous head of state and a darling of the left in South America – expelled the American ambassador and the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply. Almost two decades later, center-right Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz extradited Sebastian Marset, an alleged Uruguayan drug lord, to Virginia to face charges of money laundering. The move signaled the resumption of legal cooperation between Bolivia and the US and a mending of relations. Marset’s capture and extradition is an example of the dramatic changes that the current president, the first conservative politician to lead the country in two decades, has brought to Bolivia since his election victory in October. There has been a “tectonic shift” in Bolivia in recent months, say observers. During the runoff election, in which Paz faced a more conservative rival after infighting within the left divided the electorate, Paz pledged to bring “capitalism for all” to the country. In particular, Paz has vowed to create a mining and oil boom. Bolivia, for example, is blessed with 20 percent of the world’s lithium reserves but has failed to benefit from the massive spike in demand for the mineral, which is essential for electric vehicle batteries and other technologies. “Peru last year had mining revenues of around $50 billion,” Paz told the Financial Times. “Chile had revenues with state and private companies of $65 billion. And we . . . had just $6 billion.” Paz also recently attended American President Donald Trump’s “Shield of the Americas” summit in Miami. The organization included far-right luminaries like Argentine President Javier Milei and El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. Moves like these are reasons why Bolivia under Paz has received billions in loans from the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington. He has faced headwinds, however. For example, critics of Paz’s reform plan say it flouts the law and will harm the environment. Writing in the Conversation, Enrique Castañón Ballivián, a lecturer in international development at University College London, wrote how Paz has garnered emergency powers and made changes to national taxes without legislative approval, given the central bank too much leeway in acquiring foreign debt, and fast-tracked commodity extraction projects without pollution safeguards or local approval. Paz’s defenders counter that he must do something to bring prosperity to the landlocked Andean nation. Morales nationalized the country’s lithium industry, vowing to retrieve the so-called “white gold” without multinational corporations, wrote Progressive magazine. He invested $1 billion into the state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos, but the company has failed to capitalize on the country’s resources. Paz also ended fuel subsidies to shore up the Bolivian government’s finances, part of an austerity plan that led to other cuts in public services and stipends. Mass nationwide, union-led protests broke out in response. After weeks of negotiations with unions and other groups, the government retreated: It eliminated or changed most of the cuts even as the fuel subsidy cut remained. Yet even Paz’s detractors admit that the subsidies were unsustainable. He increased the minimum wage, school stipends, and state pensions in a bid to take the sting out of the new policy. Paz has a tough road to travel. But analysts say they are amazed at what he has done already. When he took office, Paz faced a country in economic crisis with inflation topping 20 percent, depleted foreign currency reserves and lines at gas stations stretching for blocks, wrote Americas Quarterly. At the same time, he faced staunch opposition from the legislature, the opposition and within his own government. “Any one of these challenges might have immobilized a new administration,” the magazine wrote. “Yet in his first 90 days, Paz has done what many believed impossible: He not only survived the initial storm but also began to change the nation’s trajectory.”

Argentina Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup

Argentinians Mark 50th Anniversary of Military Coup ARGENTINA Argentina Tens of thousands of people marched in cities across Argentina this week to mark 50 years since the 1976 military coup that ushered in one of Latin America’s bloodiest dictatorships, the Associated Press reported. Demonstrations took place Tuesday in a number of cities, with the largest in Buenos Aires, as political tensions rise due to libertarian President Javier Milei’s efforts to challenge long-standing narratives about the junta that ruled the country from 1976 to 1983. The anniversary coincided with the publication of nearly 500 pages of intelligence documents from 1973 to 1983, including records of surveillance on universities, unions and political organizations, the Buenos Aires Times reported. Human rights organizations say around 30,000 people were disappeared during the junta’s campaign against dissidents, including left-wing guerrillas, labor activists and students. A truth commission and rights groups attribute most of the violence to state security forces, which carried out disappearances, torture and the theft of babies. The Abuelas (grandmothers) de Plaza de Mayo, one of the groups leading the demonstrations, say they have identified around 140 children taken from their families, out of an estimated 500 babies born in captivity and illegally adopted. More than 300 are still believed to be missing. However, Milei’s government has rejected the human rights organizations’ tally of the victims, putting the number of disappeared at fewer than 9,000 and arguing that the victims of attacks by left-wing guerrilla groups active at the time should also be commemorated. On Tuesday, the presidency released a video criticizing what it called a “biased and revanchist perspective” of the period. Meanwhile, critics have accused the libertarian president of undermining human rights efforts and recovering victims’ remains. As part of his austerity plan, Milei’s administration has downgraded the Human Rights Secretariat by cutting its budget and dismissing staff involved in archive analysis. Efforts to locate victims’ remains have long been hindered by the military’s refusal to provide information, activists say.

La larga sombra de Dos Erres

La larga sombra de Dos Erres Miembros de los Kaibiles, las fuerzas especiales de élite que perpetraron la masacre de Dos Erres. Crédito: This American Life Miembros de los Kaibiles, las fuerzas especiales de élite que perpetraron la masacre de Dos Erres. Crédito: This American Life Un tribunal canadiense sanciona al perpetrado de la masacre de Dos Erres de 1982 en Guatemala El gobierno de Canadá no cumple aplicar la Ley de Crímenes de Guerra Sobreviviente de la masacre: “No hay justicia” Published: Mar 19, 2026 Briefing Book # 917 Editado por Kate Doyle y Claire Dorfman Para más información contacte: 202-994-7000 o nsarchiv@gwu.edu Subjects Human Rights and Genocide Torture Regions Mexico and Central America Events Guatemala Civil War, 1960-1996 Project Guatemala Ramiro Osorio Cristales Ramiro Osorio Cristales, uno de los dos sobrevivientes de la masacre, testifica en Canadá en 2024. Crédito: Loubna Chlaikhy/La Converse. Jorge Sosa Orantes Fotografía militar de Jorge Sosa Orantes. Crédito: ProPublica. Members of the EAAF and relatives of victims at the Dos Erres site during an excavation. Miembros del EAAF y familiares de víctimas en Dos Erres durante una excavación. Crédito: EAAF. Patricia Bernardi Patricia Bernardi del Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense (EAAF) sostiene ropa de niños encontrada en el pozo de Dos Erres durante una excavación, el 16 de julio de 1995. Crédito: EAAF. The EAAF in the well at Dos Erres during an excavation. El EAAF en el pozo de Dos Erres durante una excavación. Crédito: EAAF. Washington, D.C., 19 de marzo de 2026 - El tribunal federal de Ottawa finalmente decidió revocar la ciudadanía canadiense de un oficial militar guatemalteco que participó en una horrible y tristemente célebre masacre de cientos de civiles inocentes en 1982. El 5 de febrero, la decisión concluyó que Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes, un ex subteniente y miembro de las fuerzas especiales Kaibiles, cometió crímenes de lesa humanidad al participar en la masacre de hombres, mujeres y niños que vivían en el pequeño pueblo de Dos Erres, en el norte de Guatemala. Kate Doyle del Archivo de Seguridad Nacional testificó como experta durante el juicio. El Archivo publicó la decisión de la Corte y documentos estadounidenses y guatemaltecos utilizados como pruebas. El “Plan de campaña Victoria 82”, documento clave del ejército guatemalteco que estableció la estrategia de contrainsurgencia durante el año de la masacre de Dos Erres, se publica hoy por primera vez. También se han divulgado cables de la embajada estadounidense en Guatemala, que, tras la masacre, responsabilizó al ejército por los actos cometidos. La decisión del juez Roger R. Lafrenière constituye una victoria en la larga lucha relacionada con la masacre de Dos Erres. Representa una prueba de esperanza para los sobrevivientes y los defensores de los derechos humanos. Según el principio de jurisdicción universal, Canadá puede procesar a otras personas por crímenes internacionales, como el genocidio y los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Sin embargo, el gobierno canadiense no ha ejercido este poder. En cambio, impuso sanciones administrativas a Jorge Sosa, impidiéndole enfrentar los cargos por los crímenes que cometió. Uno de los sobrevivientes reaccionó con desconfianza ante la decisión del tribunal. Ramiro Osorio Cristales tenía cinco años cuando su familia fue asesinada en Dos Erres. Como refugiado en Canadá, testificó en el juicio de Ottawa. Al anunciarse el veredicto, Osorio declaró su decepción. “Simplemente le quitarán la ciudadanía y lo expulsarán. No habrá justicia. En realidad, casi no se ha hecho nada… Queríamos que respondiera por sus actos y que fuera juzgado por sus crímenes”. Ataque sistemático contra civiles en Guatemala La masacre de Dos Erres ocurrió en el contexto de un “ataque generalizado y sistemático perpetrado por el ejército guatemalteco contra la población civil en los años 80”, como señala el juez Lafrenière en su decisión. Este conflicto interno se intensificó en violencia durante más de cuatro décadas, de 1960 a 1996, cuando se firmó un tratado de paz. La guerra enfrentó al gobierno contra insurgencias armadas, movimientos sociales militantes y cualquier persona sospechosa de simpatías subversivas, incluidas comunidades enteras. Al final del conflicto, más de 200,000 guatemaltecos habían muerto o desaparecido, y más de un millón de personas habían sido desplazadas. En 1999, una comisión de la verdad auspiciada por las Naciones Unidas concluyó que el 93 % de las violaciones de derechos humanos documentadas durante la guerra fueron cometidas por “las fuerzas del Estado y grupos paramilitares afines”. Según la comisión, el ejército destruyó aproximadamente 626 aldeas en operaciones que devastaron las regiones rurales de Guatemala, incluyendo Dos Erres.[1] El 6 de diciembre de 1982, una unidad de élite de 40 soldados, dirigida por la unidad Kaibil, salió de su base militar hacia la pequeña comunidad agrícola de Dos Erres, que contaba con unos 300 habitantes y había sido identificada por el sistema de inteligencia guatemalteco como favorable a la insurgencia armada. El 7 de diciembre, soldados vestidos como gorilas entraron al pueblo, ocultando sus identidades. Fueron de casa en casa para reunir a las familias en el centro del pueblo. Ejecutaron a los hombres en una escuela y asesinaron a mujeres y niños en una iglesia. La matanza comenzó cuando un soldado arrojó a un niño a un pozo. Los Kaibiles torturaron a hombres, violaron a varias mujeres y niñas antes de matarlas y arrojarlas al pozo. Para la noche del 7 de diciembre, habían asesinado a la mayoría de los habitantes de Dos Erres, incluidos los niños. Como describe la sentencia canadiense, En la mañana del 8 de diciembre, cuando la patrulla se disponía a partir, personas que no sospechaban nada llegaron a la aldea. Como el pozo ya estaba lleno, fueron llevadas a media hora de distancia y ejecutadas. Dos adolescentes, salvadas por la patrulla, fueron violadas repetidamente y luego estranguladas. Solo dos niños pequeños, uno de ellos de ojos claros, sobrevivieron. Cuando la patrulla dejó Las Dos Erres, el pueblo fue borrado del mapa. (pp. 6) Más de 250 personas perdieron la vida en esta masacre.[2] Los Kaibiles eran soldados entrenados en operaciones especiales de contrainsurgencia y contraterrorismo, tristemente célebres por su uso de la tortura y su brutalidad extrema. En la sentencia canadiense, Jorge Sosa Orantes fue identificado como instructor en la escuela Kaibil y “uno de los oficiales que comandó la operación en Las Dos Erres”. (pp. 3-4) Basándose en testimonios y otras pruebas presentadas en el juicio, el juez Lafrenière concluyó que Sosa asesinó directamente a aldeanos, incitó a sus subordinados a hacerlo y que sus actos formaban parte de un “ataque más amplio contra los civiles en Dos Erres y sus alrededores”. (pp. 6) Un mentiroso consumado Tras la masacre, el sargento Jorge Sosa continuó enseñando en la escuela Kaibil. Su expediente militar indica que su rol en este trágico evento no afectó negativamente su carrera. Incluso fue ascendido a teniente y trasladado a la zona de conflicto militar de Quiché en 1983, donde sirvió como comandante. En 1984, fue transferido a la Ciudad de Guatemala para trabajar en la academia militar (Escuela Politécnica). Sosa desertó del ejército y se dirigió a Estados Unidos en 1985, donde solicitó asilo político, presentándose como un antiguo soldado honorable amenazado de muerte por guerrilleros guatemaltecos. Tras el rechazo de su solicitud en Estados Unidos, acudió al consulado canadiense en San Francisco para obtener el estatus de refugiado y la residencia en Canadá. Este fracaso en Estados Unidos lo obligó a cambiar de estrategia. Como demostrarían más tarde los fiscales canadienses, Sosa se describió entonces como un “trabajador de fábrica desesperado” que se unió a sus colegas para exigir mejores condiciones laborales. Tras el arresto de estos, Sosa declaró a los agentes de inmigración que se había visto obligado a huir de Guatemala con su familia “por temor a la persecución política”. (pp. 49) La estrategia funcionó. Sosa obtuvo una visa de residente permanente en Canadá en 1988 y se convirtió en ciudadano canadiense en 1992. Treinta y cuatro años después, el juez Lafrenière utilizó las declaraciones fraudulentas de Sosa para revocar su ciudadanía, calificando al exmilitar guatemalteco de “mentiroso consumado”. (pp. 116) Gracias a las acusaciones del gobierno canadiense contra Sosa Orantes, esta información se hizo pública. Fue presentada por los ministros de Ciudadanía e Inmigración y de Seguridad Pública y Protección Civil. El Ministerio de Justicia canadiense decidió no procesar al guatemalteco en virtud de la Ley de Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y Crímenes de Guerra, una ley de 26 años que otorga a los fiscales canadienses poder de jurisdicción universal. El ministro de Justicia no anunció públicamente su decisión, dejando dudas sobre los factores considerados y los ignorados. En 2016, las autoridades contactaron al Archivo de Seguridad Nacional para saber si aceptaríamos participar como expertos en este caso. Esas autoridades eran de la Sección de Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y Crímenes de Guerra del Ministerio de Justicia de Canadá. Si la obtención de la ciudadanía de Sosa dependía de la veracidad de la información proporcionada en sus entrevistas de inmigración, un tribunal debía determinar si existían “motivos razonables para creer” que Sosa había cometido el crimen más atroz contra los derechos humanos: genocidio, crímenes de lesa humanidad o crímenes de guerra. Esto incluye delitos criminales canadienses como “asesinato, exterminio, esclavitud, deportación, encarcelamiento, tortura, violencia sexual, persecución o cualquier otro acto u omisión inhumana cometida contra una población civil o un grupo identificable…”. El fiscal del Estado presentó este argumento ante la corte usando documentos como pruebas. En su decisión de 136 páginas, el juez Lafrenière se basó en las pruebas presentadas para examinar los patrones de violencia cometidos por el ejército guatemalteco contra civiles a principios de los años 80;[3] la estrategia de contrainsurgencia del ejército y la estructura y operaciones de las fuerzas especiales Kaibil;[4] documentos desclasificados estadounidenses y guatemaltecos que muestran que la masacre de Dos Erres era consistente con otras atrocidades cometidas durante la guerra;[5] y los resultados de las primeras exhumaciones en Dos Erres, realizadas en los años 90 por un equipo de antropólogos forenses.[6] La Corte escuchó el testimonio de un exmiembro de los Kaibil y testigo de la masacre, quien describió las acciones del entonces teniente Jorge Sosa Orantes,[7] así como los recuerdos de Ramiro Osorio Cristales, uno de los pocos sobrevivientes de la masacre, quien perdió a su padre, madre, hermanas y hermanos hace 44 años.[8] El testimonio de Osorio fue mucho más que una simple enumeración de horrores vividos. Como escribió el juez en su decisión: Recuerda Las Dos Erres como un paisaje rural verde, habitado por una comunidad agrícola. Además de las pequeñas casas de madera, el pueblo contaba con una iglesia y una escuela. Allí vivía con su madre, Petrona, su padre, Víctor, y sus cinco hermanos. Recordaba que su hermana menor tenía aproximadamente dos meses al momento de la masacre. (p103) En conclusión, el juez Lafrenière determinó que “en diciembre de 1982, Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes participó en la atroz masacre durante la operación de patrulla Kaibil en el pueblo de Las Dos Erres”. Calificó claramente la destrucción del pueblo y el asesinato de sus habitantes como crímenes de lesa humanidad. Esta decisión hace que Sosa Orantes sea considerado inadmisible en Canadá y sujeto a una medida de expulsión. Sosa Orantes, aún impune, continúa beneficiándose de protección después de cometer un terrible genocidio. Retórica vs. responsabilidad Canadá se ha considerado durante mucho tiempo un defensor de los derechos humanos internacionales y un líder en la implementación de la jurisdicción universal. Dos años después de la adopción del Estatuto de Roma en 1998, que estableció la Corte Penal Internacional, Canadá se convirtió en el primer país del mundo en incorporar las obligaciones del estatuto al derecho interno con la aprobación de la Ley de Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y Crímenes de Guerra en 2000. Esta ley otorgó a Canadá la facultad de investigar y enjuiciar a los presuntos autores de crímenes internacionales en tribunales nacionales, independientemente de que los crímenes se hubieran cometido en Canadá o de que los acusados ​​fueran ciudadanos canadienses. Sin embargo, 26 años después, el historial de Canadá en materia de jurisdicción universal es escaso. Desde la ratificación de la ley, se han llevado a cabo exactamente dos juicios bajo esta ley. En 2005, el ruandés Désiré Munyaneza se convirtió en la primera persona arrestada bajo esta ley. Fue juzgado por genocidio, crímenes de lesa humanidad y crímenes de guerra, declarado culpable en 2009 y condenado a cadena perpetua. Un segundo ruandés residente en Canadá, Jacques Mungwarere, fue acusado de manera similar y juzgado, pero absuelto en 2013. Un tercer caso se deriva del arresto en 2024 de Ahmed Eldidi, un ciudadano naturalizado acusado de desmembrar a un prisionero en nombre de Daesh (ISIS o Estado Islámico) en 2015. Expertos en derecho internacional en Canadá han advertido durante años que la preferencia del gobierno por los recursos migratorios en lugar de los juicios por crímenes de guerra dañó la reputación de Canadá como pionero en la jurisdicción universal. En 2010, la jurista Fannie Lafontaine publicó un artículo fundamental sobre la Ley de Crímenes de Guerra de Canadá, diez años después de su promulgación e inmediatamente después de la condena de Munyaneza. Las autoridades "deberían considerar la responsabilidad que Canadá ha asumido en la lucha global contra la impunidad", escribió. "Una vez que se encuentra a un sospechoso en territorio canadiense, Canadá tiene la responsabilidad, ante la comunidad internacional, de garantizar la rendición de cuentas, tanto en Canadá como en el extranjero".[9] Los expertos también se muestran escépticos respecto al compromiso de Canadá de seguir adelante con su caso contra Ahmed Eldidi. Tras hacerse pública la acusación contra Eldidi en 2024, Mark Kersten, profesor de justicia penal en Columbia Británica, observó que "la capacidad de Canadá para procesar crímenes internacionales en los tribunales canadienses se ha debilitado". Abogados Sin Fronteras Canadá ha brindado asistencia legal a Ramiro Osorio Cristales, sobreviviente de la masacre de Dos Erres, durante más de 15 años. En un informe reciente, ASF Canadá denunció la "clara falta de voluntad política" de las autoridades canadienses para utilizar las herramientas legales a su disposición para procesar a Jorge Sosa Orantes. Si bien las medidas migratorias, como la exclusión o la expulsión, "son útiles para evitar que el país se convierta en refugio de criminales de guerra", señaló el informe, "no cumplen el objetivo general de hacer justicia a las víctimas y garantizar la rendición de cuentas por estos crímenes". El único caso activo en Canadá relacionado con genocidio, crímenes de lesa humanidad y crímenes de guerra (Eldidi) contrasta marcadamente con los Estados que impulsan con mayor intensidad los procesos de jurisdicción universal. Según TRIAL International, organización de investigación y defensa de la justicia con sede en Ginebra, en su Informe sobre la Jurisdicción Universal 2025, Francia tiene 26 casos activos; Alemania, 20; Bélgica y los Países Bajos, 12 cada uno. Fuera de Europa, Argentina tiene siete casos en curso. Entre expulsiones, extradiciones y ausencia Se desconoce actualmente el paradero de Jorge Sosa Orantes. Al no haber comparecido nunca ante el tribunal de Ottawa, fue juzgado en rebeldía. En su fallo, el juez Lafrenière escribió que el ex Kaibil había declarado bajo juramento ante el tribunal que residía en Alberta; sin embargo, posteriormente se reveló que ni siquiera se encontraba en Canadá en ese momento. (pp. 117) Técnicamente, Sosa podría ser arrestado por crímenes contra la humanidad si se encontrara en el territorio nacional, pero esto es altamente improbable. Según la directora de ASF Canadá, el gobierno dedicó más de diez años y recursos considerables a un caso de inmigración y ciudadanía. Sería difícil imaginar que el ministro de Justicia considere un segundo arresto en virtud de la ley sobre crímenes de guerra. Si Sosa permanece en el país, es posible que sea expulsado. Esta situación no sería sin precedentes: de hecho, ya había sido expulsado hacia Estados Unidos en 2011. En 1980, se le había denegado el estatus de refugiado, pero en 2008 logró obtener la ciudadanía estadounidense gracias a su matrimonio. Después de que las autoridades gubernamentales estadounidenses descubrieron que había mentido sobre su servicio militar en Guatemala, el Departamento de Justicia decidió acusarlo de fraude y expulsarlo del país. En ese momento, otros dos países habían presentado solicitudes de extradición. Una provenía de España, en el marco de un amplio caso de genocidio instruido ante la Audiencia Nacional española, que, al igual que Canadá, reconocía la jurisdicción universal.[10] La otra provenía de Guatemala. En 2011, Guatemala había nombrado a una nueva fiscal general, Claudia Paz y Paz, dispuesta a procesar casos criminales históricos relacionados con violaciones de los derechos humanos. El primer juicio contra los soldados acusados de la masacre de Dos Erres concluyó el 2 de agosto de 2011 con la condena de cuatro ex Kaibiles: Daniel Martínez, Manuel Pop Sun, Reyes Collin Golip y el teniente Carlos Antonio Carias. Cada uno fue condenado a 30 años de prisión por cada habitante de Dos Erres asesinado (se identificaron 201 víctimas en este caso), lo que suma un total de 6.060 años, por asesinato y crímenes contra la humanidad. Canadá podría haber expulsado a Sosa Orantes a su país de origen para que fuera juzgado por la masacre de Dos Erres. Sin embargo, Canadá decidió extraditarlo a Estados Unidos, donde enfrentó cargos de fraude, mucho menos graves que los actos que cometió en Guatemala. Condenado por fraude en California en 2014, Sosa Orantes pasó cinco años en una prisión federal estadounidense antes de regresar a Canadá en 2020. Tras la decisión del juez Lafrenière, es muy probable que Sosa Orantes sea trasladado nuevamente, esta vez a Guatemala. Pero el panorama de la rendición de cuentas en este país centroamericano ha cambiado radicalmente desde 2011. La fiscal general Maria Consuelo Porras, en el cargo desde hace ocho años, ha debilitado progresivamente la capacidad del sistema judicial para procesar a antiguos miembros de las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad por violaciones de los derechos humanos. Porras ha desmantelado el equipo jurídico del Ministerio Público encargado de investigar crímenes contra la humanidad (Fiscalía de Derechos Humanos); ha intimidado, acosado y procesado penalmente a jueces que dictaron sentencias en juicios por violaciones de los derechos humanos; y jueces afines a ella han ordenado la liberación de militares ya condenados por crímenes contra la humanidad.[11] El ataque a la justicia de los derechos humanos en Guatemala ha tenido un impacto directo en el caso Dos Erres. De 2011 a 2018, los tribunales guatemaltecos llevaron a cabo tres juicios contra los presuntos autores de la masacre de Dos Erres. Estos juicios resultaron en la condena de seis ex soldados Kaibil. Pero el 7 de noviembre de 2023, el primer juicio de Dos Erres celebrado desde que Consuelo Porras asumió su cargo como fiscal general concluyó con absoluciones para los tres acusados. Uno de ellos es Gilberto Jordán, quien fue condenado en Florida en 2010 por mentir sobre su papel en la masacre durante su solicitud de ciudadanía, en relación con sus acciones en los servicios militares en Guatemala. En el juicio, como indicaron los fiscales al juez, el ex Kaibil confesó que arrojó a un bebé al pozo al inicio de la masacre y que llevó a decenas de hombres, mujeres y niños para que fueran asesinados allí. Jordán fue condenado a la pena máxima por fraude de ciudadanía estadounidense y cumplió una década en una prisión federal. En 2020, fue extraditado a Guatemala, donde fue absuelto, al igual que sus antiguos compañeros de armas, Alfonso Bulux y José Mardoqueo Ortiz. En mayo, María Consuelo Porras terminará su segundo y último mandato como fiscal general. Dejará atrás un sistema judicial en ruinas y que seguirá siendo abiertamente hostil a los procesos por violaciones de los derechos humanos en un futuro previsible. Si Canadá expulsa a José Sosa Orantes a Guatemala, las probabilidades de su condena en ese país parecen ahora escasas. Canadá: una decepción para la justicia internacional Durante el juicio de Sosa en Canadá, los fiscales del gobierno presentaron argumentos convincentes para probar la culpabilidad del ex Kaibil en atrocidades contra la humanidad. No era necesario presentar cargos para que Canadá le retirara la ciudadanía, pero sí para sacarlo del país. Sin embargo, los abogados presentaron mucho más que un simple argumento de inadmisibilidad. En su alegato final, la fiscal Sonja Pavic destacó ante el juez Lafrenière la importancia de su decisión: “Su decisión tendrá repercusiones en la historia, en las víctimas y en sus familias”. El juez respondió calificando inequívocamente las atrocidades cometidas en Dos Erres como crímenes de lesa humanidad. La Ley de Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y Crímenes de Guerra otorga exclusivamente al ministro de Justicia de Canadá la decisión de iniciar o no procesos bajo esta ley. Sin embargo, en varias ocasiones, el ministro optó por no iniciar procesos. En el caso de Dos Erres, la decisión de Canadá afectó a Ramiro Osorio: el país que le ofreció refugio tras salir de Guatemala es el mismo país que albergó durante décadas a uno de los asesinos de su familia y que hoy se niega a procesarlo por sus crímenes. No obstante, el fallo Dos Erres también daña el estado de derecho internacional. La persistencia de Canadá en privilegiar sanciones administrativas frente a los presuntos autores de los crímenes más graves debilita la ley, socava las instituciones judiciales y contribuye a la impunidad. Como Estado adherente al principio de jurisdicción universal, Canadá, al abstenerse de aplicarlo ante sus propios tribunales federales, vacía la Ley de Crímenes de Guerra de su alcance y la reduce a una promesa sin efecto. Traducción original por Yohan Leclerc con redacción por el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional * * * * Los documentos estadounidenses publicados hoy fueron obtenidos por el Archivo de Seguridad Nacional bajo la Ley de Libertad de Información (FOIA). Todos ellos se utilizaron como pruebas en el caso canadiense de Dos Erres. Los documentos guatemaltecos provienen de la colección de investigación del Archivo. Se obtuvieron a lo largo de los años gracias a su participación en diversas investigaciones y juicios penales de derechos humanos en Guatemala. Los fiscales canadienses utilizaron estos cuatro documentos y otros 23 que les entregaron las autoridades guatemaltecas como pruebas en el caso. Documentos Documentos estadounidenses d1 917s Documento 1 Defense Intelligence Agency, Military Intelligence Summary (MIS), Volume VIII--Latin America, Diciembre 1980, Resumen de inteligencia secreta Dec 1980 La Agencia de Inteligencia de Defensa (DIA) publica periódicamente informes de inteligencia con información sobre la estructura y las capacidades de las fuerzas militares extranjeras. En la página seis de este resumen de 1980 sobre el ejército guatemalteco, la DIA proporciona información sobre el centro de entrenamiento de contrainsurgencia Kaibil (rangers), ubicado en La Pólvora, en el Petén. El informe describe cómo cada batallón de infantería de Guatemala cuenta con un pelotón Kaibil, “que puede desplegarse como una pequeña unidad independiente. Estos pelotones se utilizan como cuadro para entrenar a otros reclutas en técnicas y tácticas de insurgencia y contrainsurgencia. La Fuerza Aérea envía personal a la Escuela Kaibil para entrenamiento de supervivencia”. El documento indica que era rutinario que las unidades del ejército guatemalteco tomaran prestados pelotones Kaibil para acciones específicas, tal como lo hizo la Brigada Militar de Poptún durante la operación Dos Erres. d2 917s Documento 2 Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Establishes a Strategic Reaction Force, 19 Noviembre, 1982, Cable confidencial Nov 19, 1982 Menos de un mes antes de la masacre de Dos Erres, la DIA informa sobre la creación de una "fuerza de reacción estratégica" compuesta por 20 instructores de guardabosques Kaibil con base en la Brigada Mariscal Zavala de la Ciudad de Guatemala. Esta unidad especial se formó para llevar a cabo la misión de "desplegarse rápidamente a todo el país para buscar y destruir elementos guerrilleros". El documento indica que la unidad Kaibil quedó bajo el control directo del mando militar central de Guatemala. Afirma: "El gran éxito de la unidad en enfrentamientos previos con el enemigo ha impulsado al Estado Mayor del Ejército de Guatemala (EGU) a asumir el mando y control directo de esta unidad". El documento aclara que esta unidad especial de instructores Kaibil se formó y movilizó apenas unas semanas antes de la masacre de Dos Erres. 3 917s Documento 3 U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Guatemalan Counter Terrorism Capabilities, 10 Diciembre, 1982, Cable secreto Dec 10, 1982 Días después de la masacre de Dos Erres, la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Guatemala envía un mensaje a Washington con información sobre la capacidad táctica antiterrorista de la policía y las fuerzas militares guatemaltecas. El cable informa que una unidad Kaibil, con base en el cuartel general de la Brigada Mariscal Zavala, "ha sido desplegada recientemente en el Petén y ahora opera bajo la supervisión de la Brigada Militar de Poptún". 4 917s Documento 4 U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Alleged Massacre of 200 at Village of Dos R's, Petén, 28 Diciembre, 1982, Cable secreto/Exdis Dec 28, 1982 Mientras surgen noticias sobre Dos Erres, funcionarios estadounidenses investigan el asunto e informan sobre la información obtenida a través de una "fuente confiable de la embajada", quien les indicó que el ejército guatemalteco pudo haber masacrado a 200 aldeanos en Dos Erres. Habitantes de la cercana aldea de Las Cruces informaron a la fuente que una unidad del ejército guatemalteco "disfrazada de guerrilleros" había entrado en el asentamiento de Dos Erres, había reunido a la gente y les había exigido su apoyo. Un aldeano que fue golpeado, pero logró escapar, relató la historia posteriormente a los habitantes de Las Cruces. Al preguntársele repetidamente a quién apoyaba, el hombre respondió: "al ejército", aunque "no está claro cómo supo que los hombres armados eran del ejército disfrazados de guerrilleros", según el cable. Otro testigo afirmó que la aldea estaba completamente desierta y afirmó haber encontrado tarjetas de identificación quemadas en la iglesia local. También afirmó que el ejército regresó a la aldea unos días después y utilizó vehículos militares para trasladar techos y muebles de las casas a la base militar en Las Cruces. La Embajada de Estados Unidos ofrece posibles teorías sobre por qué no se encontraron cuerpos y cómo toda la población de Dos Erres pudo simplemente haber "desaparecido". Una posibilidad era que el ejército hubiera asesinado a todos los habitantes del pueblo y arrojado los cuerpos al pozo. Esto se basó en el testimonio de los lugareños que habían entrado en el pueblo y vieron que el pozo ya estaba tapado, pero temían mirar dentro. El cable, firmado por el encargado de la Embajada, continúa indicando que, debido a la fiabilidad de la fuente y la gravedad de las acusaciones, un funcionario de la Embajada viajará a la zona el 30 de diciembre de 1982 para investigar el asunto personalmente. 5 917s Documento 5 U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, Possible Massacre in “Dos R's”, El Petén, 31 Diciembre, 1982, Cable secreto Dec 31, 1982 El 30 de diciembre, tres miembros de la misión de la Embajada de Estados Unidos y un diplomático canadiense visitaron el pueblo de Las Cruces para investigar las denuncias de la masacre de "Dos Erres". El equipo verificó la existencia de "Dos Erres", señalando que "no era realmente un pueblo ni siquiera una aldea", sino que consistía en "casas o grupos de casas dispersas" que ahora estaban desiertas, muchas de ellas quemadas hasta los cimientos. En el camino, los miembros del equipo de la misión se detuvieron en la Base del Ejército de Guatemala en Poptún, donde hablaron con el oficial de operaciones (S3), quien les informó que la zona cercana a Las Cruces era excepcionalmente peligrosa debido a la reciente actividad guerrillera. Oficiales del ejército explicaron que Dos Erres "había sufrido un ataque guerrillero a principios de diciembre" y que visitar el pueblo representaría un riesgo considerable para ellos. Desde Poptún, los miembros de la misión volaron directamente al pueblo de Las Cruces (siguiendo las indicaciones proporcionadas por su fuente) y luego a Dos Erres. Sin embargo, al llegar, el piloto del helicóptero se negó a aterrizar, pero accedió a sobrevolar la zona a baja altura. Desde esta perspectiva, los funcionarios de la Embajada pudieron observar que las casas habían sido “arrasadas o destruidas por el fuego”. Posteriormente, regresaron a Las Cruces para hablar con los lugareños, incluyendo a un miembro de la patrulla de defensa civil (PAC) local y “un confidente del ejército en la zona”. Este declaró a los funcionarios que el ejército era responsable de la desaparición de las personas en Dos Erres y que le habían ordenado mantenerse alejado de la zona a principios de diciembre, ya que el ejército “iba a realizar una redada”. También confirmó informes previos de que los soldados vestían de civil durante la redada, pero portaban botas de combate militares y rifles Galil identificables. El cable señala que esta información coincide con la de la fuente anterior. Con base en la información obtenida durante su viaje, el cable indica que “la Embajada debe concluir que el más probable responsable de este incidente es el Ejército de Guatemala”. 6 917s Documento 6 Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Guatemala’s Guerrillas Retreating in the Face of Government Pressure, 3 Marzo, 1983, Informe secreto Mar 3, 1983 Este informe de inteligencia resume la historia y la situación en 1983 de cada uno de los cuatro grupos insurgentes guatemaltecos y analiza los éxitos militares del presidente Ríos Montt contra ellos y sus seguidores. “A quienes se percibe como no partidarios del gobierno se les responde con la fuerza que se considere necesaria”. En la sección dedicada al grupo armado Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), que operaba en el Petén, los autores del informe estiman que en ese momento solo había entre 150 y 300 combatientes, pero que la inteligencia guatemalteca, no obstante, creía que las FAR, “doctrinalmente marxistas-leninistas, son potencialmente la más peligrosa” de las organizaciones guerrilleras. Para el caso canadiense contra Sosa Orantes, el informe fue útil por la conexión que establece entre una emboscada perpetrada por las FAR contra tropas del ejército en octubre de 1982, en la que murieron más de una docena de soldados, y el ataque a Dos Erres dos meses después. Según el documento, tras la emboscada, “el ejército respondió quemando las casas y los cultivos de dos aldeas cercanas. Las FAR respondieron con un ataque a una aldea vecina. La masacre de la población de Los Dos R’s por parte del ejército se produjo poco después”. Documentos guatemaltecos 7 917s Documento 7 Decreto no. 1782, Ley Constitutiva del Ejército de Guatemala, 11 Septiembre, 1968 Sep 11, 1968 Esta edición del Diario Oficial de la República de Guatemala—Centro América (la publicación oficial de los decretos, reglamentos y avisos públicos del gobierno guatemalteco, análogo al Registro Federal de los Estados Unidos) proporciona el marco legal para la estructura, jerarquía y funciones de las fuerzas armadas de Guatemala en 1968. El documento demuestra que el ejército guatemalteco tenía una estructura de mando estrictamente jerárquica y se ajustaba a reglas detalladas con respecto a todo, desde el entrenamiento, el reclutamiento, los ascensos y los premios, hasta los salarios de los soldados y los beneficios de vacaciones. Según el decreto, la estructura del ejército estaba organizada de arriba a abajo: desde el Comandante General (Presidente o Jefe de Estado), el Ministro de la Defensa Nacional, el Viceministro de Defensa y el Jefe del Estado Mayor General del Ejército, hasta los Estados Mayores Especiales y Personales, los Comandos Militares, los Servicios Militares, los Centros de Educación e Instrucción y otras dependencias. Juntos, el Comandante General, el Ministro de la Defensa Nacional y el Jefe del Estado Mayor del Ejército constituían el Alto Mando (Artículo 12). Los miembros del ejército, con instrucciones de ser "obedientes" (Artículo 7), incluían oficiales, tropas y "especialistas", civiles que buscaban empleo en la institución en su campo de especialidad (Capítulo XXI). El decreto también indicaba que el país estaba dividido en Zonas Militares y Bases Militares. Si bien la Ley Constitutiva del ejército sufrió reformas y pequeños cambios ocasionales, se mantuvo esencialmente igual entre 1944 y 1985. Para el caso canadiense contra Jorge Sosa Orantes, este documento fue útil porque evidencia la naturaleza institucional, jerárquica y altamente regulada del ejército guatemalteco en el momento de la masacre de Dos Erres. 8 917s Documento 8 Manual de Guerra Contrasubversiva, [Marzo 1978] Mar 1978 El Manual de Guerra Contrasubversiva fue elaborado por el Centro de Estudios Militares de la Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor del Ejército en 1978 (con ediciones posteriores publicadas periódicamente). Escrito con fines de entrenamiento, constituyó la doctrina militar definitiva sobre operaciones militares en guerra no convencional en aquel momento. El Manual estableció las políticas, directivas, directrices y definiciones fundamentales que debían cumplir los soldados para llevar a cabo la campaña de contrainsurgencia y brindó instrucciones tácticas extensas y detalladas aplicables a los diversos escenarios de combate que pudieran enfrentar. En un capítulo inicial, se aclaró que todas las decisiones sobre acciones militares debían tomarse dentro del contexto de la jerarquía institucional de las fuerzas armadas: “Es fundamental que los canales de autoridad en todos los escalones sean claramente definidos” (8). El Manual se creó en las primeras etapas de una ola de intensa violencia y operaciones de tierra arrasada por parte de las fuerzas de seguridad guatemaltecas que duró siete años (1978-1985), alcanzando su punto máximo en 1982, año de la masacre de Dos Erres. El documento revela la amplia preparación del ejército guatemalteco para la guerra contrasubversiva años antes de Dos Erres, y describe la estrategia básica, la autoridad de mando y los conceptos operativos que aún estaban vigentes cuando los Kaibiles entraron en el pequeño asentamiento de El Petén el 6 de diciembre de 1982 y masacraron a sus residentes. Sus preceptos ayudan a explicar cómo se crearon las condiciones para las operaciones de tierra arrasada dirigidas contra la población civil. El Manual establece, por ejemplo, que el objetivo de las operaciones contrasubversivas (a diferencia de la guerra convencional) es destruir al enemigo interno, definido como “seguidores del comunismo internacional”, pero también “individuos, grupos u organizaciones que no son comunistas pero que intentan romper el orden establecido...”. Era una categoría tan amplia que otorgaba al ejército la máxima flexibilidad para atacar a quienes percibían como una amenaza. Según el Manual, la guerra contrasubversiva era “total, permanente y universal” y consideraba a los civiles como un peligro potencial, “porque... la población se convierte [por las guerrillas] en un objetivo y un entorno en el que desarrollan sus actividades” (554). El Manual también estableció el sistema que el ejército utilizaba para dividir el país en “tres clases de zonas”, según el nivel de penetración subversiva y la amenaza al orden establecido: “las rojas, en donde el movimiento subversivo controla efectivamente la población y desarrolla operaciones de guerrillera; las rosadas, en las que trata de extender su movimiento, haciendo algunos esfuerzos por organizar a la población y ejecutando algunas operaciones de guerrilla…; [y] las blancas, no afectadas todavía, pero ya amenazadas…” (78). El sistema de clasificación militar perduró durante todo el conflicto armado y tuvo implicaciones directas para Dos Erres, que el ejército consideraba una zona roja. El Manual era claro al describir cómo el ejército debía manejar una “zona roja”: el objetivo era la “destrucción o expulsión de elementos armados subversivos” (81). Anticipando las tácticas utilizadas en Dos Erres, el Manual promovía el cerco del área objetivo, de preferencia en la noche para mantener el factor sorpresa, y luego la ofensiva. “El círculo constituye el procedimiento ideal para contener una fuerza guerrillera identificada; luego viene la destrucción” (617). El Manuel reconoció el probable desenlace que traerían las acciones contrasubversivas dentro de las zonas rojas: “Siendo las operaciones durante este primer paso principalmente de naturaleza militar, es inevitable que ocasionen estragos…” (82). 9 917s Documento 9 Plan de Campaña Victoria 82, 16 Junio, 1982 Jun 16, 1962 El Plan de Campaña Victoria 82 es un documento elaborado por el ejército bajo el mando del general Efraín Ríos Montt, que dirige a sus oficiales a lanzar una serie de operaciones de contrainsurgencia en puntos estratégicos del país. Representó el eje central de la estrategia de contrainsurgencia del ejército guatemalteco durante el gobierno de Ríos Montt. Es clave para comprender cómo las fuerzas armadas pretendían gestionar el conflicto durante 1982: mediante una combinación de ataques militares en zonas rurales donde operaban los combatientes guerrilleros, operaciones antiterroristas dirigidas a los líderes de la insurgencia en la Ciudad de Guatemala y otros centros urbanos, y acciones cívicas diseñadas para ganarse el apoyo de la población civil. Fue un documento importante para el caso canadiense contra Sosa Orantes, ya que evidencia que, al momento de la masacre de Dos Erres, las fuerzas armadas guatemaltecas operaban en todo el país bajo las órdenes del Estado Mayor del Ejército, con una cadena de mando sólida y eficaz, y requisitos de información bien definidos. El Plan Victoria es una prueba de que las fuerzas especiales Kaibil que entraron en Dos Erres el 6 de diciembre de 1982 no eran una unidad rebelde que mataba gente por deporte, sino parte de una estrategia militar nacional planificada. Del Plan Victoria se desprende claramente que las operaciones militares dentro del Petén —y específicamente en la región que abarca Dos Erres— se consideraban parte integral del asalto contrainsurgente de Ríos Montt. Entre los mapas superpuestos a los que se hace referencia en la primera página del Plan se encuentra La Libertad, el municipio que incluía Dos Erres, y su destacamento militar más cercano, Las Cruces, lo que indica que el ejército lo consideraba una prioridad. La Brigada Militar “General Luis García León” (GLGL) en Poptún (posteriormente conocida como Zona Militar 23) es uno de los comandos designados por el Plan para recibir cinco compañías de fusileros adicionales (1000 soldados) para el aumento previsto de efectivos (144). El Estado Mayor del Ejército también asignó a la Brigada GLGL raciones militares adicionales, uniformes, armas y municiones para su uso en el asalto (168). La Base Aérea Santa Elena en Flores, Petén, recibió la orden de proporcionar apoyo táctico y logístico, no solo a la Brigada GLGL, sino también “para las diferentes actividades realizadas en la Escuela Kaibil” (70). El Plan Victoria estableció responsabilidades de mando a nivel de brigada en las “Áreas de Operaciones” asignadas. Los comandantes tenían libertad para adaptar sus operaciones dentro de su área de responsabilidad “de acuerdo con la inteligencia y la situación real”. Al mismo tiempo, el Plan exigía que los comandantes coordinaran sus movimientos en todo momento. Recordaba a los jefes de unidad su obligación de informar sus planes al Ministerio de Defensa de forma regular y programada, y les ordenaba “mantener comunicación permanente con el Estado Mayor del Ejército”. Estas y otras órdenes relativas a los requisitos de información y transmisión de las unidades indican que el Alto Mando probablemente estaba al tanto de los movimientos y operaciones de las tropas durante los asaltos de contrainsurgencia en tiempo real. En resumen, el Plan Victoria deja claro que la unidad de fuerzas especiales Kaibil que perpetró la masacre en Dos Erres (con el apoyo de la Brigada Militar GLGL, o Zona Militar 23) lo hizo bajo órdenes de sus superiores y en comunicación constante con el Estado Mayor del Ejército en Ciudad de Guatemala. El documento elimina la posibilidad de que la masacre fuera un encuentro impulsivo o no planificado. d10 917s Documento 10 Plan de Campaña Firmeza 83-1 y Anexo “1” (Inteligencia), [Agosto 1983] Aug 1983 Estos son dos documentos: el primero es una copia parcial del Plan de Campaña “Firmeza 83-1”, un suplemento al Plan de Campaña original “Firmeza 83”.[12] Si bien el Plan hace referencia en varias ocasiones a la necesidad de “normalizar” la institución militar tras el despliegue masivo de 1982 (mediante el retorno de las tropas temporales a sus unidades de origen), se ordena, no obstante, a los soldados mantener la presión sobre la guerrilla. Estos deben “localizar y destruir a las fuerzas enemigas con toda su fuerza y ​​capacidad militar, apoyando sus operaciones con el mayor número de elementos de las PADCIL [Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil], con el fin de arrasar los cultivos colectivos que los subversivos poseen en determinadas zonas donde han logrado la plena participación activa y la colaboración de aldeas comprometidas que simpatizan con los subversivos y han sido organizadas por ellos” (4). Al igual que el Plan de Campaña “Victoria 82”, Firmeza 83-1 insistió en que el Estado Mayor de la Defensa Nacional controlara los acontecimientos militares en el terreno, exigió informes periódicos de los jefes de unidad al Alto Mando y ordenó que todas las comunicaciones, informes y solicitudes de apoyo se canalizaran a través del Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas (COC), con sede en la Ciudad de Guatemala. Estas directivas recuerdan que las operaciones de contrainsurgencia en todo el país fueron ordenadas, supervisadas y monitoreadas en todo momento por el Alto Mando de las fuerzas armadas. Pero Firmeza 83-1 también representó la evolución de la estrategia de contrainsurgencia del gobierno a mediados de 1983. Mientras que Victoria 82 hacía hincapié en las operaciones de combate para perseguir y "eliminar" a las fuerzas guerrilleras y a sus supuestos colaboradores civiles, Firmeza 83-1 refleja una creciente frustración ante el fracaso de la acción militar por sí sola para sofocar la insurgencia. El plan afirma que el combate con un enemigo persistente había provocado un "agotamiento prematuro" entre las tropas gubernamentales; subraya la necesidad de un "control físico y psicológico" de la población civil para aislar a los guerrilleros; y ordena a los comandantes locales que estimulen a las patrullas de defensa civil de las aldeas a "colaborar al máximo en la destrucción y aniquilación de los grupos subversivos", como una forma de involucrar a los civiles en la lucha. El Plan de Campaña "Firmeza 83-1" fue significativo para el caso de Canadá contra Jorge Sosa Orantes porque describe la continuidad y la progresión lógica de las operaciones de contrainsurgencia del ejército después de la masacre de Dos Erres. El segundo documento, el Anexo “1” (Inteligencia), es un resumen de la inteligencia militar sobre la fuerza de combate de la guerrilla. En la sección relativa a las Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), la organización insurgente que operaba en el departamento norteño de El Petén, donde se ubicaba Dos Erres, se describe a las FAR como la organización que llevó a cabo una intensa labor política y militar en toda la región entre 1979 y 1982. En particular, las FAR lograron emboscar a una patrulla militar de la base de Poptún, matando a soldados y apoderándose de casi dos docenas de armas, municiones y otros equipos, lo que el documento denomina “el golpe más duro contra el Ejército guatemalteco”. La muerte de los soldados y el robo de sus fusiles se han considerado uno de los motivos de la decisión del ejército de enviar a los Kaibiles a Dos Erres. Documentos judiciales a11 917s Documento 11 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness vs. Jorge Vinicio Sosa Orantes Feb 5, 2026 Esta es la sentencia dictada por el juez Roger R. Lafrenière el 5 de febrero de 2026, que determinó que Sosa obtuvo la ciudadanía canadiense mediante declaraciones falsas o fraude. Asimismo, se le declaró inadmisible en Canadá por violar los derechos humanos o internacionales al cometer un acto fuera del país que constituye un crimen de lesa humanidad. d12-1 917s Documento 12-1 [Resolution in the Guatemalan Trial of Three ex-Kaibiles for the Dos Erres Massacre]. Part 1/2 Nov 7, 2023 En 2023, un tribunal guatemalteco declaró inocentes a tres exmiembros de Kaibiles —Gilberto Jordán, José Mardoqueo Ortiz Morales y Alfonso Bulux Vicente— de los cargos de asesinato y crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos en la masacre de Dos Erres. Este fallo supuso la primera absolución en Guatemala para acusados ​​de participar en la masacre y representó un retroceso significativo en los esfuerzos por obtener justicia para las víctimas y sus familiares. d12 917s Documento 12-2 [Resolution in the Guatemalan Trial of Three ex-Kaibiles for the Dos Erres Massacre]. Part 2/2 Nov 7, 2023 Véase la descripción del documento 12-1. Notes [1] Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio (Nueva York: UNOPS, 1999), “Conclusiones y Recomendaciones” [2] CEH, Tomo VI, Anexo I, Caso Ilustrativo No. 31, “Masacre de las Dos Erres.” Ver también Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala, 29 November 2009 [3] Relacionado con el testimonio de la perito Dra. Elizabeth A. Oglesby pp 65-72 [4] Relacionado con el testimonio del experto Grl. (jubilado) Rodolfo Robles, pp 72-79 [5] Relacionado con el testimonio de la experta Kate Doyle, pp 79-89 [6] Relacionado con el testimonio de la experta Dra. Silvana Turner, pp 89-95 [7] Testimonio de Fabio Pinzón, pp 95-103 [8] Testimonio de Ramiro Osorio Cristales, pp 103-106 [9] El artículo de Lafontaine se titula “The Unbearable Lightness of International Obligations: When and How to Exercise Jurisdiction Under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act” [10] En 2014, el Parlamento español (Las Cortes Generales) aprobó reformas a la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial que eliminaron efectivamente la jurisdicción universal, anulando así la solicitud de extradición de Sosa Orantes. [11] La propia Porras ha sido designada por el Departamento de Estado de Estados Unidos como “actor corrupto y antidemocrático” y fue sancionada tanto por Estados Unidos como por Gran Bretaña. [12] A la copia le faltan secciones. Falta la página 24 (parece ser la primera página del Anexo “A”, Organización para el Combate), y solo se incluyen tres de los nueve Anexos enumerados al final del documento: Anexo “A”, Anexo “F” (Plan de Operaciones Psicológicas) y Anexo “G” (Plan de Asuntos Civiles). No se incluye ninguno de los cinco Apéndices enumerados al final del document