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SJ-21 Maneuvers by China’s SJ-21 in GEO, including moving a Beidou satellite out of the belt, is just one of the many Chinese space activities with counterspace implications. (credit: ExoAnalytic Solutions) Preventing a “Space Pearl Harbor”: Rep. Turner leads the charge by Brian G. Chow Monday, March 25, 2024 Bookmark and Share Accolades are due to House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner and the White House for a quick and amicable settlement of Russia’s developing space threat. It involved a balancing act between the American public’s need to know and the Biden Administration’s need for secrecy. If a Chinese spacecraft can dock with a friendly satellite to refuel, repair, or transport it, the same robotic arm can also disable a US satellite’s solar panels and antennas. On February 14, Turner asked that President Biden “declassify all information” relating to a “serious national security threat.” The very next day, the White House confirmed that Russia is developing an “anti-satellite weapon,” but “there is no immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” On February 20, the public further learned that Russia is developing a “space-based nuclear anti-satellite weapon.” While it is a limited declassification, the administration rightly said that fuller disclosure could reveal to adversaries the sources and methods of how the US collects intelligence. Let’s hope that, on the heels of his recent success, Turner leads the charge to counter the most urgent national security threat facing the US and the free world: China’s use of a new kind of anti-satellite weapon to generate a “Space Pearl Harbor” as a precursor to seizing Taiwan sometime later this decade. While this scenario is drawing attention in the public, the Defense Department has not openly commented on it. Space Pearl Harbor is a surprise attack on critical US satellites that causes devastating impacts similar to those on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Dual-use robotic spacecraft will soon become the anti-satellite weapon of choice for mounting this attack. The development of such spacecraft that can dock with other satellites has been ongoing in the US since 1990 and in China since 2008, almost two decades behind. In February 2020, a US company successfully docked a robotic spacecraft with another friendly satellite. Less than two years later, China accomplished the same feat in January 2022, narrowing the gap on estimates from many US experts inside and outside of the government that it would take far longer for China to catch up. If a Chinese spacecraft can dock with a friendly satellite to refuel, repair, or transport it, the same robotic arm can also disable a US satellite’s solar panels and antennas. Alternatively, China can use these spacecraft to tow satellites into locations where they can, at best, only sub-optimally perform intended duties such as early warning, surveillance, or geolocation. Based on public commercial data that tells a lot about the military potential of these dual-use robotic spacecraft, we have shown that China can manufacture and deploy 200 such spacecraft as early as 2026, enough to cripple critical US satellites in geosynchronous, highly elliptical, and other orbits, and thus severely degrading space support to wartime operations. Will the US be ready to avert a surprise attack with robotic spacecraft that will likely arrive years ahead of expectations of so many space experts? The House Intelligence Committee and the Congress must make space readiness and governance a high priority on their current agenda. Turner’s next inquiries should focus on US preparedness against a Space Pearl Harbor. Although it is well known that such an attack on critical US satellites would cause untold devastation, the Defense Department has not disclosed to the American public details on the specific anti-satellite weapons and a plan for defense. It should first be clear that, before DoD can estimate the timing and magnitude of any potential surprise attack and develop a timely preparedness to counter it, it must specify which anti-satellite weapons and how many of them will be used in the attack. However, the Pentagon has not publicly revealed whether it has made that all-important specification. This raises public concerns that, at this late date, DoD might not have such a specification, whether classified or unclassified, even for its own internal use. This is not an empty worry: Gen. John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the second highest-ranking US military officer at the time, said on the eve of this retirement in October 2021 that “although we’re making marginal progress, the DoD is still unbelievably bureaucratic and slow” in its response to China’s rapidly advancing space weapons. If DoD’s preparedness to prevent Space Pearl Harbor is too slow, it is better to find out now than later so that DoD and others can catch up. As far back as 1985, nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter and I penned an op-ed, ”Arms Control That Could Work”. We considered that satellites can become anti-satellite spacecraft. We accordingly proposed a framework of self-defense zones to “facilitate unilateral defense against a surprise attack on satellites.” Since 2015, this space architecture has been updated to reflect the current and future space environment and advances in anti-satellite weapons such as dual-use robotic spacecraft discussed here. In June 2021, Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, testified before Congress that President Xi Jinping had ordered the Chinese military to accelerate its timeline for attaining the operational capability to seize Taiwan by force from 2035 to 2027.Turner has taken the vital initial step of bringing the issue of high-tech anti-satellite weaponry to current headlines and the forefront of American consciousness. With a capability to mount a Space Pearl Harbor as early as 2026, a key question is whether China can use this surprise attack as a precursor to enhance the already substantial odds of successfully seizing Taiwan. The House Intelligence Committee and the Congress must make space readiness and governance a high priority on their current agenda. Turner’s next inquiries should focus on US preparedness against a Space Pearl Harbor. Turner and others should first get classified briefings from DoD and the US intelligence community and then direct them to prepare a public disclosure on DoD’s plan to prevent and react to a Space Pearl Harbor. Specifically, the US plan must acknowledge China’s accelerated timetable of being capable to take Taiwan by force from 2035 to 2027. The public needs Congress to represent its national security interests and hold DoD accountable for both unclassified and classified disclosures. Turner sounded the alarm about Russia’s developing anti-satellite weapon out of fear that the Biden administration was “sleepwalking into an international crisis.” It is even more important for him to sound the alarm about China’s already developed anti-satellite weapon out of the same fear, making sure that DoD and others will be ready to prevent a Space Pearl Harbor and save Taiwan should aggression come sometime in the 2020s. Brian Chow (Ph.D. in physics, MBA with distinction, Ph.D. in finance) is an independent policy analyst with more than 180 publications. He can be reached at brianchow.sp@gmail.com.