HMS Invincible returns to Portsmouth after the Falklands war.
This is a very interesting what if. Let’s take a look at where and when it might have occurred.
The Argentine navy’s TF 79 carrier strike group did try to join battle at the beginning of the war and there was a moment from 1–2 May 1982 when a fleet action could have taken place, indeed one very nearly did.
The planned air strike from the carrier ARA Veinticinco de Mayo against the British carriers early on the 2 May was cancelled at the last minute (for reasons that still remain unclear). In the event the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano later on the same day created enough fear of the RN nuclear submarines to send the Argentine carrier task force back to port. And from then onward land based aviation took up the offensive role.
After the long voyage from the UK and Gibraltar via Ascension Island, and the successful recapture of South Georgia, the British carrier battlegroup was scheduled to enter the the unilaterally declared 200 nautical mile Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falkland Islands on Saturday 1st May.
Royal Navy CVBG and Argentine TF 79 naval operations on May 1, 1982.
TF commander Admiral Sandy Woodward’s priority was to deny the Argentine navy and air force use of the airfields at Port Stanley, Goose Green and Pebble Island, from which his fleet and the slower and vulnerable amphibious transports, which were yet to arrive, could be attacked. By attacking Port Stanley’s airfield he also hoped to convince the Argentine commanders that the landings would take place near Stanley. The plan was complex and required the carriers to come within range of the islands. Key elements were:
- An RAF Vulcan bomber carrying 21 x 1,000lb bombs would target the runway at Port Stanley early in the morning of 1 May. A follow up attack was to be made on Tuesday 4 May.
- At 8:00am 1 May, after the CVBG entered the TEZ, twelve Sea Harriers from Hermes would carry out follow-up strikes against aircraft and supply dumps at both Stanley and Goose Green, using CBUs.
- 8 Sea Harriers from Invincible would provide CAP, while SeaKings screened the task group from submarine and surface attack.
- Three escorts - the DD Glamorgan, and FFs Alacrity and Arrow were detached from the CVBG to carry out a naval gunfire support mission against Port Stanley airfield at Midday on the 1 May after the Sea Harrier strike.
- After dark on the evening of 1 May, SAS and SBS covert observation teams are flown in by helicopter from Hermes - they will provide surveillance and artillery observation and call in airstrikes onto targets in the Stanley, Goose Green and Pebble Island areas during the coming battles.
Woodward was aware that two Argentine Task Forces were converging on him from the Northwest and South of the Falklands and had positioned his nuclear attack submarines to intercept them. Splendid and Spartan to the north and Conqueror to the south.
To protect the fleet from land based air attack during these littoral carrier operations a radar picket was established 100 nm to the southwest of the carrier battle group between the task force and the Argentine airbases in Tierra Del Fuego and Santa Cruz. The pickets took up positions to the north of West Falkland: these were the Type 42 air defence destroyers, Sheffield, Coventry and Glasgow - all had long range radars and Sea Dart area defence surface-to-air missiles.
Believing a full scale invasion was underway, the Argentine command reacted quickly. Air strikes were launched on the 1 May by Daggers, Skyhawks and Canberras, escorted by Mirages, from the mainland, as well as by MB339As and Pucara light attack aircraft from Port Stanley. Three Grupo 6 Daggers bombed and strafed the Naval Bombardment Group near Stanley, causing minor damage to all three vessels. Meanwhile Sea Harriers shot down a Mirage IIIEA, an IAI Dagger and a Canberra bomber. Another Mirage IIIEA was damaged by a sidewinder and then shot down by mistake by Argentine AAA.
ARA Hercules. Both the Argentinian and Royal Navies fielded British-built Type 42 air defence destroyers on May 1st 1982.
Also on the 1 May, the submarine ARA San Luis was detected north of the Falklands and two of the carriers’ escorting frigates, Brilliant and Yarmouth, along with 3 Sea King helicopters from Hermes, were sent to find her. After searching all day they finally gave up and returned to the CVBG. Meanwhile to the north of the TEZ the nuclear submarine HMS Spartan made contact with the Argentine carrier TF and asked permission to attack, which was denied by the British government, overruling Admiral Woodward. In the only other incident HMS Alacrity’s Lynx helicopter, while directing naval gunfire support, spotted the Argentine patrol vessel Islas Malvinas and attacked it with its machine gun.
The main Argentine naval attack was planned for the next day, 2 May. Veincicento de Mayo was to steam south and launch her 10 A-4Q Skyhawks against the British carriers from about 100 nm North of the CVBG, while 2 land-based Super Etendard strike fighters would attack simultaneously from the southwest with Exocet missiles, using two KC-130s to support this long range mission. Grumman S2-E Tracker patrol aircraft from the Argentine carrier located the British Task Force on radar on the evening of the 1 May, around 4 hours before briefing was due to begin for the strike.
The Argentine carrier strike was scheduled to be launched at dawn on the 2 May, however for some reason the attack was cancelled (light winds some say, others due to fear of inciting more Vulcan attacks). The Super Etendard mission went ahead, but it too had to be aborted as there were problems refuelling from the KC-130s. At 4:00pm the submarine HMS Conqueror, which had been shadowing Argentine TF 79.3 south of the Falklands all day, fired two Mk 8 torpedos at ARA General Belgrano, sinking the cruiser with heavy casualties. The next day the Argentine fleet was ordered to return to port.
The Argentine Navy’s Super Etendard - carrying Exocet anti-ship missiles - proved a deadly weapon in 1982. Two set out to attack the CVBG from Tierra del Fuego on May 2.
But what if things has panned out differently? There are a number of possibilities.
- The submarine ARA San Luis managed to get into a firing position. Its likely that she tried several attacks, and she was a modern, if small, German-built 20 knot SSK, although they may have had problems with their SST Seal passive homing torpedos. The carrier group was extremely well protected against submarine attack with modern ASW escorts and many cutting edge ASW helicopters. It would appear that she was patrolling close to Port Stanley in order to intercept a landing force. So her most like adversary would be one of NGS group, Glamorgan, Alacrity or Arrow. None of these ships was an ASW specialist vessel, although they all had helicopters and basic self-defence weaponry like depth charge mortars and torpedos. So we could see one of these ships being lost.
- The combined strike of Veincicento de Mayo’s A4s and the Super Etendards would have been challenging too. We can expect one of the two Super Etendard’s Exocets to get through, as one did a few days later, and in the same vein sink one of the destroyers providing the picket line between the Etendard’s base in Tierra del Fuego and the CVBG. It’s unlikely two would be lost, as in reality Coventry tracked the second missile, while Sheffield was unlucky, having taken her eye off the ball momentarily and having some misfortune too. But let’s assume Sheffield is sunk on 2 May by an Exocet too.
- The Skyhawk carrier strike on the morning of 2 May is a big “what-if?’ The Argentine navy pilots were well trained in anti-shipping strike as the RN found out later. We know the submarine HMS Spartan was in contact with the carrier and had been denied permission to attack on the 1 May too (although she may have lost contact soon afterwards). There were no Sea Harrier strikes on Stanley planned for 2 May, so all 20 would have been available for fleet defence. Also by 2 May the CVBG had moved out to sea, out of range of land-based aircraft. Spartan may have been able to provide early warning of the A4 strike, and if not the screen of SeaKings would have picked it up. Each of the two British carriers had a Type 22 frigate in close escort with the excellent SeaWolf missile system acting as a ‘goalkeeper’ for last ditch defence, and Invincible had the long range Sea Dart missile system too. We can discount the SeaCat missiles carried by Hermes and the other escorting frigates as they proved worse than useless, although their guns would have helped. An attempted strike against the CVBG by Canberras the previous day had failed to find the task force, and one Canberra was shot down by a Sea Harrier. The most likely outcome is very heavy losses for the Argentine A4s if they managed to find the CVBG, although it is possible that one of the carriers would have sustained a hit. It is also most likely that Spartan would have torpedoed the Argentine carrier too, and Splendid would have been sent to join her.
- Task force 79.4, comprising three modern French-built 24 knot corvettes, was also steaming south and could have combined with the carrier task force on 2 May. It’s my belief that the plan was for Task Force 79.2 (the two Type 42 destroyers escorting the Argentine carrier) and 79.4 to use Exocets (they had 20 in total) to attack the invasion force which the ARA command thought was approaching Stanley. However the Royal Navy amphibious force was kept well back on 2 May and it would have been difficult for the this force to get within striking distance of the faster British CVBG. TFs 79.2 and 79.4 were unlikely to have taken part in the planned fleet action on 2 May except in defence of the carrier Veinicento de Mayo, and the corvettes lack of effective anti-submarine or air defence equipment would have made them vulnerable to Sea Harriers and submarines, although the Type 42 destroyers were formidable air defence platforms and both the ARA’s carrier and the Type 42s carried ASW helicopters.
- Lastly what of the Belgrano task force? If HMS Conquerer had failed to make contact, and they had sailed north to intercept what they thought was an invasion force at Stanley. This contest would have been between Belgrano and her two destroyers and the RN NGS group - Glamorgan, Antrim and Alacrity - who were off Stanley, perhaps during the night of the 2 May or early on 3 May. Its probable that the Argentine air force would have made an appearance and drawn off the Sea Harriers. If the Belgrano group were able to get in close they could have caused a lot of damage with their 5″ and 6″ guns. The RN squadron’s better radar and radar equipped Lynx and Wessex helicopters should have provided early warning however. In a long range duel the NGS group had 12 Exocets to the Belgrano’s escorting destroyers 8 Exocet missiles, and much better capacity for over the horizon targeting, unless one of the Argentine navy’s two P2 Neptunes could have been put up, and avoided the Sea Harriers. The most likely outcome would have been a long range salvo of Exocets from the NGS group, with over the horizon targeting from their helicopters, followed by a hasty withdrawal out to sea, and Sea Harrier strikes the next day. On balance I think the Belgrano group would have been in mortal danger if it came close to Stanley, but could have caused chaos if it got in close under cover of darkness.
What would have been the outcome? Loss of several escorts in the radar picket and NGS groups would have been bearable if inconvenient. More escorts were on their way to join the task force with the two amphibious groups. Although the A4 carrier strike would have probably led to the loss of the Argentine carrier, it was of less strategic importance to Argentina than the two British carriers were to the UK. The chances of a hit on the carriers were low, given the proven effectiveness of the Sea Harrier, SeaWolf and SeaDart air defences around the CVBG, and the presence of HMS Spartan tracking the Argentine carrier, yet the quality and bravery of the Argentine navy pilots was never in doubt, and low level strikes by A4s sank or destroyed five British ships in the enclosed waters of San Carlos water and Bluff Cove and damaged numerous others.
It is entirely possible that one or both of Hermes or Invincible could have sustained sufficient damage on 2 May to put them out of action, and that would have changed the course of the war. At minimum the conflict would have been longer, and the RN would have needed to get the new carrier Illustrious rapidly into service, or even re-commission the Bulwark, a commando carrier that had recently been paid off (this was examined at the time but considered too time consuming and costly). A negotiated solution was also a possibility if one or more of the carriers were lost as winter was rapidly approaching in the South Atlantic. All in all the British operation to retake the Falklands was very high risk and running against the clock. Aggressive action by the Argentine Navy could well have caused severe problems.
The Falklands War was one of the few recent conflicts fought with honour on both sides. Exceptional skill and bravery was demonstrated at times by both the British and Argentine armed forces. It remains a great pity that two countries that had been great friends and share similar values remain divided.
ARA Veinicento de Mayo. The British-built Argentine Navy light carrier was scheduled to launch a strike against the British Task Force on May 2.
Order of Battle, 2 May 1982[1] .
Argentine Navy
Task Force 79.1 (steaming south towards the RN carrier task force, 300 miles NNW of East Falkland)
ARA Veinticinco de Mayo. 24 knot Light Carrier. 10 A4-Q Skyhawks, 6 Grumman Tracker Patrol Aircraft and 4 SH-3D Seaking ASW helicopters. 12 x 40mm light guns.
ARA Punta Medanos. 18 knot Fleet tanker (unarmed)
Task Force 79.2 (escort for TF 79.1)
ARA Hercules and ARA Santisima Trinidad. 30 knot Type 42 Destroyers. Each with an automatic 4.5″ gun, twin SeaDart long range anti-aircraft missile launchers, 4 x Exocet AshM, Lynx ASW helicopter, ASW torpedoes, long range air search and tracking radars, hull sonars, 2 x 20mm light guns.
Task Force 79.3 (steaming eastwards from Ushaia towards the 200 TEZ, south of West Falkland)
ARA General Belgrano. 30 knot former USN Cruiser. 15 x 6″ guns, 8 x 5″ guns, seacat short range anti aircraft missiles, 16 x 40 mm light guns, 8 x 20mm light guns, Alouette III light helicopter, medium range search radar.
ARA Hipólito Bouchard and ARA Piedrabuena. 34 knot Ex. US FRAM destroyers. 6 x 5″ guns, 4 x Exocet AShM, 4 x 40mm light guns, Alouette III light helicopter, torpedos, short range air search radar, hull sonar.
ARA Punta Delgada. 12 knot small support tanker.
ARA Piedrabuena. One of two former Korean and Vietnam war veteran destroyers in Argentine service. They had been extensively updated by the USN in the ’60s as ASW escorts and the Argentine navy gave them Exocet missiles and a helicopter. She and her sister were escorting the Belgrano on 1 May.
Task Force 79.4 (steaming south towards the Falklands, around 100nm West of TF 79.1, in Argentine coastal waters)
ARA Drummond, ARA Guerrico and ARA Granville. 24 knot Corvettes. 1 x 4″ gun, 4 x Exocet AShM, 2 x 40mm and 2 x 20mm light guns, 2 x 0.5″ MGs, torpedos, short range air search radar, hull sonar. Landing pad but no helicopters.
Submarines
ARA San Luis. 22 knot SSK Type 209. SST Seal passive homing torpedos. (San Luis was patrolling North of Port Stanley close to the RN carrier battle group.)
Land Based Aviation
Argentine Navy A4–Q Skyhawks. They were due to strike the Royal Navy carriers on the morning of 2nd May.
NAS Rio Grande, Tierra Del Fuego
- 4 Dassault Super Etendard with 5 Exocet AShMs.(anti-shipping strike)
- 15 IAI Dagger (fighter/attack)
- 2 Lockheed SP2 Neptune (maritime patrol)
AFB Rio Gallegos, Santa Cruz
- 9 Dassault Mirage IIIEA (escort fighter)
- 14 McDonnell Douglas A4-B (attack)
- 2 EMB 111 Bandeirantes (maritime patrol)
Puerto Santa Cruz Airport
- 12 McDonnell Douglas A4-B (attack)
Puerto San Julien, Santa Cruz Airport
- 15 IAI Dagger (fighter/attack)
- 12 McDonnell Douglas A4-C (attack)
The Mirage IIIEA was the primary air-superiority fighter used by the Argentine Air Force on May 1.
AFB Commodoro Rivadavia, Chabut (FAS command HQ)
- 8 Dassault Mirage IIIEA (escort fighter)
- 12 C/KC-130 (patrol/tanker/transport)
- 8 English Electric Canberra (bomber recon)
- 2 Learjet (photo recon)
Buenos Aires International Airport
- 3 Boeing 707 (patrol/recon)
Falklands Islands (Stanley, Goose Green, Pebble Island)
- 24 FMA Pucara (close air support)
- 4 Beechcraft Turbo Mentor (close air support)
- 6 Aermacchi 339A (light attack)
- 5 Short Skyvan (patrol/light transport)
- 14 mixed CH-47, Bell 212, UH-1D, SH-3D and Augusta A 109 helicopters.
A Royal Navy carrier task force in 1982
Royal Navy Task Force 317 Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
CVBG Advanced Group (radar picket line 50 miles north of West Falkland)
HMS Coventry, HMS Glasgow and HMS Sheffield. 30 knot Type 42 Destroyers. Each with an automatic 4.5″ gun, twin SeaDart long range anti-aircraft missile launchers, Lynx helicopter with Sea Skua AShM, ASW torpedoes, long range air search and tracking radars, hull sonars, 2 x 20mm light guns.
CVBG Main Group (80 miles northeast of East Falkland)
HMS Hermes (flag): 28 knot Light Carrier. 12 Sea Harriers, 9 SeaKing HAS 5 ASW Helicopters and 4 SeaKing HC4 commando assault helicopters. Seacat short range AA missiles, long range air search radar.
HMS Invincible 30 knot Light Carrier. 8 Sea Harriers, 11 Sea King HAS 5 ASW Helicopters. Twin SeaDart long range AA missiles, long range air search and tracking radars.
The Sea Harrier, always a compromise to keep the RN in the fixed wing aviation game, proved a deadly low level interceptor on May 1.
HMS Broadsword and HMS Brilliant 30 knot Type 22 ASW Frigates. Twin SeaWolf anti-missile missile launchers, 4 Exocet AShMs, 2 Lynx helicopters with radar, dipping sonar and Sea Skua missiles, ASW torpedos, 2 x 40mm light guns, ASW torpedos, towed array sonar, medium range air search and tracking radars.
HMS Plymouth and HMS Yarmouth: 28 knot Type 12M ASW Frigates. Twin 4.5″ semi-automatic guns, Wasp light helicopter with ASW torpedos and AS 12 missiles, limbo anti-submarine depth charge mortar, hull sonar, medium range air search radar, 2 x 20mm light guns.
RFA Olmeda. 21 knot Ol class fast fleet tanker. Carrying elements of ‘G’ squadron 21 SAS regiment for raid on airstrip at Pebble Island. - she was only armed with 2 x 20mm light guns. 2 Wessex HU5 commando assault helicopters.
RFA Resource. 20 knot Resource class ammunition supply ship. 2 x 20mm guns. Carrying SBS and SAS surveillance teams for pre-landing insertion on the Falklands. 3 Wessex HU5 commando assault helicopters.
CVBG Southern Group (to carry out shore bombardment against Port Stanley Airport to follow-up ‘Black Buck 1’ Vulcan bomber raid)
HMS Glamorgan (flag): 32 knot County Class Destroyer. Twin-barrelled 4.5″ semi-auto gun, 4 x Exocet AShMs, SeaSlug AA missile twin launcher, Seacat short range anti-aircraft missiles, Wessex ASW helicopter, squid anti-submarine depth charge mortar, 2 x 20mm light guns, long range air search and tracking radar, hull sonar.
HMS Alacrity and HMS Arrow. 38 knot Type 21 General Purpose Frigates. Each with an automatic 4.5″ gun, 4 x Exocet AShMs, Seacat short range AA missiles, Lynx helicopter, ASW torpedos, 2 x20mm light guns, search radar, hull sonar.
HMS Glamorgan. One of two 1960s vintage county class destroyers with the Task Force. On 2 May Glamorgan was flag of the naval gunfire support group off Stanley, while her sister, Antrim, was escorting the amphibious group from Ascension Island.
Amphibious Group
The main landing force (3 Commando Brigade) and its amphibious ships and escorts were arriving to the East of the Falklands, while a smaller task force was at South Georgia. The follow-up force (5 Airborne Brigade) were preparing to embark on transports in the UK. There were also many tankers and resupply vessels held in a holding ‘box’ in the South Atlantic just beyond the range of Argentine land-based aircraft. Two more squadrons of RN Sea Harriers and RAF Harriers and more transport helicopters were also sailing south with 3 Cdo brigade on the aircraft transport Atlantic Conveyor.
Submarines
HMS Conqueror: 30 knot SSN. Tigerfish wire guided + passive homing and Mk 8 conventional torpedos. Arriving edge of exclusion zone 200 miles south of East Falkland from South Georgia, to attack Argentine TF 79.3 (Belgrano group).
HMS Splendid. 30 knot SSN. Mk 24 Tigerfish wire guided + passive homing and Mk 8 conventional torpedos. Preparing to intercept TF 79.1 200m north of Falklands on edge of exclusion zone (Veinticinco de Mayo carrier and escorts). Given permission to attack TF 79 on May 2 when the carrier ran for port after the sinking of the Belgrano, but failed to make contact.
HMS Spartan. 30 knot SSN. Mk 24 Tigerfish wire guided + passive homing and Mk 8 conventional torpedos. Shadowing Argentine TF 79.1 (Veinticinco de Mayo carrier and escorts). She made contact and requested permission to attack on 1st May, but was denied by UK cabinet.She may have been carrying SBS teams for covert insertion at the landing beaches in San Carlos water.
HMS Spartan, with the UK special forces swimmer delivery system (known to the SBS as ‘the caravan of death’).
Land Based Aviation
RAF Wideawake, Ascension Island. Ascencion island, off the West African coast, was shared by the USAF and various UK signals intelligence gathering agencies, the BBC World Service and Cable and Wireless, a UK company which provided undersea telephone infrastruture.
- 4 BAC Vulcan B2 bombers. These had been hastily fitted with inertial navigation systems from commercial VC-10 airliners for overwater flights and in-flight refuelling probes. They were also able to carry the US provided Shrike Anti-Radiation Missile for use against Argentine SAMs in addition to 21,000lbs of bombs and ECM gear.
- 11 Hawker Siddleley Victor K2 refuelling tankers. The Victors refuelled the Vulcans (and each other) in relays to get the Vulcans to the Falklands.
- 4 Hercules C3 (C-130K) transports. The C-130s were used to air drop supplies and paradrop personnel to the task force from Ascension. Other C-130s, VC-10s and contracted Short Belfast frieghters resupplied Ascencion itself from Gibraltar and the UK.
- 3 Harrier GR3. These RAF Harriers were from 1(F) squadron RAF. The majority of the squadron’s aircraft were on the Atlantic Conveyor aircraft transport on their way to join the task force with the amphibious group. Three were retained on Ascension to provide local air defence. They were soon sent to the Falklands too, and replaced by Phantom FGR2s (F-4M Phantom II).
- 4 Nimrod MR2. The Nimrods provided long range maritime patrol and ASW coverage in the south Atlantic but did not have the range to reach the Falklands themselves. After the war they were given in-flight refuelling probes.
- 2 Helicopters (1 Sea King HAS 2 and 1 Wessex HU 5) - used to resupply ships en route to the Falklands and for local SAR.
Southern Chile
- A small reconnaissance force was based in Chile, comprising 1 VC-10 transport, a Nimrod R1 ELINT aircraft and 2 Canberra PR9 photo recce aircraft. It was very covert and thus has become legendary among conspiracy theorists, but the main reason for secrecy was operational and to prevent embarrassment to either the British or Chilean goverments.
Footnotes
A brilliant historical review! My hat is off to you! Well done!
Hi James
I thank you again for your very thorough, fair and impartial answer
I did notice a boo boo regarding Admiral Woodward and the attack submarines
Woodward had no control over them whatsoever - they were a totally separate Task Group controlled directly from London.
He had tried but failed to have
… (more)Thank you! Yes Woodward did not have authority over SSN weapons release, but the deplyoment and operational orders for the SSNs during the campaign were agreed by Woodward and the First Sea Lord during a planning conference on HMS Hermes at Ascension Island before the Task Force sailed further south
… (more)Hi James
That's an EXCELLENT answer - thank you!
You meantioned that the Argentinian air attack was cancelled for reasons that were unclear
On the morning of the planned attack there was very little wind
The carrier was built as a light carrier with a fairly short deck so it needed a decent breeze over
… (more)
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