Ecuador: Bring In The Calvary

Bring in the Cavalry Ecuador Ecuador will seek foreign military aid to combat drug cartels and organized crime groups in the South American country, officials said this week, as authorities continue to grapple with rising violent crime, the Associated Press reported. On Wednesday, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa ordered the foreign ministry to create cooperation agreements with “allied nations” that would allow “the incorporation of special forces” to aid Ecuador’s security forces. The arrangement did not specify which countries Ecuador is asking for security assistance. The proposal comes weeks after Noboa won the first round of presidential elections, with the second vote scheduled in April. It also comes as Ecuador struggles with a spike in violence tied to the trafficking of cocaine produced in neighboring Colombia and Peru. Mexican, Colombian, and Balkan cartels operate in the country with help from local gangs. Noboa’s administration has managed to reduce the homicide rate from 46.18 per 100,000 people in 2023 to 38.76 per 100,000 people last year. Despite the dip, it remained far higher than the rate of 6.85 killings per 100,000 people recorded in 2019. Security analysts said the request is a temporary measure that would see foreign troops help in gathering intelligence, and local security officials stop trafficking via the country’s ports. Wednesday’s announcements came months after Ecuador’s constitutional court ruled in favor of an amendment to the constitution that would allow foreign military bases in the country. For a decade, the United States military operated a base in Ecuador primarily dedicated to anti-narcotic operations. However, this ended in 2009 when then-President Rafael Correa terminated the agreement with the US, citing concerns over sovereignty. The constitutional court’s decision will now be debated in the legislature and, if approved, ratified through a referendum. Share this story

Rio Suffers Its Hottest Day In A Decade

World Rio de Janeiro records its hottest day in at least a decade — about 145 degrees hotter than North Dakota Updated on: February 18, 2025 / 8:06 AM EST / CBS/AP Rio de Janeiro recorded its hottest day in at least a decade when temperatures on Monday reached 44 degrees Celsius (111 degrees Fahrenheit) — about 145 degrees warmer than Bismarck, North Dakota — as residents flocked to the ocean to try to cool off. It was the highest temperature since the southeastern Brazilian city started a climate alert system just over 10 years ago. The second-highest was 43.8°C in November 2023. City officials issued an alert for extreme heat for the coming days, set up hydration stations and prepared the public health system to handle an increase in heat-related cases. People cool off in showers during a heatwave at the Ipanema beach in Rio de Janeiro People cool off in showers during a heatwave at the Ipanema beach in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil February 16, 2025. Pilar Olivares / REUTERS Raquel Franco, chief meteorologist of the Rio Alert System, said the previous heat record for February in the city was 41.8C, recorded in February 2023. With no rain on the horizon, "we may have one of the driest Februarys in history," Franco said. Rio Mayor Eduardo Paes on Sunday ruled out canceling Carnival festivities that ramp up over the coming weeks, but he recommended that revelers take precautions. "We are expecting the hottest summer in recent years," Rio's health secretary Daniel Soranz told AFP on Monday. "In January, more than 3,000 people were treated in municipal emergency services due to the intense heat," particularly for sunburns and dehydration, Soranz said, adding this was more than double the numbers seen in recent years. APTOPIX Brazil Summer Weather People flock to Ipanema beach during summer in Rio de Janeiro, Sunday, Feb. 16, 2025. Bruna Prado / AP There has been heightened concern about heat at public events in Brazil since a Taylor Swift fan died during her Eras Tour concert in Rio during the November 2023 heat wave. In Copacabana, wilting doorman Robson Oliveira stopped to take a picture of an electronic display showing the temperature at 39C. "This heat is unbearable," he told AFP. "I'm not used to it. It's about time for a little rain to cool off." The weather picture was decidedly different in the U.S. on Monday. The National Weather Service warned of "life-threatening cold" as wind chills dropped to minus 50 Fahrenheit in parts of Montana and minus 60 Fahrenheit in parts of North Dakota. The temperature in Bismarck, North Dakota on Monday reached a low of minus 35 Fahrenheit. Agence France-Presse contributed to this report. More from CBS News Brazil's Bolsonaro charged for alleged plot for coup, poison try on successor "No Kings on Presidents Day" rallies across the country target Trump, Musk Over 150 false killer whales stranded on beach can't be saved, experts say The pope has a "polymicrobial respiratory tract infection." What is it? In: Brazil Heat

Uruguay Is Moving Toward China

Stability Über Alles Uruguay Last fall, when Uruguayans were asked in a referendum whether they would like to retire five years early with bigger pension payments, they resoundingly said no. They worried that the country would become unstable if it took on more debt to fund the changes. It’s unusual for voters to vote against their own personal interests anywhere. But in this small, prosperous South American country of 3.4 million people in the center of a region marked by violence, instability, and authoritarian governments, voters see stability as their interest. That drive for moderation and stability is evident in the politics of the country – here, elections are fought from the center, wrote World Politics Review. That was especially true of the elections last fall. For example, the winner, Yamandú Orsi of the left-wing Broad Front party, won on a campaign that promised stability and “Safe change that won’t be radical.” His opponent, Álvaro Delgado of the center-right National Party, delivered a similar message. During the election, as the Americas Society/Council of the Americas explained, voters liked the idea of decreasing the retirement age from 65 to 60. But they worried it would put too much pressure on the national budget. Some say that such caution isn’t helping the country solve its problems. For example, one top concern is the deteriorating security situation, mainly due to the rise of criminal gangs, which is harming the country’s reputation as a beacon of stability. Cocaine shipments to Europe have surged through the port of the capital, Montevideo, fueling a rise in gang violence, wrote Insight Crime. The murder rate has almost doubled in a decade to 11 per 100,000 people. That has shocked the population, which is unaccustomed to such violence. “Uruguay is in a precarious position,” wrote Reuters, “fighting a lonely battle against cocaine-smuggling gangs” that have expanded into every corner of Latin America over the last decade, turning once-tranquil nations like Ecuador into cartel badlands. Other issues facing the country, in spite of it being one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America, are the cost of living, education, and poverty. About half of all children finish high school, one in five children live in poverty, and the country has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Latin America – about 26 percent. Another issue that worries voters is the economy and trade. Economic growth is slow and steady in the country, at around 4 percent last year. But Ecuadorians are rattled by US President Donald Trump’s tariff threats and other shocks to the global economy. As a result, Uruguayans are growing closer to China and also Europe. “Energy is expensive. China is now seen as a complicated competitor. The US is getting more and more protectionist. In this new geopolitical scenario, it is key for Europe to strengthen the partnerships they can have,” Uruguay’s Foreign Minister Omar Paganini told Politico. “For Latin America, the situation is rather similar … in the sense that we are being pulled by different powers like China, the US. We need long-term friendships with stable partners.” Top European Union officials visited Uruguay in December to sign a landmark free-trade agreement with the Latin American Mercosur trade bloc, made up of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. The deal had been in the works for decades. Meanwhile, China and Uruguay are negotiating a bilateral trade deal even as Uruguay is also pushing for a wider Mercosur trade agreement with China. China and Brazil are Uruguay’s top trade partners. Uruguayan officials say they have tried for years to get a free trade agreement with the US and would have preferred that, given that they have “issues related to how the Chinese believe, and their political organization, the human rights issues,” Uruguay officials explained. “So let’s be pragmatic, we are a small country in a complicated world, we need trade partners – and they are stable people,” added Paganini. “Moreover, the world is changing and not for good for those who believe in rules-based relationships and agreements.”

Brasil: Why The World's Green Engine Is Stalling

Why the world’s green engine is stalling Ana Lankes Brazil bureau chief A few weeks ago I visited the port of Açu, which lies 320km north-east of Rio de Janeiro. There were no containers piled up in warehouses or big gantry cranes hanging over terminals. Instead, the site looks almost like a nature reserve—including a sanctuary for baby loggerhead turtles and a broad-leaf forest—with most of the action concentrated on the distant horizon. The port was built to provide offshore logistical support to oil platforms that pump crude out of nearby basins, as part of a plan to establish Brazil as a global oil-and-gas hub. Now, though, the current owners have different plans. They are ploughing billions of dollars into turning it into a hub for green industry, including factories to build wind farms, make clean steel and produce ammonia. The transformation of the Açu is representative of Brazil’s broader aspirations. The country has everything it takes to become a green powerhouse. It has huge potential sources for clean energy, thanks to mighty rivers in the Amazon basin, consistent sunshine in the north-east and strong winds from the Atlantic. It is also an agricultural behemoth, producing much of the sugar, soyabeans, cotton, coffee and oranges the world consumes. The waste from these products can be converted into fuel. All this could make Brazil one of the cheapest places to produce green hydrogen (which requires vast amounts of renewable electricity to replace the power usually provided by coal) as well as biofuels, which are needed to decarbonise heavy industries like steel, shipping and aviation. Investors should be flooding in. Brazil has attracted some foreign direct investment in renewables, but it will need much more to realise its green ambitions. Why is the cash slow in coming? There are several reasons, but an important one is Brazil’s volatile economy. Even in more stable countries there are dangers to investing in big decarbonisation projects. The German government has ploughed $525m into a green-steel plant owned by ThyssenKrupp. It was set to open in 2027, but may be cancelled due to escalating costs. Now think of Brazil: last year the real was the world’s worst-performing major currency. The interest rate is expected to reach 14.25% in March, compared with 4.25-4.5% in the United States and 6.25% in India. Many investors worry that President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is a spendthrift and that their investments could eventually get caught up in a wider economic crisis. The president has also sent mixed signals. Even while pursuing green ambitions, he is pressuring the environmental regulator to grant Petrobras, the state oil firm, a licence to drill for oil near the mouth of the Amazon. That is a bad look for a country that will host the COP30 climate summit in November. Brazil has everything it needs to be the world’s green engine. It just needs the right driver. Thanks for reading this edition of the Climate Issue. Do you think Brazil can become a green superpower while still pursuing oil? Should it push ahead with big green investments regardless of the risks? We’re always interested to hear our readers’ views. Write to us at climateissue@economist.com. .

Most Latin AMerican Migrants No Longer Go To The United States

The Americas | Migration Most Latin American migrants no longer go to the United States Can the region cope with a new wave? Venezuelan migrant holds his daughter while resting in a hammock Photograph: AP Feb 13th 2025|Cúcuta Save Share Give Listen to this story. Esther Hernández fled Venezuela to Colombia in 2017 with her husband, three daughters and a sewing machine. Her voice cracks as she recalls sleeping in a shelter, cooking on an open fire and at times going hungry. Her husband left for Chile in 2018, desperate for work. He eventually got a construction job in Puerto Montt, some 8,000km (5,000 miles) away. Ms Hernández built up a sewing business. Saving furiously, and with regularised legal status in Colombia, the family eventually bought land in El Zulia, a small village near the Venezuelan border. Brick by brick she built a house there. Now, after six years away, her husband is coming home at last. “I am a Zuliana now,” she smiles. If you listen to American politicians you might think that every migrant in Latin America is heading for the United States. In the past most did, but not any more. The Hernández family, rather than those who make for the United States, is now typical of Latin American migrants. Between 2015 and 2022 the number of intra-regional migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean soared by nearly 7m to almost 13m. Over the same period the number of migrants from the region living in the United States increased by just 1m. Map: The Economist Most of those migrants are Venezuelans fleeing dictatorship and economic chaos. Some 8m now live outside Venezuela, 85% of those in Latin America and the Caribbean. They are joined by Nicaraguans, also ditching dictatorship, who tend to make for Costa Rica. Haitians, escaping the horror of their gang-run state, also tend to settle in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in the Dominican Republic and Chile. With a 2,200km border with Venezuela, Colombia is on the front line. Some 2.8m Venezuelans live there, one in every 20 people in Colombia. The country has been remarkably welcoming. In 2017 it opened the first of a series of schemes giving some Venezuelans access to health care and education, and the right to work, for two years. In 2021 it went further, guaranteeing Venezuelans who had arrived before February that year most of the rights enjoyed by Colombians, even if they had entered the country irregularly. This scheme lasts for a decade, and provides a path to permanent residency and citizenship. Almost 2m Venezuelans, including Ms Hernández, have already received their new identity card under this scheme. Some 350,000 more applications are being processed. This warm welcome can be seen at the Centro Abrazar (roughly, hugging centre) in Bogotá, a kindergarten-cum-migrant-centre funded by the city’s government. Mere days after long, scary journeys, dozens of Venezuelan children twirl and sing, wearing paper sashes decorated in crayon with their favourite word about themselves (“happy”, “beautiful”, “brave”). The centre is free, open every day of the year and, crucially, helps new arrivals quickly get their papers in order and their children registered in Bogotá’s school system. A nativist might expect such a welcome to lead to severe economic disruption. Yet migrants did not push up unemployment among local workers, even in Colombia. The wages of less-educated and informal workers did fall in Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, but the decrease was usually small and temporary. The IMF estimates that since 2017, Venezuelan migrants have increased annual GDP growth by an average of 0.1 percentage points in receiving countries like Panama, and by 0.2 in Colombia, a boost which will last until 2030. Hospitals and schools feel the strain, nowhere more so than in Colombia. In 2019 the country spent 0.5% of its GDP looking after migrants, according to the IMF. Spending has declined since then to around 0.3% of GDP. The IMF says the costs will be balanced over time by rising tax revenues as more migrants enter the labour force. Quick regularisation is helpful, as it brings down health-care costs as well as boosting the tax take. Many Latin Americans, especially Chileans, think migrants bring crime. A study by Nicolás Ajzenman of McGill University and co-authors, which examined data from between 2008 and 2017, found that when the proportion of migrants in a given part of Chile doubles, the share of people there who say crime is either their biggest or second-biggest concern jumps by 19 percentage points, relative to the nationwide mean of 36%. But they found no impact on crime of any sort. Colombia saw an increase in violent crime near the border in 2016, when migration was surging, but the victims tended to be Venezuelan, suggesting it is migrants who bear the risks. Still, crime has risen overall in Chile in recent years. Politicians blame migrants. The influx of black Haitians also “triggered much more evident racism”, says Ignacio Eissmann of the Jesuit Migrant Service in Chile, an NGO. Attitudes are hardening elsewhere, too. Between 2020 and 2023 the share of Costa Ricans who say migrants damage the country jumped by 15 percentage points to 65%. In Peru and Ecuador four in five people believe the same. Governments—most of which were welcoming initially—are reaching their limits. From 2018 Chile demanded that Venezuelans and Haitians must get a visa before coming. Peru and Ecuador started demanding the same of Venezuelans in 2019. It is now nearly impossible for Venezuelans to get a visa at home; after Nicolás Maduro stole the election in July, all three countries closed their embassies there. Chile’s leftist president, Gabriel Boric, says the country cannot take more migrants. Regularisation has stopped, and he is pushing to widen deportation powers. Peru’s government has made it much harder for migrants to regularise their status. In theory migrant children can attend school regardless. In practice the missing paperwork often blocks them. Brazil and Colombia remain relatively generous. Carlos Fernando Galán, the mayor of Bogotá, says political leaders have a responsibility “to ensure there is not more xenophobia, to show the benefits that migration can bring”. Yet angry voices are growing louder. Almost 70% of Colombians think that migrants cause an increase in crime. That may be why Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s president, has been slow to introduce new regularisation schemes for recent Venezuelan arrivals. (He recently announced a scheme so restrictive that few will benefit.) “The central government has gone backwards,” sighs Gaby Arellano of the Together We Can Foundation, an NGO which helps Venezuelans. Mr Maduro’s rule in Venezuela is becoming more despotic. Arrivals to Colombia have increased since July 2024, though official numbers are unreliable. The border is riddled with trochas (illegal crossings); at official crossings people are often waved through without a document check. Some say the Maduro regime’s persistence makes little difference to migration. “Whoever comes will be manageable,” says Jorge Acevedo, mayor of the border town of Cúcuta. His words reflect Colombia’s welcoming spirit, but his city is now dealing with an influx of Colombians displaced by violence in the nearby region of Catatumbo. More Venezuelans could break a strained system. Whoever comes, Colombia, Peru and the region, not the United States, will again feel the biggest impact. ■ Sign up to El Boletín, our subscriber-only newsletter on Latin America, to understand the forces shaping a fascinating and complex region. Explore more Venezuela Immigration The Americas United States

The US Is Giving El Salvador A Nuclear Reactor For Housing US Prisoners There

The Trade El Salvador El Salvador offered to incarcerate criminals of any nationality deported from the US and house them in its mega-jail, a deal made the same day that the US offered to help El Salvador develop nuclear energy capabilities, CBS News reported. According to El Salvador’s Foreign Minister Alexandra Hill Tinoco, the civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed by El Salvador and the US aims at providing the country with “competitive” energy pricing while cutting its dependence on favorable geopolitics and oil prices. Tinoco explained that the US’ experience on civil nuclear energy will provide El Salvador with the tools to train the expert personnel who will manage the technical and regulatory aspects of this “unprecedented” transition. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio approved the nuclear agreement immediately after praising El Salvador President Nayib Bukele’s offer to take individuals incarcerated in the US, including US citizens, as an “offer of friendship” that no other country ever made, the BBC reported. Bukele said he would house convicted criminals in El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT) – a mega-jail capable of holding up to 40,000 people – charging the US a fee that would be “relatively low” for the country but “significant” enough to make El Salvador’s prison system sustainable. El Salvador’s nuclear plans are in a very early stage. According to the World Nuclear Association, the US is the largest producer of nuclear energy. Nuclear supporters say that this resource is one of the most reliable and environmentally friendly energy sources, while critics believe it is dangerous, wasteful, and expensive. Before receiving significant exports of US nuclear material and equipment, partner countries will need to sign a 123 Agreement intended to promote mutual nuclear nonproliferation between the United States and its partners. Because El Salvador is not one of the eight countries able to enrich uranium and procure the necessary fuel for nuclear power, it has to rely on other countries for new nuclear technology. El Salvador signed a similar agreement with Argentina last October.

The Huge Problems With US Deportations To Latin American Countries

Carrots, Sticks, and Dignity Central America / South America When US President Donald Trump sent a plane of deported Colombians back to the country recently, Colombian President Gustavo Petro balked, saying he would only permit deportees to be returned “in a dignified manner.” He turned back the flights. US threats of high tariffs on Colombian goods and other punishments led to a standoff until Petro gave in, but only after the White House promised “dignified” returns in the future. The affair served as a warning to the entire region, wrote the Los Angeles Times. “For Trump, the episode gave him a chance to show the rest of Latin America the risks they face if they do not fall in line with his deportation plan.” As a result, other leaders in the region, such as those of Brazil and especially Mexico, are trying to avoid a showdown, choosing pragmatism instead. For example, when a flight with deportees to Brazil landed in the city of Manaus in late January, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva wasn’t happy. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the highest-ranking diplomat at the US embassy in Brasília soon after to demand that such an incident not be repeated. The issue was how 88 deportees were forced to travel handcuffed on an aging US airplane in uncomfortable conditions. The Brazilian officials demanded – and were given, similar to the Colombians – assurances that such fights in the future would provide “dignified, respectful, and humane treatment” for the returning Brazilians. “We had a very sober reaction,” said Brazilian Minister of Justice Ricardo Lewandowski after the incident. “We do not want to provoke the American government.” Still, it’s Mexico that has the most to lose. Colombia is a minor trade partner with the US and also isn’t a major source of migrants. But Mexico is not only the largest source of migrants to the US, the US is its largest trade partner – 80 percent of its exports head north. As a result, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum is playing it safe. “The relationship with the United States is special,” Sheinbaum said. “We are obliged to have a good relationship.” Mexico might be feeling a little put upon since Trump became president again, however: “More than any other country, Donald Trump went after Mexico on his first day in office,” the Economist noted. For example, the flurry of actions directed at Mexico included threatening tariffs on the country of 25 percent, ordering an investigation into trade imbalances, ordering its criminal gangs to be designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), declaring an emergency at the southern border, and reinstating policies that leave third-country migrants languishing on Mexican soil. The migrant issue poses a particular problem for Mexico. Thousands who were hoping to cross the border are stuck in Mexico. Some border towns are worried that they will be overwhelmed with deported Mexicans – illegals are estimated to number about five million in the US – plus millions more who are not Mexican. Tijuana recently declared a state of emergency over the issue, CNN reported. While Mexico accepted thousands of migrants deported from the US last month, one sticking point is the third-country nationals and who will pay for them. Sheinbaum has allowed some of those flights to land but said Mexico wouldn’t accept everyone, especially those foreign asylum-seekers who are part of the resumption of the “remain in Mexico” policy. Still, in most cases, Sheinbaum is acquiescing to US demands or making it seem as if she is, the Washington Post noted. Meanwhile, there is one US demand that has crossed a line for Mexico – renaming the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America. Sheinbaum said when she encountered that executive order, she couldn’t help but laugh. “He says that he will call it the Gulf of America on its continental shelf,” Sheinbaum said, noting the gulf was named four centuries ago. “For us, it is still the Gulf of Mexico, and for the entire world, it is still the Gulf of Mexico.” But she wasn’t joking when she sent Google a note afterward, telling the company to reverse the name change because one country could not unilaterally rename the gulf. Maybe we should “rename North America as ‘América Mexicana,’” she added. “That sounds nice, no?”

Panama's Canal Treat Declassified

The Panama Canal Treaty Declassified Panama Canal Treaty in the Pan American Union Building in Washington, September 7, 1977 Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos shake hands after signing the Panama Canal Treaty in the Pan American Union Building, Washington, September 7, 1977 Formerly Top Secret Records Shed Light on True History of Canal Negotiations Canal Negotiations Were Bipartisan Effort, Spanned Four Presidencies Kissinger Signed “Declaration of Principles” for New Treaty; Oversaw Diplomatic Advances on Ceding Control of Canal Zone in mid 1970s Kissinger Warning: “This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism.” Published: Feb 3, 2025 Briefing Book # 884 Edited by Peter Kornbluh For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or peter.kornbluh@gmail.com Regions Mexico and Central America Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Robert Anderson Robert M. Anderson served as special ambassador to Panama to negotiate a Canal Zone treaty from April 1964 to June 1973 Ellsworth Bunker Ellsworth Bunker, the former US Ambassador to Vietnam, served as a lead negotiator on the Panama Canal accords during the Ford and Carter administrations. Sol Linowitz In 1977, Jimmy Carter appointed Sol Linowitz to work with Ambassador Bunker to finalize the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. Washington, D.C., February 3, 2025 - Continued U.S. control of the Panama Canal “looks like pure colonialism,” Henry Kissinger advised President Gerald Ford during a National Security Council meeting in May 1975, 50 years ago. “Internationally, failure to conclude a treaty is going to get us into a cause celebre, with harassment, demonstrations, bombing of embassies,” Kissinger warned, according to a declassified memorandum of conversation posted today by the National Security Archive. The lead negotiator for a new Canal Zone treaty, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, reinforced that point: “I have no doubt that failure in these negotiations would entail unacceptable risks,” Bunker told the president, “including negative effects beyond Panama which would disrupt our relations with Latin America, lead to world condemnation, and hamper the operation of the waterway.” According to Kissinger, “This is no issue to face the world on.” The NSC ”memcon” is featured in a new Electronic Briefing Book published today by the National Security Archive as confrontation over the Panama Canal escalates into a central U.S. foreign policy and international issue. On February 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio held meetings in Panama to press the Trump administration’s claims that the presence of a Chinese company in the Canal Zone violates the neutrality clause of the 1977 Treaty. “Secretary Rubio made clear that this status quo is unacceptable and that absent immediate changes, it would require the United States to take measures necessary to protect its rights under the treaty,” the State Department said in a threatening summary of the meeting. During his inaugural address, President Trump said, “We didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back”—an ominous statement that prompted Panama to file a complaint to the United Nations that the U.S. is in violation of the UN Charter prohibiting “the threat or use of force” against the territorial integrity of member nations. But during Secretary Rubio’s visit to Panama, Trump reiterated that threat: “We’re going to take it back, or something very powerful is going to happen.” CIA memorandum The documents posted today include CIA reports, NSC briefing papers, White House meeting minutes, telephone transcripts and audio tapes dating back to the Kennedy era. Although the current Canal accords were signed by President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos in September 1977, negotiations for a new treaty ceding sovereignty of the Canal Zone back to Panama spanned a period of 13 years—from 1964 to 1977—during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. Almost a half century after complex and protracted bilateral diplomatic efforts finally removed the Canal Zone as a contentious and internationally repudiated symbol of U.S. hegemony in the Latin America region, these fascinating archival records provide a contextual, factual overview to understand and appreciate the historical foundations of the foreign policy crisis that is escalating today over Panama. Memorandum for the president Historical Takeaways The various phases of bilateral talks evolved during different eras and with a variety of approaches on both the U.S. and Panamanian sides. But as a collection, the documents provide several key takeaways that can inform the increasingly misleading and aggressive political discourse over Panama. Among them: **The Canal Treaty negotiations were bipartisan: Diplomatic negotiations to withdraw U.S. control of the Canal Zone and recognize Panama’s sovereignty over the waterway were conducted under two Democratic administrations—Johnson and Carter—and two Republican administrations—Nixon and Ford. Although the Carter administration receives due historical credit in the media for negotiating and signing the current Panama Canal accords, that historic agreement evolved from talks initiated under the Johnson Administration in early 1964, after anti-American protests in the Zone and the U.S. response cost the lives of 22 Panamanian students and four U.S. soldiers and left hundreds injured. In April 1964, Johnson appointed the first “special ambassador,” Robert M. Anderson, to negotiate a new treaty to replace the imperial 1903 agreement giving the U.S. carte blanche political, military, economic and administrative control over the Canal territories. Over the course of three years, Anderson negotiated a package of three treaties governing the administration and defense of the Canal Zone; for political reasons, the accords were never signed or ratified in either Washington or Panama. But Anderson continued as chief negotiator during the Nixon administration until June 1973. Kissinger signed a "Declaration of Principles" On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a "Declaration of Principles" with Panama's foreign minister, Juan Antonio Tack, creating a framework for a new Canal Zone treaty. During Henry Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary of State, negotiations between the U.S. and Panama gained significant momentum. In February 1974, Kissinger traveled to Panama for a signing ceremony of a “Declaration of Principles” that established an eight-point framework for negotiations to cede control of the Zone to Panama. Given the contentious domestic politics surrounding U.S. control of the Zone, the Ford administration planned to finalize and sign an accord after the November 1976 presidential election on the assumption that Ford would win. Instead, the new Carter administration quickly affirmed that it would finalize negotiations to replace the 1903 treaty with a two-treaty package—one on administrative control and one on the future defense of the canal. President Carter also committed himself to a major public relations campaign to educate U.S. public opinion on how the new treaties would advance U.S. interests and lobby swing senators from both parties to vote to ratify the two-treaty agreement. **U.S. policy motivations were to secure sustainable, peaceful access to, and defense of, the waterway: After President Carter died at age 100, President Trump accused him of “giving [the Canal] away.” But the documents show that Carter, like his three predecessors, sought to advance U.S. strategic and economic interests in redefining an enduring and unstable symbol of an imperious U.S. presence in Central America into a zone of mutual and harmonious collaboration. As early as 1962, as a declassified memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Panama’s President Roberto Chiari reveals, Panamanian officials warned the U.S. of “the intensity of the feeling of the present Panamanian generation with regard to the 1903 treaty” and demanded new accords that respected Panama’s sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Those warnings became reality when violent, deadly riots broke out in early 1964, convincing President Johnson that a new treaty was needed to stabilize the geostrategic and economically imperative waterway. In three different national security directives, President Nixon instructed his negotiators to continue treaty negotiations, at one point calling for a new draft treaty by the end of 1971. When President Ford faced hostile domestic opposition to a treaty and division among his own national security team, top aides led by Henry Kissinger advised him on the regional and international repercussions of terminating the Canal Zone negotiations: “There will be an uproar in Panama, with riots and harassment. It will become an armed camp and will spread rapidly to the Western Hemisphere. It will become an OAS issue around which they will all unite. Then it will spread into the international organizations,” Kissinger told him. Ford was convinced. “It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty,” Ford told his advisors during a July 1975 NSC meeting. “We don’t want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either. We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.” **Domestic politics were a critical consideration and obstacle: Changing public opinion about the Canal and securing a two thirds vote in the Senate to ratify a new treaty with Panama were ever-present considerations for U.S. presidents. President Kennedy flat-out rejected the entreaties of Panama’s president, Roberto Chiari, to negotiate a new treaty on political grounds because, according to the summary of their conversation, “he could not see the end of the road in sitting down to rewrite the treaty nor how he could demonstrate to two-thirds of the Senate that such a course had advanced the United States interest.” President Ford was advised that “a new treaty could constitute a striking foreign-policy achievement for the Administration. It will not be easy to move a treaty through the Senate. But the real problem derives more from ignorance than antipathy.” With Ronald Reagan challenging Ford in the 1976 primaries with the mantra “When it comes to the Panama Canal, we built it; we paid for it; and…we are going to keep it,” discussions on treaty negotiations during the Ford administration repeatedly addressed how to sustain the pretense of talks while not actually finalizing an agreement until after the November 1976 election. The very first policy review meeting on Panama during the Carter administration determined that the President should start the campaign to inform public opinion by including Panama in his fireside chats, and that he should authorize “a National Citizens Committee on the Panama Canal…to stimulate a national educational campaign.” The Carter administration did mount a major and ultimately successful public relations effort to win hearts and minds (and votes) that included recruiting Hollywood star John Wayne to specifically rebut Ronald Reagan for spreading falsehoods and “misinforming people” about the treaty proposals. Panama Canal **Diplomacy Produces Positive Results: In his first conversation with the President of Panama after the January 9, 1964, riots in the Canal Zone, during which U.S. security personnel shot and killed some 20 Panamanians, President Johnson portrayed himself as “cold and hard and tough as hell.” But by April, when he appointed a special ambassador to engage in treaty negotiations, Johnson had adopted a proactive diplomatic attitude which helped contain the dangerous and explosive threat of unrest targeting the Canal Zone for the duration of his presidency. Mitigating unrest through the promise of diplomatic negotiations for a new treaty was also a strategy of the Nixon/Ford administrations. Carter had far more empathy for Panama’s historical grievances than his predecessors—“It is obvious we cheated the Panamanians out of their canal,” he wrote in his diary—but according to Kai Bird’s biography, The Outlier, Carter was influenced by intelligence briefings of how vulnerable the Zone was to political unrest and that 100,000 U.S. troops would be needed to defend it. Diplomacy was far more promising than the use of force. Carter’s special ambassadors, Sol Linowitz and Ellsworth Bunker, quickly negotiated a two-treaty solution—one on jurisdiction and administration and the other securing the U.S. rights to defend the Canal against threats to its neutrality. At a White House meeting with General Torrijos one day before the September 7, 1977, signing ceremony, according to the summary posted today, Carter told him that “the treaty opened the way to a new era of mutual respect, equality and friendship between our peoples.” For almost half a century since the signing of those historic accords, that “new era” has more or less endured; notwithstanding the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 to seize General Manuel Noriega, the Canal Zone has functioned to the advantage of the U.S., Panama and the international community—until now. “As the U.S. threatens a return to an era of gunboat diplomacy in Panama,” notes Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh, “the historical record of the Canal Zone negotiations reflects the pragmatic promise of actual diplomacy to advance U.S. interests.” The Documents KENNEDY AND JOHNSON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 1 Document 1 White House, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting Between John F. Kennedy and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, “United States-Panamanian Relations,” Confidential, June 12, 1962 Jun 12, 1962 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Document 405 During a state visit to Washington, Panamanian President Roberto Chiari meets with President Kennedy at the White House regarding the status of the Canal Zone. Chiari presents the case for renegotiating the 1903 Canal treaty—arguments he has previously shared with Kennedy in a September 8, 1961, letter—suggesting that the original agreement has led to “misunderstandings” for many years. Chiari “asked in the name of Panama that the treaties be revised and not considered sacred just because they were signed 58 years ago.” According to this summary of their White House meeting, Kennedy’s response is diplomatic but negative. Kennedy “could not see the end of the road in sitting down to rewrite the treaty nor how he could demonstrate to two-thirds of the Senate that such a course had advanced the United States interest. He suggested that since sovereignty is the principal issue and we have recognized Panama as sovereign that we attempt within this framework to work out operation of the Canal along with mitigation of frictions.” The meeting summary notes that Chiari became “petulant and frustrated” with the conversation; his foreign minister, Galileo Solis, took over the presentation of Panama’s position. Solis “repeated that President Chiari cannot go back to Panama without agreement to discuss in a negotiation committee all the claims Panama may present; otherwise he will face a political crisis. President Kennedy replied that he was not in a position to give any commitment that the United States could at this time agree to, sign or ratify a new treaty.” Presciently, the former foreign minister, Octavio Fabrega reminded U.S. officials of “the intensity of the feeling of the present Panamanian generation with regard to the 1903 treaty.” 2 Document 2 CIA, Central Intelligence Bulletin, Daily Brief, “Panama,” Top Secret, January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source CIA Crest database The CIA Daily Brief reports on January 9th riots that have led to death and destruction in the Canal Zone. The report notes that the violence broke out over “the issue of flying the Panamanian flag in the Zone…with the Panamanians insisting on this dual display.” The anti-American sentiment generated by the riots and the shooting of Panamanians by U.S. Canal Zone guards, according to the CIA assessment, “is likely to be prolonged.” The riots, deaths and injuries of dozens of Panamanians mark a turning point in the history of U.S. control of the Canal Zone. President Roberto Chiari responds by cutting diplomatic relations with Washington and demanding negotiations for a new Canal treaty as a quid pro quo for restoration of bilateral ties. 3 Document 3 CIA, Memorandum for the Record, “White House Meeting on Panama, 10 January 1964,” Secret, January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Top Johnson administration officials convene to address the first foreign policy crisis of Johnson’s presidency. CIA Director John McCone provides an initial briefing on the violent riots and the prospect of their continuation. Officials agree on a series of crisis management steps, including a call from Johnson to the president of Panama, Roberto Chiari, and the immediate launch of a fact-finding mission to Panama led by Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Thomas Mann. 4 Document 4 White House, Tapes, [President Johnson Telephone Conversation with Senator Richard Russell on U.S. Response to Violent Riots in the Canal Zone, January 6, 1964], Recorded on January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source The Miller Center at the University of Virginia On January 9, 1964, violent riots in the Canal Zone and the heavy-handed U.S. response left four U.S. personnel and 20 Panamanians dead and more than 200 injured and led to Panama breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. The next day, President Johnson calls Senator Richard Russell to brief him on a phone conversation he has just had with President Chiari of Panama. Chiari told Johnson about the June 1962 meeting with Kennedy, complaining that “not a thing has been done” since then to address Panama’s demands for a new treaty. Johnson reports to Russell that he shut down Chiari’s efforts to press for treaty negotiations. “I told him that we couldn’t get into that,” Johnson states. “I was cold and hard and tough as hell.” Johnson appears to commend the toughness of the U.S. military commander who “had to order his people to start shooting,” killing 20 Panamanians. “I am not trying to unjustify it or justify it,” the President tells Russell. “I am just saying, it’s a hot [situation]—hot as a firecracker.” Audio file doc 5 Document 5 White House, Tapes, Conversation between President Johnson and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, April 3, 1964 Apr 3, 1964 Source The Miller Center at the University of Virginia Between January and April, President Johnson rethinks his “cold and hard” position and turns to diplomacy to address the Panama Canal crisis situation. On April 3, he places a call to Panamanian President Roberto Chiari to mark the restoration of diplomatic ties, and to inform him of the appointment of a “special ambassador,” Robert M. Anderson, to begin negotiations with Panama on the conflict over the Canal Zone. Chiari is recorded telling Johnson that it is time for “a complete revision of the treaty,” which has become “the source of dissatisfaction” for the Panamanian people. In the seven-and-a-half-minute telephone call, Johnson makes It clear that the U.S. is willing to negotiate but with “no pre-conditions.” Over the next three years, Ambassador Anderson negotiates a “package” of three treaties. But the treaty ratification process is aborted when the U.S. Congress rejects the accord and Panamanian President Marco Robles fails to sign the accord amidst political turmoil before the 1968 elections. In October 1968, Robles' successor, Anulfo Arias, is overthrown in a military coup that eventually brings a National Guard officer, Omar Torrijos, to power. Anderson continues as the special U.S. negotiator to Panama until June of 1973. Audio file 6 Document 6 State Department, Information Memorandum, “Panama Canal Treaties,” Confidential, June 27, 1967 Jun 27, 1967 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 439 One day after President Johnson and Panamanian President Marco Robles announce agreement on three new treaties—the Lock Canal Treaty, the Sea Level Treaty, and the Defense Treaty—this memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarizes the provisions in the new accords. The treaties replace the 1903 original agreement, establish a “Joint Administration of the Panama Canal” to operate the Panama Canal and administer the “Canal Area,” and grant the U.S. rights to construct a new sea-level canal within the next 20 years. Under the Defense Treaty, “the United States retains certain defense areas in which it may maintain its Armed Forces” and where it can act unilaterally to defend those areas. A breakthrough at the time, this package agreement was never ratified by the U.S. Congress; in Panama, it was overtaken by a military coup in 1968, which brought Omar Torrijos to power. NIXON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 7 Document 7 NSC, “National Security Study Memorandum 86,” Secret, January 2, 1970 Jan 2, 1970 Source Richard Nixon Presidential Library National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger requests an interagency study on prospects for negotiating a new Panama Canal treaty. Three issues are to be addressed: 1) Identifying U.S. interests in a new treaty, along with timing and options “to achieve those objectives;” 2) An evaluation of the treaties prepared in 1967, during the Johnson administration, and what changes should be made to them; and 3) evaluation of U.S. policy towards the government of General Omar Torrijos and the internal situation in Panama as it would relate to advancing a new accord on the Canal Zone. 8 Document 8 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 64, “Panama Canal,” Secret, June 5, 1970 Jun 5, 1970 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In response to an interagency study on prospects for a Panama Canal treaty, President Nixon issues National Security Decision Memorandum 64, ordering his national security team to begin “exploratory and preliminary talks” with Panamanian leaders. Nixon cites several “nonnegotiable” issues: effective U.S. control of canal operations; effective U.S. control of canal defense; and “continuation of these controls for an extended period of time preferably open-ended.” Ensuing meetings with Panamanian officials result in extensive negotiations on those very issues, which eventually become the core of the new treaty. 9 Document 9 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 115, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret/Exdis, June 24, 1971 Jun 24, 1971 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In this national security directive, President Nixon authorizes his emissary, Special Ambassador Robert Anderson, “to undertake formal negotiations with Panama with a view to obtaining agreement on the text of a draft treaty this year.” Nixon’s instructions also provide more latitude to Anderson to negotiate a shorter time period for phasing out U.S. jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, a demand Panama has made. 10 Document 10 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 131, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret/Exdis, September 13, 1971 Sep 13, 1971 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In a third national security directive on Panama, President Nixon authorizes Special Ambassador Robert Anderson to negotiate “the possibility of a termination formula” for the treaty, “provided that the duration negotiated is a long one and that other provisions of the treaty package are satisfactory to the U.S.” Nixon prefers an open-ended treaty but is willing to agree to a 50-year duration “with provision for an additional 30-50 years if Canal capacity is expanded.” Nixon also wants a joint guarantee that “the Canal will be open to all world shipping without discrimination at reasonable tolls and that Panama would take no action that would hamper the efficient operation of the waterway.” 11 Document 11 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum, “Panama: 1973—Year of the Treaty?” Secret, November 28, 1972 Nov 28, 1972 Source CIA.gov website The CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence produced a comprehensive 13-page assessment that reviewed the history of negotiations on the Canal and provided substantive insight into the negotiating approach of General Omar Torrijos. “Torrijos’ efforts to demonstrate to Washington that he could be tough have always been balanced by signals that he was really quite reasonable,” the CIA analysis concluded. “If Torrijos' basic objectives are met, if he can get fairly complete jurisdiction over the Zone in a relatively short period of time, and if he can significantly shorten the duration period that was embodied in the 1967 drafts, then a treaty agreement may be possible in 1973.” 12 Document 12 State Department, Declaration of Principles [signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Tack] February 7, 1974 Feb 7, 1974 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger met in Panama with Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack and, in a major ceremony, signed a framework for Canal negotiations known as the “Declaration of Principles.” The two countries agreed that the original 1903 Treaty, which the U.S. had essentially imposed on the Panamanian people, would be replaced by a new interoceanic canal treaty; the concept of “perpetuity” of U.S. control over the Canal Zone would be eliminated, and U.S. jurisdiction would come to an end. The territory of the Canal Zone would return to Panamanian sovereignty, and Panama would have “a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of the canal in its territory,” the joint agreement stated. “The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the protection and defense of the canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new treaty,” according to a key principle. Both countries would also participate in the expansion of the canal should such development be needed in the future. The “principles” framework becomes the foundation for a renewed three-year effort during the Ford and Carter administrations to negotiate a new Panama Canal treaty. FORD AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 13 Document 13 Department of State, “Issue Paper for the President: Panama Negotiation, ‘Roadmap,’ Secret, January 11, 1975 (with cover memorandum to Brent Scowcroft) Jan 11, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The State Department sends the White House a “roadmap” on the status of Canal treaty negotiations, identifying decisions to be made and actions to be taken. “Now there has been a negotiating breakthrough: a new treaty is in sight,” according to the secret memorandum. But there are significant political obstacles to overcome. “A new treaty could constitute a striking foreign-policy achievement for the Administration,” the memo advises. “It will not be easy to move a treaty through the Senate. But the real problem derives more from ignorance than antipathy.” 14 Document 14 Department of State, action memorandum, “Panama Canal Negotiations,” Secret, February 6, 1975 (with cover memo and attachments) Feb 6, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The lead U.S. negotiator, Ellsworth Bunker, sends Kissinger material for President Ford, including a public relations plan to educate the Congress and influence opinion polls on the treaty. The memo to the President provides a comprehensive update on the status of negotiations that “have progressed to a critical point at which certain tradeoffs are necessary to reach an agreement.” Ambassador Bunker seeks a “certain flexibility” in his presidential instructions in order to finalize the treaty. If the U.S. does not move forward, the memo warns, “serious confrontation, possibly involving violence against the Canal Zone, would ensue, plus a consequent deterioration of our relations in Latin America and mounting world censure.” 15 Document 15 White House, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, “Panama Canal Negotiations,’ Top Secret, May 15, 1975 May 15, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Gerald Ford convenes an NSC meeting to discuss negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty that would eventually cede control of the Canal Zone back to the Panamanians. The meeting not only covers key areas such as the duration of the treaty and U.S. defense rights to protect it, but also the conflicting domestic and international political pressures on Washington that, as Secretary of State Kissinger makes clear, necessitate the negotiations to conclude after the 1976 presidential election. The lack of support in the United States for returning the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty is also a subject of the NSC meeting. Kissinger states that “from the foreign policy point of view, I favor going ahead. However, domestically I’ve already encountered enough opponents to know what a barrier exists.” Kissinger points out that abandoning negotiations for a new treaty would generate turmoil in the canal zone, upheaval in the region and world-wide condemnation. “We would have [a] real uproar…demonstrations, violence, and we would be dragged into every international forum. This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism.” 16 Document 16 White House, Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, “Panama Canal Negotiations,” Top Secret, July 23, 1975 Jul 23, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Ford convenes his national security team to discuss the Canal negotiations, which have come to a stalemate as the two sides disagree on major issues. “Negotiations are stalled and everyone is getting itchy,” Kissinger reports to the President. “It is not difficult to foresee that unless we begin the negotiations again there will be increasing unrest and eventually all Latin Americans will join in and we will have a cause celebre on our hands.” The meeting to address the issue of whether the President should favor a new treaty, given its domestic unpopularity and the political risks for his election in 1976, exposed divergent opinions among top national security officials. “It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty,” Ford tells his advisors. “We don’t want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either. We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.” 17 Document 17 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 302, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret, August 18, 1975 Aug 18, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Ford issues a national security decision directive authorizing U.S. negotiators to “proceed promptly” to restart talks and address outstanding issues, among them the duration for both U.S. operational control and defense of the Zone before Panama assumes those duties. He also directs his negotiators “to obtain Panama’s agreement that the negotiations will remain confidential so that the Panama Canal issue will not be injected into the domestic political process in the United States in 1976.” 18 Document 18 NSC, Memorandum, “Panama Canal Negotiations: January Status,” Secret, January 28, 1976 Jan 28, 1976 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The NSC specialist on the National Security Council, Stephen Low, reports on the status of the treaty talks. His memo provides a brief overview of the history of the negotiations starting with the January 1964 riots in the Canal Zone which left four U.S. soldiers and 20 Panamanians dead. The memo also reports on the “threshold agreements” on U.S. jurisdiction, control and defense of the Canal that negotiations during the Ford administration have advanced. Key issues remain, among them the duration of time before Panama assumes control of the Canal Zone, the amount of territory the U.S. will cede back to Panama, compensation, and whether the U.S. will have a formal role in guaranteeing the future neutrality of the Canal. 19 Document 19 NSC, Memorandum, “The Sovereignty Issue in the Panama Canal Negotiations,” Limited Official Use, April 9, 1976 Apr 9, 1976 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library NSC Latin America specialist Stephen Low sends National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft an overview on the issue of whether the Canal Zone is actually U.S. property. “Whether we have full sovereignty or ownership over the Canal is not central to the issue,” he argues. “The argument can go on and become very complex, as well as sterile. The important point is that it is not central to continuing the negotiations which are based on an assessment of our national interests.” The public argument that should be made, he suggests, is that “We are continuing these negotiations because the last three Presidents have all examined the matter carefully and found that our national interest in preserving access to the Canal over the long term is better served by negotiating a new arrangement with Panama.” 20 Document 20 State Department, Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting, August 25, 1976 Aug 25, 1976 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976, Document 131 During his staff meeting, Kissinger and his top aides discuss whether to send Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker back to Panama for another negotiating session. The presidential campaign is in high gear, and any finalization of the treaty will complicate Gerald Ford’s chances of re-election as well as create problems for pushing a finalized treaty forward if he loses. Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman tells Kissinger that sending Bunker to Panama in September “would be a good step in keeping Torrijos quiet, more or less.” “I have no problem with the going,” Kissinger responds, “as long as he doesn’t do anything.” CARTER AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 21 Document 21 White House, Policy Review Committee Meeting Minutes, “Panama,” Top Secret, January 27, 1977 Jan 27, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One week after Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, his top national security aides hold a Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting meet to discuss renewing negotiations on a Panama Canal treaty. The meeting addresses preparations for a visit from Panama’s foreign minister, Aquilino Boyd, for “informal talks” on the Canal treaty and how to set the diplomatic stage for reviving negotiations conducted by the Ford administration. The PRC concludes that the new administration should reaffirm the “Tack-Kissinger Principles” (a general outline of an agreement signed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Panamanians) beginning with exploratory talks but with a goal to finalize a new treaty by mid-1977. The PRC also “suggested that a National Citizens Committee on the Panama Canal be set up to stimulate a national educational campaign” in order to shift public opinion in favor of returning the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty. After the meeting, National Security Advisor Brzezinski transmits a summary of the conclusions to President Carter, advising him that he should mention Panama in his fireside chat, and/or State of the Union address. 22 Document 22 State Department, Cable, “Letter from the President to General Torrijos,” Secret, March 10, 1977 Mar 10, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library This secret cable transmits President Carter’s first message to Panamanian chief of state, General Omar Torrijos, agreeing to re-open negotiations on a Canal treaty. Carter’s letter comes in response to a communique Torrijos sent the new U.S. president in late February asking to continue negotiations that had started during the Ford administration. “I can assure you that the United States wishes to proceed cooperatively to meet the proper concerns of both Panama and the United States,” Carter writes. “My purpose lies in assuring that the Canal will remain permanently open and of use to the ships of all the world. The treaty should provide for an arrangement which allows the United States to meet its responsibility to operate the canal during the treaty's lifetime and which recognizes our security interest in the continuing neutrality of and access to the canal after the termination date of the treaty.” Carter’s letter concludes that “I will be pleased if we can agree on a new treaty and meet personally to sign it on behalf of our two countries.” 23 Document 23 White House, Memoranda from National Security Adviser Brzezinski to President Carter, “Panama Canal Treaty—Last Decisions,” Secret, ca. July 28, 1977 Jul 28, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library In this dramatic memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski advises President Carter on the “momentous” decision he faces to finalize the Panama Canal treaties. The Panamanians want a significant financial “package” of U.S. payments as part of the accord. But if Carter accedes to this demand, Brzezinski argues, it is unlikely that the Senate will ratify the treaty, with serious consequences for U.S. security and Carter’s own political interests. “A defeat in the Congress on this issue will not only jeopardize the Canal and our relations with Panama and Latin America; because you will have to invest so much of your political capital in this effort, a defeat might strike a significant blow at your overall effectiveness.” But denying the Panamanians the sizeable economic payout they sought also carried major risks of the negotiations breaking down. “With equally high probability,” Brzezinski counsels, “there will be rioting in Panama, which will spill over into the Zone. The Canal would be jeopardized and relations with Panama and all of Latin America and the developing world would be seriously, perhaps irreparably, harmed.” As Carter prepares for a meeting with General Torrijos’ emissaries, Brzezinski suggests he “convey directly to them and indirectly to Torrijos your strong commitment to a new treaty and your equally strong feelings about what the United States can do economically to help Panama and more importantly what the U.S. cannot do.” 24 Document 24 State Department, Memorandum from Secretary Vance to President Carter, “Your Meeting with Panamanian Representatives, July 29 at 9:30 a.m.,” with attached draft of letter from Carter to Torrijos, Secret, ca. July 28,1977 Jul 28, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library To seal the deal on the Canal treaties, President Carter agrees to meet with two emissaries of General Omar Torrijos to explain his administration’s final proposals after more than a decade of negotiations on the future of the Canal Zone. In preparation for that meeting, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance provides Carter with this briefing memorandum on the remaining issues to be resolved. Vance also provides a draft of a letter for Carter to give to the emissaries for General Torrijos. In his letter, Carter advised Torrijos that U.S. negotiators would soon return to Panama with final proposals on annual payments to Panama that “we truly believe to be fair and just,” even if they were “less than you had expected or wished.” Carter asked Torrijos to understand the political pressures and widespread opposition the treaties faced in Washington that threatened ratification by the U.S. Senate. “With understanding and patience,” Carter concludes, “I believe we can move quickly forward and achieve the goal that has eluded past governments and leaders in both our countries.” 25 Document 25 White House, Memorandum for President Carter, “Status of Canal Negotiations,” Secret, August 6, 1977 Aug 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library U.S. negotiators Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz report on a five-hour negotiating session on final points of contention on the treaty. At issue is the language that would prevent Panama from drawing on third countries to help it construct a second Canal—a provision the U.S. opposes—and restrictions on the U.S. from building a second canal through another Central American nation. Despite disagreement on this issue, Bunker and Linowitz predict that “barring quite unforeseen problems, we will be able to reach conceptual agreement early next week” and “final texts will be ready before long.” 26 Document 26 White House, Telcon, “Panama Canal Treaty: Telephone Call from President Carter to General Omar Torrijos,” August 24, 1977 Aug 24, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Just two weeks before the formal signing of the canal treaties in Washington, President Carter places a call to General Torrijos to discuss final arrangements for the ceremony. The discussion focuses mostly on how invitations will be made to all the heads of state in Latin America. Torrijos suggests inviting Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. It was only with great moral courage that our ends could be achieved,” Torrijos tells Carter at the end of the conversation. “I am proud of the progress we have made,” Carter responds. 27 Document 27 White House, Memorandum of Conversation, “President Carter/General Omar Torrijos Bilateral,” Confidential, September 6, 1977 Sep 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One day before the treaty-signing ceremony, President Carter holds a bilateral meeting with General Torrijos at the White House to discuss coordinating statements during the campaign in both countries to obtain ratification of the new accords and to evaluate the importance of this international accomplishment. Torrijos, according to the memorandum of conversation of their meeting, expressed “profound admiration for the President's honesty and political valor.” He compared Carter’s “act of valor” to bring a decade of negotiations to fruition to “jumping from an airplane without a parachute to take on this battle.” For his part, President Carter called the treaty “the right, fair and decent thing to do” and predicted “it would eventually prove to be a popular accomplishment for him and his Administration.” Carter said “the climate would improve as the American people came to understand the terms of the treaty and to realize the unfairness of the past.” According to Carter, “the treaty opened the way to a new era of mutual respect, equality and friendship between our peoples.”

Political Instability In Ecuador

A Clenched Fist Ecuador When Daniel Noboa took over the presidency of Ecuador in November 2023, there was hope that the young outsider could turn the country, bruised and battered by criminal gangs, around. Now almost 15 months later, polls show that Ecuadorans are quickly running out of patience with the young heir to a banana fortune: He may not win the first round of elections on Feb. 9 outright and may have to compete in a run-off election in April. For most of last year, Noboa was on track to easily win reelection, with polls showing him as a frontrunner on approval ratings topping 50 percent. Regular citizens initially saw Noboa as “a president who is making decisions,” under challenging circumstances, Quito-based analyst Max Donoso-Muller told Americas Quarterly. That mano dura (iron fist) stance on security was helping boost his popularity, it added. Now, however, escalating violence, frequent blackouts, and continuing economic malaise are threatening to derail his candidacy. Elected last year to complete the term of former President Guillermo Lasso, who called a snap election after facing mounting opposition, charges of corruption, and impeachment, Noboa won the election on a wave of optimism. Ecuador was long one of South America’s most peaceful countries, but in recent years it has been rocked by a wave of violence from organized crime gangs operating in neighboring Colombia and Peru, using it as a transit hub to the Pacific Ocean to ship cocaine to the world. By 2023, the country’s homicide rate had increased to 40 deaths per 100,000 people, one of the highest in the region. When he entered office, Ecuadorians, weary of the country’s near-takeover by gangs, held out hope that the outsider would be able to challenge the political elite and find new ways to tackle the country’s security situation, energy crisis, and sluggish economy. Since then, he has taken a tough-on-crime approach, noted World Politics Review, launching a war against gangs by engaging the military to support police and correction officers on the streets and in prisons, increasing prison sentences, and arresting thousands of suspected gang members. When voters were asked if they supported such measures in spite of worries over human rights in a referendum last year, they overwhelmingly answered “yes.” “We can’t live in fear of leaving our homes,” Leonor Sandoval, a 39-year-old homemaker, told the Associated Press. In spite of his measures, it’s spiraling crime that poses the most significant threat to Noboa’s reelection. While homicides have decreased marginally since he became president, the rate is still higher than in 2022. Meanwhile, Ecuador is grappling with a severe drought that has drastically reduced hydroelectric power generation. In some parts of the country, residents have cuts lasting up to 14 hours a day. “There shouldn’t be power cuts,” Brandon Samueza, who lost his job at a factory after blackouts reduced his employer’s earnings significantly, told Al Jazeera. “A government should be prepared … the fact that they have not done anything to adjust speaks badly of the government.” Part of the political blowback on Noboa is due to his championing of an electricity reform law last year that did nothing to alleviate the problem, analysts said. And in a country still struggling to recover from the pandemic, the situation is severely harming companies and the economy. Meanwhile, other candidates have been gaining in the polls. Although there are 15 other candidates on the ballot, polls suggest Noboa will face off against former assemblywoman Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution Movement, a leftist party led by popular, self-exiled former President Rafael Correa, who was convicted of corruption, a charge he decries as political. Noboa defeated González in 2023’s runoff election with 52 percent of the vote to her 48 percent. González was briefly running ahead of Noboa last fall but he’s the frontrunner again – for now. Still, analysts say that the election is hard to predict because of the gangs. “I think that violence will intensify because drug trafficking gangs, which did particularly well during Correa’s government, will intensify their actions so that the population thinks that Noboa failed in his attempt to control them and opts for the Correa candidate,” Walter Spurrier of the Guayaquil-based consultancy Grupo Spurrier told Bnamericas. He added that Noboa made a mistake by sparking hope that the war on the gangs would be short-lived: “The fight is a long one.” Share this story

Argentina: Upending Progress

Upending Progress Argentina Thousands of Argentinians took to the streets of the capital Buenos Aires and other major cities to protest President Javier Milei’s recent comments disparaging the LGBTQ community and announcing plans to remove the crime of femicide from the penal code, Euronews reported. Saturday’s protests – dubbed the “Federal March of Anti-Fascist and Anti-Racist Pride” – saw participants draped in rainbow flags and carrying banners reading “rights are not negotiable.” During last month’s World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Milei criticized “sick wokeism,” feminism, social welfare, and the fight against climate change. He compared homosexuality to pedophilia. He also criticized the concept of femicide – when a man murders a woman because of her gender – claiming that “equality before the law already exists in the West. Everything else is just seeking privileges,” according to the Guardian. Soon after his comments, the Argentinian government announced plans to remove femicide as an aggravated crime from the country’s penal code. Justice Minister Mariano Cúneo Libarona defended the move, saying that “no life is worth more than another,” and that feminism had “distorted the concept of equality.” The rollback would eliminate femicide – a category that has existed since 2012 and is punishable by life imprisonment – as an aggravating factor in homicide cases. Numerous countries in Latin America have enacted femicide laws. The government says these measures are necessary to make sure Argentina offers a level playing field. However, protesters and critics complained that the decision ignores the reality of gender-based violence – official data recorded 295 femicides in Argentina last year, with Amnesty International warning that most women are killed by partners or family members. Since taking office in December, Milei has rapidly dismantled gender-equality policies, eliminated the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and dissolved programs supporting victims of gender-based violence. The country has also voted against a United Nations resolution to prevent violence against women. Until now, Argentina had been at the forefront of such policies in the region. Human rights groups and legal observers have criticized the administration’s policies as dangerous, warning they could increase the risk to women and minorities, and are setting the country back decades. Milei’s administration has also come under scrutiny for slashing funding for historical memory initiatives, which would delay trials for crimes against humanity perpetrated during Argentina’s military dictatorship. Some protesters also expressed concern that Milei’s policies could have a ripple effect across the region, the Argentina-based Buenos Aires Herald wrote. Share this story