Panama's Canal Treat Declassified

The Panama Canal Treaty Declassified Panama Canal Treaty in the Pan American Union Building in Washington, September 7, 1977 Jimmy Carter and General Omar Torrijos shake hands after signing the Panama Canal Treaty in the Pan American Union Building, Washington, September 7, 1977 Formerly Top Secret Records Shed Light on True History of Canal Negotiations Canal Negotiations Were Bipartisan Effort, Spanned Four Presidencies Kissinger Signed “Declaration of Principles” for New Treaty; Oversaw Diplomatic Advances on Ceding Control of Canal Zone in mid 1970s Kissinger Warning: “This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism.” Published: Feb 3, 2025 Briefing Book # 884 Edited by Peter Kornbluh For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or peter.kornbluh@gmail.com Regions Mexico and Central America Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Carter and Torrijos at Sept 7 1977 Signing Ceremony Robert Anderson Robert M. Anderson served as special ambassador to Panama to negotiate a Canal Zone treaty from April 1964 to June 1973 Ellsworth Bunker Ellsworth Bunker, the former US Ambassador to Vietnam, served as a lead negotiator on the Panama Canal accords during the Ford and Carter administrations. Sol Linowitz In 1977, Jimmy Carter appointed Sol Linowitz to work with Ambassador Bunker to finalize the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. Washington, D.C., February 3, 2025 - Continued U.S. control of the Panama Canal “looks like pure colonialism,” Henry Kissinger advised President Gerald Ford during a National Security Council meeting in May 1975, 50 years ago. “Internationally, failure to conclude a treaty is going to get us into a cause celebre, with harassment, demonstrations, bombing of embassies,” Kissinger warned, according to a declassified memorandum of conversation posted today by the National Security Archive. The lead negotiator for a new Canal Zone treaty, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, reinforced that point: “I have no doubt that failure in these negotiations would entail unacceptable risks,” Bunker told the president, “including negative effects beyond Panama which would disrupt our relations with Latin America, lead to world condemnation, and hamper the operation of the waterway.” According to Kissinger, “This is no issue to face the world on.” The NSC ”memcon” is featured in a new Electronic Briefing Book published today by the National Security Archive as confrontation over the Panama Canal escalates into a central U.S. foreign policy and international issue. On February 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio held meetings in Panama to press the Trump administration’s claims that the presence of a Chinese company in the Canal Zone violates the neutrality clause of the 1977 Treaty. “Secretary Rubio made clear that this status quo is unacceptable and that absent immediate changes, it would require the United States to take measures necessary to protect its rights under the treaty,” the State Department said in a threatening summary of the meeting. During his inaugural address, President Trump said, “We didn’t give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back”—an ominous statement that prompted Panama to file a complaint to the United Nations that the U.S. is in violation of the UN Charter prohibiting “the threat or use of force” against the territorial integrity of member nations. But during Secretary Rubio’s visit to Panama, Trump reiterated that threat: “We’re going to take it back, or something very powerful is going to happen.” CIA memorandum The documents posted today include CIA reports, NSC briefing papers, White House meeting minutes, telephone transcripts and audio tapes dating back to the Kennedy era. Although the current Canal accords were signed by President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos in September 1977, negotiations for a new treaty ceding sovereignty of the Canal Zone back to Panama spanned a period of 13 years—from 1964 to 1977—during the Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations. Almost a half century after complex and protracted bilateral diplomatic efforts finally removed the Canal Zone as a contentious and internationally repudiated symbol of U.S. hegemony in the Latin America region, these fascinating archival records provide a contextual, factual overview to understand and appreciate the historical foundations of the foreign policy crisis that is escalating today over Panama. Memorandum for the president Historical Takeaways The various phases of bilateral talks evolved during different eras and with a variety of approaches on both the U.S. and Panamanian sides. But as a collection, the documents provide several key takeaways that can inform the increasingly misleading and aggressive political discourse over Panama. Among them: **The Canal Treaty negotiations were bipartisan: Diplomatic negotiations to withdraw U.S. control of the Canal Zone and recognize Panama’s sovereignty over the waterway were conducted under two Democratic administrations—Johnson and Carter—and two Republican administrations—Nixon and Ford. Although the Carter administration receives due historical credit in the media for negotiating and signing the current Panama Canal accords, that historic agreement evolved from talks initiated under the Johnson Administration in early 1964, after anti-American protests in the Zone and the U.S. response cost the lives of 22 Panamanian students and four U.S. soldiers and left hundreds injured. In April 1964, Johnson appointed the first “special ambassador,” Robert M. Anderson, to negotiate a new treaty to replace the imperial 1903 agreement giving the U.S. carte blanche political, military, economic and administrative control over the Canal territories. Over the course of three years, Anderson negotiated a package of three treaties governing the administration and defense of the Canal Zone; for political reasons, the accords were never signed or ratified in either Washington or Panama. But Anderson continued as chief negotiator during the Nixon administration until June 1973. Kissinger signed a "Declaration of Principles" On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a "Declaration of Principles" with Panama's foreign minister, Juan Antonio Tack, creating a framework for a new Canal Zone treaty. During Henry Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary of State, negotiations between the U.S. and Panama gained significant momentum. In February 1974, Kissinger traveled to Panama for a signing ceremony of a “Declaration of Principles” that established an eight-point framework for negotiations to cede control of the Zone to Panama. Given the contentious domestic politics surrounding U.S. control of the Zone, the Ford administration planned to finalize and sign an accord after the November 1976 presidential election on the assumption that Ford would win. Instead, the new Carter administration quickly affirmed that it would finalize negotiations to replace the 1903 treaty with a two-treaty package—one on administrative control and one on the future defense of the canal. President Carter also committed himself to a major public relations campaign to educate U.S. public opinion on how the new treaties would advance U.S. interests and lobby swing senators from both parties to vote to ratify the two-treaty agreement. **U.S. policy motivations were to secure sustainable, peaceful access to, and defense of, the waterway: After President Carter died at age 100, President Trump accused him of “giving [the Canal] away.” But the documents show that Carter, like his three predecessors, sought to advance U.S. strategic and economic interests in redefining an enduring and unstable symbol of an imperious U.S. presence in Central America into a zone of mutual and harmonious collaboration. As early as 1962, as a declassified memorandum of conversation between President Kennedy and Panama’s President Roberto Chiari reveals, Panamanian officials warned the U.S. of “the intensity of the feeling of the present Panamanian generation with regard to the 1903 treaty” and demanded new accords that respected Panama’s sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Those warnings became reality when violent, deadly riots broke out in early 1964, convincing President Johnson that a new treaty was needed to stabilize the geostrategic and economically imperative waterway. In three different national security directives, President Nixon instructed his negotiators to continue treaty negotiations, at one point calling for a new draft treaty by the end of 1971. When President Ford faced hostile domestic opposition to a treaty and division among his own national security team, top aides led by Henry Kissinger advised him on the regional and international repercussions of terminating the Canal Zone negotiations: “There will be an uproar in Panama, with riots and harassment. It will become an armed camp and will spread rapidly to the Western Hemisphere. It will become an OAS issue around which they will all unite. Then it will spread into the international organizations,” Kissinger told him. Ford was convinced. “It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty,” Ford told his advisors during a July 1975 NSC meeting. “We don’t want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either. We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.” **Domestic politics were a critical consideration and obstacle: Changing public opinion about the Canal and securing a two thirds vote in the Senate to ratify a new treaty with Panama were ever-present considerations for U.S. presidents. President Kennedy flat-out rejected the entreaties of Panama’s president, Roberto Chiari, to negotiate a new treaty on political grounds because, according to the summary of their conversation, “he could not see the end of the road in sitting down to rewrite the treaty nor how he could demonstrate to two-thirds of the Senate that such a course had advanced the United States interest.” President Ford was advised that “a new treaty could constitute a striking foreign-policy achievement for the Administration. It will not be easy to move a treaty through the Senate. But the real problem derives more from ignorance than antipathy.” With Ronald Reagan challenging Ford in the 1976 primaries with the mantra “When it comes to the Panama Canal, we built it; we paid for it; and…we are going to keep it,” discussions on treaty negotiations during the Ford administration repeatedly addressed how to sustain the pretense of talks while not actually finalizing an agreement until after the November 1976 election. The very first policy review meeting on Panama during the Carter administration determined that the President should start the campaign to inform public opinion by including Panama in his fireside chats, and that he should authorize “a National Citizens Committee on the Panama Canal…to stimulate a national educational campaign.” The Carter administration did mount a major and ultimately successful public relations effort to win hearts and minds (and votes) that included recruiting Hollywood star John Wayne to specifically rebut Ronald Reagan for spreading falsehoods and “misinforming people” about the treaty proposals. Panama Canal **Diplomacy Produces Positive Results: In his first conversation with the President of Panama after the January 9, 1964, riots in the Canal Zone, during which U.S. security personnel shot and killed some 20 Panamanians, President Johnson portrayed himself as “cold and hard and tough as hell.” But by April, when he appointed a special ambassador to engage in treaty negotiations, Johnson had adopted a proactive diplomatic attitude which helped contain the dangerous and explosive threat of unrest targeting the Canal Zone for the duration of his presidency. Mitigating unrest through the promise of diplomatic negotiations for a new treaty was also a strategy of the Nixon/Ford administrations. Carter had far more empathy for Panama’s historical grievances than his predecessors—“It is obvious we cheated the Panamanians out of their canal,” he wrote in his diary—but according to Kai Bird’s biography, The Outlier, Carter was influenced by intelligence briefings of how vulnerable the Zone was to political unrest and that 100,000 U.S. troops would be needed to defend it. Diplomacy was far more promising than the use of force. Carter’s special ambassadors, Sol Linowitz and Ellsworth Bunker, quickly negotiated a two-treaty solution—one on jurisdiction and administration and the other securing the U.S. rights to defend the Canal against threats to its neutrality. At a White House meeting with General Torrijos one day before the September 7, 1977, signing ceremony, according to the summary posted today, Carter told him that “the treaty opened the way to a new era of mutual respect, equality and friendship between our peoples.” For almost half a century since the signing of those historic accords, that “new era” has more or less endured; notwithstanding the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 to seize General Manuel Noriega, the Canal Zone has functioned to the advantage of the U.S., Panama and the international community—until now. “As the U.S. threatens a return to an era of gunboat diplomacy in Panama,” notes Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh, “the historical record of the Canal Zone negotiations reflects the pragmatic promise of actual diplomacy to advance U.S. interests.” The Documents KENNEDY AND JOHNSON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 1 Document 1 White House, Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting Between John F. Kennedy and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, “United States-Panamanian Relations,” Confidential, June 12, 1962 Jun 12, 1962 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, Document 405 During a state visit to Washington, Panamanian President Roberto Chiari meets with President Kennedy at the White House regarding the status of the Canal Zone. Chiari presents the case for renegotiating the 1903 Canal treaty—arguments he has previously shared with Kennedy in a September 8, 1961, letter—suggesting that the original agreement has led to “misunderstandings” for many years. Chiari “asked in the name of Panama that the treaties be revised and not considered sacred just because they were signed 58 years ago.” According to this summary of their White House meeting, Kennedy’s response is diplomatic but negative. Kennedy “could not see the end of the road in sitting down to rewrite the treaty nor how he could demonstrate to two-thirds of the Senate that such a course had advanced the United States interest. He suggested that since sovereignty is the principal issue and we have recognized Panama as sovereign that we attempt within this framework to work out operation of the Canal along with mitigation of frictions.” The meeting summary notes that Chiari became “petulant and frustrated” with the conversation; his foreign minister, Galileo Solis, took over the presentation of Panama’s position. Solis “repeated that President Chiari cannot go back to Panama without agreement to discuss in a negotiation committee all the claims Panama may present; otherwise he will face a political crisis. President Kennedy replied that he was not in a position to give any commitment that the United States could at this time agree to, sign or ratify a new treaty.” Presciently, the former foreign minister, Octavio Fabrega reminded U.S. officials of “the intensity of the feeling of the present Panamanian generation with regard to the 1903 treaty.” 2 Document 2 CIA, Central Intelligence Bulletin, Daily Brief, “Panama,” Top Secret, January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source CIA Crest database The CIA Daily Brief reports on January 9th riots that have led to death and destruction in the Canal Zone. The report notes that the violence broke out over “the issue of flying the Panamanian flag in the Zone…with the Panamanians insisting on this dual display.” The anti-American sentiment generated by the riots and the shooting of Panamanians by U.S. Canal Zone guards, according to the CIA assessment, “is likely to be prolonged.” The riots, deaths and injuries of dozens of Panamanians mark a turning point in the history of U.S. control of the Canal Zone. President Roberto Chiari responds by cutting diplomatic relations with Washington and demanding negotiations for a new Canal treaty as a quid pro quo for restoration of bilateral ties. 3 Document 3 CIA, Memorandum for the Record, “White House Meeting on Panama, 10 January 1964,” Secret, January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library Top Johnson administration officials convene to address the first foreign policy crisis of Johnson’s presidency. CIA Director John McCone provides an initial briefing on the violent riots and the prospect of their continuation. Officials agree on a series of crisis management steps, including a call from Johnson to the president of Panama, Roberto Chiari, and the immediate launch of a fact-finding mission to Panama led by Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Thomas Mann. 4 Document 4 White House, Tapes, [President Johnson Telephone Conversation with Senator Richard Russell on U.S. Response to Violent Riots in the Canal Zone, January 6, 1964], Recorded on January 10, 1964 Jan 10, 1964 Source The Miller Center at the University of Virginia On January 9, 1964, violent riots in the Canal Zone and the heavy-handed U.S. response left four U.S. personnel and 20 Panamanians dead and more than 200 injured and led to Panama breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. The next day, President Johnson calls Senator Richard Russell to brief him on a phone conversation he has just had with President Chiari of Panama. Chiari told Johnson about the June 1962 meeting with Kennedy, complaining that “not a thing has been done” since then to address Panama’s demands for a new treaty. Johnson reports to Russell that he shut down Chiari’s efforts to press for treaty negotiations. “I told him that we couldn’t get into that,” Johnson states. “I was cold and hard and tough as hell.” Johnson appears to commend the toughness of the U.S. military commander who “had to order his people to start shooting,” killing 20 Panamanians. “I am not trying to unjustify it or justify it,” the President tells Russell. “I am just saying, it’s a hot [situation]—hot as a firecracker.” Audio file doc 5 Document 5 White House, Tapes, Conversation between President Johnson and Panamanian President Roberto Chiari, April 3, 1964 Apr 3, 1964 Source The Miller Center at the University of Virginia Between January and April, President Johnson rethinks his “cold and hard” position and turns to diplomacy to address the Panama Canal crisis situation. On April 3, he places a call to Panamanian President Roberto Chiari to mark the restoration of diplomatic ties, and to inform him of the appointment of a “special ambassador,” Robert M. Anderson, to begin negotiations with Panama on the conflict over the Canal Zone. Chiari is recorded telling Johnson that it is time for “a complete revision of the treaty,” which has become “the source of dissatisfaction” for the Panamanian people. In the seven-and-a-half-minute telephone call, Johnson makes It clear that the U.S. is willing to negotiate but with “no pre-conditions.” Over the next three years, Ambassador Anderson negotiates a “package” of three treaties. But the treaty ratification process is aborted when the U.S. Congress rejects the accord and Panamanian President Marco Robles fails to sign the accord amidst political turmoil before the 1968 elections. In October 1968, Robles' successor, Anulfo Arias, is overthrown in a military coup that eventually brings a National Guard officer, Omar Torrijos, to power. Anderson continues as the special U.S. negotiator to Panama until June of 1973. Audio file 6 Document 6 State Department, Information Memorandum, “Panama Canal Treaties,” Confidential, June 27, 1967 Jun 27, 1967 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 439 One day after President Johnson and Panamanian President Marco Robles announce agreement on three new treaties—the Lock Canal Treaty, the Sea Level Treaty, and the Defense Treaty—this memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarizes the provisions in the new accords. The treaties replace the 1903 original agreement, establish a “Joint Administration of the Panama Canal” to operate the Panama Canal and administer the “Canal Area,” and grant the U.S. rights to construct a new sea-level canal within the next 20 years. Under the Defense Treaty, “the United States retains certain defense areas in which it may maintain its Armed Forces” and where it can act unilaterally to defend those areas. A breakthrough at the time, this package agreement was never ratified by the U.S. Congress; in Panama, it was overtaken by a military coup in 1968, which brought Omar Torrijos to power. NIXON AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 7 Document 7 NSC, “National Security Study Memorandum 86,” Secret, January 2, 1970 Jan 2, 1970 Source Richard Nixon Presidential Library National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger requests an interagency study on prospects for negotiating a new Panama Canal treaty. Three issues are to be addressed: 1) Identifying U.S. interests in a new treaty, along with timing and options “to achieve those objectives;” 2) An evaluation of the treaties prepared in 1967, during the Johnson administration, and what changes should be made to them; and 3) evaluation of U.S. policy towards the government of General Omar Torrijos and the internal situation in Panama as it would relate to advancing a new accord on the Canal Zone. 8 Document 8 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 64, “Panama Canal,” Secret, June 5, 1970 Jun 5, 1970 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In response to an interagency study on prospects for a Panama Canal treaty, President Nixon issues National Security Decision Memorandum 64, ordering his national security team to begin “exploratory and preliminary talks” with Panamanian leaders. Nixon cites several “nonnegotiable” issues: effective U.S. control of canal operations; effective U.S. control of canal defense; and “continuation of these controls for an extended period of time preferably open-ended.” Ensuing meetings with Panamanian officials result in extensive negotiations on those very issues, which eventually become the core of the new treaty. 9 Document 9 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 115, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret/Exdis, June 24, 1971 Jun 24, 1971 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In this national security directive, President Nixon authorizes his emissary, Special Ambassador Robert Anderson, “to undertake formal negotiations with Panama with a view to obtaining agreement on the text of a draft treaty this year.” Nixon’s instructions also provide more latitude to Anderson to negotiate a shorter time period for phasing out U.S. jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, a demand Panama has made. 10 Document 10 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 131, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret/Exdis, September 13, 1971 Sep 13, 1971 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library In a third national security directive on Panama, President Nixon authorizes Special Ambassador Robert Anderson to negotiate “the possibility of a termination formula” for the treaty, “provided that the duration negotiated is a long one and that other provisions of the treaty package are satisfactory to the U.S.” Nixon prefers an open-ended treaty but is willing to agree to a 50-year duration “with provision for an additional 30-50 years if Canal capacity is expanded.” Nixon also wants a joint guarantee that “the Canal will be open to all world shipping without discrimination at reasonable tolls and that Panama would take no action that would hamper the efficient operation of the waterway.” 11 Document 11 CIA, Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum, “Panama: 1973—Year of the Treaty?” Secret, November 28, 1972 Nov 28, 1972 Source CIA.gov website The CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence produced a comprehensive 13-page assessment that reviewed the history of negotiations on the Canal and provided substantive insight into the negotiating approach of General Omar Torrijos. “Torrijos’ efforts to demonstrate to Washington that he could be tough have always been balanced by signals that he was really quite reasonable,” the CIA analysis concluded. “If Torrijos' basic objectives are met, if he can get fairly complete jurisdiction over the Zone in a relatively short period of time, and if he can significantly shorten the duration period that was embodied in the 1967 drafts, then a treaty agreement may be possible in 1973.” 12 Document 12 State Department, Declaration of Principles [signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Tack] February 7, 1974 Feb 7, 1974 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library On February 7, 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger met in Panama with Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack and, in a major ceremony, signed a framework for Canal negotiations known as the “Declaration of Principles.” The two countries agreed that the original 1903 Treaty, which the U.S. had essentially imposed on the Panamanian people, would be replaced by a new interoceanic canal treaty; the concept of “perpetuity” of U.S. control over the Canal Zone would be eliminated, and U.S. jurisdiction would come to an end. The territory of the Canal Zone would return to Panamanian sovereignty, and Panama would have “a just and equitable share of the benefits derived from the operation of the canal in its territory,” the joint agreement stated. “The Republic of Panama shall participate with the United States of America in the protection and defense of the canal in accordance with what is agreed upon in the new treaty,” according to a key principle. Both countries would also participate in the expansion of the canal should such development be needed in the future. The “principles” framework becomes the foundation for a renewed three-year effort during the Ford and Carter administrations to negotiate a new Panama Canal treaty. FORD AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY 13 Document 13 Department of State, “Issue Paper for the President: Panama Negotiation, ‘Roadmap,’ Secret, January 11, 1975 (with cover memorandum to Brent Scowcroft) Jan 11, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The State Department sends the White House a “roadmap” on the status of Canal treaty negotiations, identifying decisions to be made and actions to be taken. “Now there has been a negotiating breakthrough: a new treaty is in sight,” according to the secret memorandum. But there are significant political obstacles to overcome. “A new treaty could constitute a striking foreign-policy achievement for the Administration,” the memo advises. “It will not be easy to move a treaty through the Senate. But the real problem derives more from ignorance than antipathy.” 14 Document 14 Department of State, action memorandum, “Panama Canal Negotiations,” Secret, February 6, 1975 (with cover memo and attachments) Feb 6, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The lead U.S. negotiator, Ellsworth Bunker, sends Kissinger material for President Ford, including a public relations plan to educate the Congress and influence opinion polls on the treaty. The memo to the President provides a comprehensive update on the status of negotiations that “have progressed to a critical point at which certain tradeoffs are necessary to reach an agreement.” Ambassador Bunker seeks a “certain flexibility” in his presidential instructions in order to finalize the treaty. If the U.S. does not move forward, the memo warns, “serious confrontation, possibly involving violence against the Canal Zone, would ensue, plus a consequent deterioration of our relations in Latin America and mounting world censure.” 15 Document 15 White House, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, “Panama Canal Negotiations,’ Top Secret, May 15, 1975 May 15, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Gerald Ford convenes an NSC meeting to discuss negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty that would eventually cede control of the Canal Zone back to the Panamanians. The meeting not only covers key areas such as the duration of the treaty and U.S. defense rights to protect it, but also the conflicting domestic and international political pressures on Washington that, as Secretary of State Kissinger makes clear, necessitate the negotiations to conclude after the 1976 presidential election. The lack of support in the United States for returning the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty is also a subject of the NSC meeting. Kissinger states that “from the foreign policy point of view, I favor going ahead. However, domestically I’ve already encountered enough opponents to know what a barrier exists.” Kissinger points out that abandoning negotiations for a new treaty would generate turmoil in the canal zone, upheaval in the region and world-wide condemnation. “We would have [a] real uproar…demonstrations, violence, and we would be dragged into every international forum. This is no issue to face the world on. It looks like pure colonialism.” 16 Document 16 White House, Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, “Panama Canal Negotiations,” Top Secret, July 23, 1975 Jul 23, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Ford convenes his national security team to discuss the Canal negotiations, which have come to a stalemate as the two sides disagree on major issues. “Negotiations are stalled and everyone is getting itchy,” Kissinger reports to the President. “It is not difficult to foresee that unless we begin the negotiations again there will be increasing unrest and eventually all Latin Americans will join in and we will have a cause celebre on our hands.” The meeting to address the issue of whether the President should favor a new treaty, given its domestic unpopularity and the political risks for his election in 1976, exposed divergent opinions among top national security officials. “It is my feeling that yes, we want a treaty,” Ford tells his advisors. “We don’t want a blow-up here in the United States or down there either. We want the situation under control here and certainly not a renewal of the fighting from 1964 there where people were killed and we had a hell of a mess.” 17 Document 17 White House, National Security Decision Memorandum 302, “Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations,” Secret, August 18, 1975 Aug 18, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library President Ford issues a national security decision directive authorizing U.S. negotiators to “proceed promptly” to restart talks and address outstanding issues, among them the duration for both U.S. operational control and defense of the Zone before Panama assumes those duties. He also directs his negotiators “to obtain Panama’s agreement that the negotiations will remain confidential so that the Panama Canal issue will not be injected into the domestic political process in the United States in 1976.” 18 Document 18 NSC, Memorandum, “Panama Canal Negotiations: January Status,” Secret, January 28, 1976 Jan 28, 1976 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library The NSC specialist on the National Security Council, Stephen Low, reports on the status of the treaty talks. His memo provides a brief overview of the history of the negotiations starting with the January 1964 riots in the Canal Zone which left four U.S. soldiers and 20 Panamanians dead. The memo also reports on the “threshold agreements” on U.S. jurisdiction, control and defense of the Canal that negotiations during the Ford administration have advanced. Key issues remain, among them the duration of time before Panama assumes control of the Canal Zone, the amount of territory the U.S. will cede back to Panama, compensation, and whether the U.S. will have a formal role in guaranteeing the future neutrality of the Canal. 19 Document 19 NSC, Memorandum, “The Sovereignty Issue in the Panama Canal Negotiations,” Limited Official Use, April 9, 1976 Apr 9, 1976 Source Gerald Ford Presidential Library NSC Latin America specialist Stephen Low sends National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft an overview on the issue of whether the Canal Zone is actually U.S. property. “Whether we have full sovereignty or ownership over the Canal is not central to the issue,” he argues. “The argument can go on and become very complex, as well as sterile. The important point is that it is not central to continuing the negotiations which are based on an assessment of our national interests.” The public argument that should be made, he suggests, is that “We are continuing these negotiations because the last three Presidents have all examined the matter carefully and found that our national interest in preserving access to the Canal over the long term is better served by negotiating a new arrangement with Panama.” 20 Document 20 State Department, Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Principals and Regionals Staff Meeting, August 25, 1976 Aug 25, 1976 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama, 1973–1976, Document 131 During his staff meeting, Kissinger and his top aides discuss whether to send Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker back to Panama for another negotiating session. The presidential campaign is in high gear, and any finalization of the treaty will complicate Gerald Ford’s chances of re-election as well as create problems for pushing a finalized treaty forward if he loses. Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman tells Kissinger that sending Bunker to Panama in September “would be a good step in keeping Torrijos quiet, more or less.” “I have no problem with the going,” Kissinger responds, “as long as he doesn’t do anything.” CARTER AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 21 Document 21 White House, Policy Review Committee Meeting Minutes, “Panama,” Top Secret, January 27, 1977 Jan 27, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One week after Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, his top national security aides hold a Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting meet to discuss renewing negotiations on a Panama Canal treaty. The meeting addresses preparations for a visit from Panama’s foreign minister, Aquilino Boyd, for “informal talks” on the Canal treaty and how to set the diplomatic stage for reviving negotiations conducted by the Ford administration. The PRC concludes that the new administration should reaffirm the “Tack-Kissinger Principles” (a general outline of an agreement signed by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the Panamanians) beginning with exploratory talks but with a goal to finalize a new treaty by mid-1977. The PRC also “suggested that a National Citizens Committee on the Panama Canal be set up to stimulate a national educational campaign” in order to shift public opinion in favor of returning the Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty. After the meeting, National Security Advisor Brzezinski transmits a summary of the conclusions to President Carter, advising him that he should mention Panama in his fireside chat, and/or State of the Union address. 22 Document 22 State Department, Cable, “Letter from the President to General Torrijos,” Secret, March 10, 1977 Mar 10, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library This secret cable transmits President Carter’s first message to Panamanian chief of state, General Omar Torrijos, agreeing to re-open negotiations on a Canal treaty. Carter’s letter comes in response to a communique Torrijos sent the new U.S. president in late February asking to continue negotiations that had started during the Ford administration. “I can assure you that the United States wishes to proceed cooperatively to meet the proper concerns of both Panama and the United States,” Carter writes. “My purpose lies in assuring that the Canal will remain permanently open and of use to the ships of all the world. The treaty should provide for an arrangement which allows the United States to meet its responsibility to operate the canal during the treaty's lifetime and which recognizes our security interest in the continuing neutrality of and access to the canal after the termination date of the treaty.” Carter’s letter concludes that “I will be pleased if we can agree on a new treaty and meet personally to sign it on behalf of our two countries.” 23 Document 23 White House, Memoranda from National Security Adviser Brzezinski to President Carter, “Panama Canal Treaty—Last Decisions,” Secret, ca. July 28, 1977 Jul 28, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library In this dramatic memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski advises President Carter on the “momentous” decision he faces to finalize the Panama Canal treaties. The Panamanians want a significant financial “package” of U.S. payments as part of the accord. But if Carter accedes to this demand, Brzezinski argues, it is unlikely that the Senate will ratify the treaty, with serious consequences for U.S. security and Carter’s own political interests. “A defeat in the Congress on this issue will not only jeopardize the Canal and our relations with Panama and Latin America; because you will have to invest so much of your political capital in this effort, a defeat might strike a significant blow at your overall effectiveness.” But denying the Panamanians the sizeable economic payout they sought also carried major risks of the negotiations breaking down. “With equally high probability,” Brzezinski counsels, “there will be rioting in Panama, which will spill over into the Zone. The Canal would be jeopardized and relations with Panama and all of Latin America and the developing world would be seriously, perhaps irreparably, harmed.” As Carter prepares for a meeting with General Torrijos’ emissaries, Brzezinski suggests he “convey directly to them and indirectly to Torrijos your strong commitment to a new treaty and your equally strong feelings about what the United States can do economically to help Panama and more importantly what the U.S. cannot do.” 24 Document 24 State Department, Memorandum from Secretary Vance to President Carter, “Your Meeting with Panamanian Representatives, July 29 at 9:30 a.m.,” with attached draft of letter from Carter to Torrijos, Secret, ca. July 28,1977 Jul 28, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library To seal the deal on the Canal treaties, President Carter agrees to meet with two emissaries of General Omar Torrijos to explain his administration’s final proposals after more than a decade of negotiations on the future of the Canal Zone. In preparation for that meeting, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance provides Carter with this briefing memorandum on the remaining issues to be resolved. Vance also provides a draft of a letter for Carter to give to the emissaries for General Torrijos. In his letter, Carter advised Torrijos that U.S. negotiators would soon return to Panama with final proposals on annual payments to Panama that “we truly believe to be fair and just,” even if they were “less than you had expected or wished.” Carter asked Torrijos to understand the political pressures and widespread opposition the treaties faced in Washington that threatened ratification by the U.S. Senate. “With understanding and patience,” Carter concludes, “I believe we can move quickly forward and achieve the goal that has eluded past governments and leaders in both our countries.” 25 Document 25 White House, Memorandum for President Carter, “Status of Canal Negotiations,” Secret, August 6, 1977 Aug 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library U.S. negotiators Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz report on a five-hour negotiating session on final points of contention on the treaty. At issue is the language that would prevent Panama from drawing on third countries to help it construct a second Canal—a provision the U.S. opposes—and restrictions on the U.S. from building a second canal through another Central American nation. Despite disagreement on this issue, Bunker and Linowitz predict that “barring quite unforeseen problems, we will be able to reach conceptual agreement early next week” and “final texts will be ready before long.” 26 Document 26 White House, Telcon, “Panama Canal Treaty: Telephone Call from President Carter to General Omar Torrijos,” August 24, 1977 Aug 24, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Just two weeks before the formal signing of the canal treaties in Washington, President Carter places a call to General Torrijos to discuss final arrangements for the ceremony. The discussion focuses mostly on how invitations will be made to all the heads of state in Latin America. Torrijos suggests inviting Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. It was only with great moral courage that our ends could be achieved,” Torrijos tells Carter at the end of the conversation. “I am proud of the progress we have made,” Carter responds. 27 Document 27 White House, Memorandum of Conversation, “President Carter/General Omar Torrijos Bilateral,” Confidential, September 6, 1977 Sep 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One day before the treaty-signing ceremony, President Carter holds a bilateral meeting with General Torrijos at the White House to discuss coordinating statements during the campaign in both countries to obtain ratification of the new accords and to evaluate the importance of this international accomplishment. Torrijos, according to the memorandum of conversation of their meeting, expressed “profound admiration for the President's honesty and political valor.” He compared Carter’s “act of valor” to bring a decade of negotiations to fruition to “jumping from an airplane without a parachute to take on this battle.” For his part, President Carter called the treaty “the right, fair and decent thing to do” and predicted “it would eventually prove to be a popular accomplishment for him and his Administration.” Carter said “the climate would improve as the American people came to understand the terms of the treaty and to realize the unfairness of the past.” According to Carter, “the treaty opened the way to a new era of mutual respect, equality and friendship between our peoples.”

Political Instability In Ecuador

A Clenched Fist Ecuador When Daniel Noboa took over the presidency of Ecuador in November 2023, there was hope that the young outsider could turn the country, bruised and battered by criminal gangs, around. Now almost 15 months later, polls show that Ecuadorans are quickly running out of patience with the young heir to a banana fortune: He may not win the first round of elections on Feb. 9 outright and may have to compete in a run-off election in April. For most of last year, Noboa was on track to easily win reelection, with polls showing him as a frontrunner on approval ratings topping 50 percent. Regular citizens initially saw Noboa as “a president who is making decisions,” under challenging circumstances, Quito-based analyst Max Donoso-Muller told Americas Quarterly. That mano dura (iron fist) stance on security was helping boost his popularity, it added. Now, however, escalating violence, frequent blackouts, and continuing economic malaise are threatening to derail his candidacy. Elected last year to complete the term of former President Guillermo Lasso, who called a snap election after facing mounting opposition, charges of corruption, and impeachment, Noboa won the election on a wave of optimism. Ecuador was long one of South America’s most peaceful countries, but in recent years it has been rocked by a wave of violence from organized crime gangs operating in neighboring Colombia and Peru, using it as a transit hub to the Pacific Ocean to ship cocaine to the world. By 2023, the country’s homicide rate had increased to 40 deaths per 100,000 people, one of the highest in the region. When he entered office, Ecuadorians, weary of the country’s near-takeover by gangs, held out hope that the outsider would be able to challenge the political elite and find new ways to tackle the country’s security situation, energy crisis, and sluggish economy. Since then, he has taken a tough-on-crime approach, noted World Politics Review, launching a war against gangs by engaging the military to support police and correction officers on the streets and in prisons, increasing prison sentences, and arresting thousands of suspected gang members. When voters were asked if they supported such measures in spite of worries over human rights in a referendum last year, they overwhelmingly answered “yes.” “We can’t live in fear of leaving our homes,” Leonor Sandoval, a 39-year-old homemaker, told the Associated Press. In spite of his measures, it’s spiraling crime that poses the most significant threat to Noboa’s reelection. While homicides have decreased marginally since he became president, the rate is still higher than in 2022. Meanwhile, Ecuador is grappling with a severe drought that has drastically reduced hydroelectric power generation. In some parts of the country, residents have cuts lasting up to 14 hours a day. “There shouldn’t be power cuts,” Brandon Samueza, who lost his job at a factory after blackouts reduced his employer’s earnings significantly, told Al Jazeera. “A government should be prepared … the fact that they have not done anything to adjust speaks badly of the government.” Part of the political blowback on Noboa is due to his championing of an electricity reform law last year that did nothing to alleviate the problem, analysts said. And in a country still struggling to recover from the pandemic, the situation is severely harming companies and the economy. Meanwhile, other candidates have been gaining in the polls. Although there are 15 other candidates on the ballot, polls suggest Noboa will face off against former assemblywoman Luisa González of the Citizen Revolution Movement, a leftist party led by popular, self-exiled former President Rafael Correa, who was convicted of corruption, a charge he decries as political. Noboa defeated González in 2023’s runoff election with 52 percent of the vote to her 48 percent. González was briefly running ahead of Noboa last fall but he’s the frontrunner again – for now. Still, analysts say that the election is hard to predict because of the gangs. “I think that violence will intensify because drug trafficking gangs, which did particularly well during Correa’s government, will intensify their actions so that the population thinks that Noboa failed in his attempt to control them and opts for the Correa candidate,” Walter Spurrier of the Guayaquil-based consultancy Grupo Spurrier told Bnamericas. He added that Noboa made a mistake by sparking hope that the war on the gangs would be short-lived: “The fight is a long one.” Share this story

Argentina: Upending Progress

Upending Progress Argentina Thousands of Argentinians took to the streets of the capital Buenos Aires and other major cities to protest President Javier Milei’s recent comments disparaging the LGBTQ community and announcing plans to remove the crime of femicide from the penal code, Euronews reported. Saturday’s protests – dubbed the “Federal March of Anti-Fascist and Anti-Racist Pride” – saw participants draped in rainbow flags and carrying banners reading “rights are not negotiable.” During last month’s World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Milei criticized “sick wokeism,” feminism, social welfare, and the fight against climate change. He compared homosexuality to pedophilia. He also criticized the concept of femicide – when a man murders a woman because of her gender – claiming that “equality before the law already exists in the West. Everything else is just seeking privileges,” according to the Guardian. Soon after his comments, the Argentinian government announced plans to remove femicide as an aggravated crime from the country’s penal code. Justice Minister Mariano Cúneo Libarona defended the move, saying that “no life is worth more than another,” and that feminism had “distorted the concept of equality.” The rollback would eliminate femicide – a category that has existed since 2012 and is punishable by life imprisonment – as an aggravating factor in homicide cases. Numerous countries in Latin America have enacted femicide laws. The government says these measures are necessary to make sure Argentina offers a level playing field. However, protesters and critics complained that the decision ignores the reality of gender-based violence – official data recorded 295 femicides in Argentina last year, with Amnesty International warning that most women are killed by partners or family members. Since taking office in December, Milei has rapidly dismantled gender-equality policies, eliminated the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and dissolved programs supporting victims of gender-based violence. The country has also voted against a United Nations resolution to prevent violence against women. Until now, Argentina had been at the forefront of such policies in the region. Human rights groups and legal observers have criticized the administration’s policies as dangerous, warning they could increase the risk to women and minorities, and are setting the country back decades. Milei’s administration has also come under scrutiny for slashing funding for historical memory initiatives, which would delay trials for crimes against humanity perpetrated during Argentina’s military dictatorship. Some protesters also expressed concern that Milei’s policies could have a ripple effect across the region, the Argentina-based Buenos Aires Herald wrote. Share this story

Brasil Condemns US After Deportees Arrive Handcuffed

Human RightsBrazil Brazil condemns US after deportees arrive handcuffed 01/26/2025January 26, 2025 Brazil's government decried the US after dozens of deportees arrived on a plane in handcuffs. The Brazilian justice minister called it a "blatant disrespect" of their rights. https://p.dw.com/p/4pdSo A passenger who was deported from the US is greeted at the airport in Confins, Minas Gerais state The treatment of Brazilian citizens by the US will likely sour relations between the Trump administration and Brazilian President Lula's governmentImage: DOUGLAS MAGNO/AFP Advertisement Brazil strongly condemned the US on Saturday after dozens of deportees arrived to the country in handcuffs. A plane carrying 88 Brazilian passengers, 16 US security agents, and eight crew members, was originally scheduled to arrive in Belo Horizonte in the state of Minas Gerais, but had to make an emergency landing in the city of Manaus due to a technical error, said a statement by the Brazilian government. Brazilian federal police received the plane at the instructions of Justice Minister Ricardo Lewandowski and intervened, asking US agents to remove handcuffs from the deportees. Lewandowski told left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva it was a "blatant disrespect" of their fundamental rights, according to a statement by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. "Upon learning of the situation, President Lula ordered that a Brazilian Air Force (FAB) aircraft be mobilized to transport the Brazilians to their final destination, in order to ensure that they could complete their journey with dignity and safety," the ministry's statement said. Donald Trump's executive orders leave migrants in limbo 02:29 Anti-immigration sentiment in the US US President Donald Trump has taken a harsh anti-immigration stance since coming into office this week, and has vowed to remove undocumented migrants. However, the deportation flight was a result of a 2017 bilateral agreement and did not stem from any of Trump's orders on immigration, a government source told AFP news agency. It was the second such flight carrying undocumented migrants from the US back to Brazil this year. Several deportation flights have taken off since Monday when Trump took office, though they have been common under previous presidents too. The use of handcuffs on migrants is considered controversial in Brazil. Even former conservative Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump supporter, has called for an end to the practice. tg/wd (AFP, Reuters)

Panama "Caves In" To Trump

Caught in the Crossfire Panama Panamanian authorities began auditing the Hong Kong-based company that controls the two ports adjacent to the Panama Canal, following threats by US President Donald Trump of taking back control of the waterway over alleged Chinese interference, Bloomberg reported. The Panama Ports Company, which runs the ports, is a subsidiary of CK Hutchison Holdings, owned by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing and is based in Hong Kong. Panama gave Li’s company concession over the canal ports in a 1998 agreement that was renewed in 2021. According to the terms of the agreement, Li must share a part of the revenue earned from running the two docks with the country. Because the ports today handle “significantly more cargo” compared with 1998, the Panamanian government believes that the share of revenue it receives is insufficient and is auditing the company to determine the proper share. Hong Kong is a part of China but the city operates autonomously, with its own borders, currency and legal system. However, many say Hong Kong is firmly under Chinese control. As a result, Trump has alleged that Panama is allowing Chinese interference in the canal, violating the promise of neutrality in the American-built canal given by Panama to the US in 1999 when Washington turned over control of the waterway, the Wall Street Journal explained. And while China’s investment and cargo in the canal are minimal compared to the US’ share, Washington worries over Beijing’s influence growing: Currently, there are some China-backed projects in Panama, including a canal bridge, a new subway line, a cruise ship terminal and a wind-energy farm, the Wall Street Journal wrote. Share this story

Venezuela: Maduro Refuses To Quit

The Odyssey Venezuela On Jan. 10, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was sworn into office for his third term, promising to uphold the constitution even as he defied it – he reportedly lost July’s election by a landslide. But trampling over the popular will and civil rights is nothing new for Maduro during his 12 years in power, say observers. The only thing is, wrote World Politics Review, that now, “governing for Maduro has largely become an exercise in repression and controlling the narrative”. Maduro has tightened his grip on the country so completely that even the protests have dwindled – the number of demonstrators that took to the streets after Maduro’s election victory could be measured in the thousands – but during the inauguration only in the hundreds. As a result, opposition leader Edmundo González, who says he won about 67 percent of the vote in last year’s election over Maduro’s 30 percent, has been hoping for more external pressure to oust Maduro, and to that end he’s been visiting world capitals to drum up support and pressure the president. The US, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union listened. Recently, they increased sanctions on the Maduro regime while in addition the US hiked its reward for capturing Maduro and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, a top ally, to $25 million each. It also placed a bounty of $15 million for the capture of Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López. Still, none of those measures will likely oust Maduro, who remains defiant. “I have not been made president by the government of the United States, nor by the pro-imperialist governments of Latin America,” he said during his inauguration – which was only attended by a handful of regional leaders. “I come from the people, I am of the people, and my power emanates from history and from the people. And to the people, I owe my whole life, body and soul.” Opponents say they are tired of waiting. “In the end, it feels as if the soup got cold,” college professor Nelson Perez told Marketplace. “We’ve been on the subject of not losing hope for a while … But then you realize it’s more of the same.” Many say the situation is almost a rerun of 2019. Then, the speaker of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, declared himself the country’s interim leader and called for mass protests on the streets after having been recognized as Venezuela’s legitimate leader by the US and around 60 other countries. Maduro responded by cracking down on the opposition and forcing many into exile. Now he is shifting those efforts into higher gear. In the weeks before the inauguration, the Maduro regime detained thousands of opposition supporters and their relatives. He also blocked the opposition from communicating with their supporters, blocking access to X, TikTok, VPN networks, and other ways to reroute Internet communications to bypass government restrictions. He closed the borders when González, a stand-in for the revered opposition leader, María Corina Machado, whom the regime banned from running, tried to enter the country to hold a counter inauguration. He had his officers detain Machado – then tried to make it appear as if it was a staged detention to discredit the regime. He also cut off electricity, cellphones, and Internet access to her neighborhood to prevent her from communicating with her supporters. The Economist believes a large-scale protest movement could dislodge Maduro. But the problem is, millions of Venezuelans have fled the dire economic conditions and repression in the country and those dissidents who remain face severe consequences. The issue is the military, which is loyal to Maduro and is the real power center in the country. It profits handsomely off of the Maduro regime. “Democratic forces are not only contending with ruthless authoritarian rule – they are also dealing with a country dominated by an oil economy and massive criminality and corruption, complicating any transition (to democracy),” wrote Spain’s El País. “In this epic Latin American tragedy, the task ahead is not only to rebuild a democracy that has been destroyed, it is also to rebuild an economy, a society, and a country.”

Carter And Cuba

ngs Projects Documents FOIA DNSA Blog Русские Страницы About Carter and Cuba: A Legacy of Dedicated Diplomacy Toward Normalization In May 2002, Jimmy Carter became the first US president in or out of office to visit Cuba, where he was welcomed by the island's communist leader Fidel Castro In May 2002, Jimmy Carter became the first US president in or out of office to visit Cuba, where he was welcomed by the island's communist leader Fidel Castro. Exclusive: Archive Publishes Jimmy Carter Interview on Cuba Policy Carter was First President to Order Official Effort to Normalize Relations, White House Records Show Former President Opposed Trade Embargo and Bush-era Travel Restrictions as “restraints on American civil liberties” “Why can’t I sell my peanuts to Cuba? Why can’t my Sunday school class take an unrestricted visit to Cuba?” Published: Jan 15, 2025 Briefing Book # 882 Edited by Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or peter.kornbluh@gmail.com Subjects Cold War – General Regions Cuba and Caribbean Project Cuba Back Channel to Cuba The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana William M. LeoGrande, Peter Kornbluh University of North Carolina Press back channel Spanish cover Diplomacia encubierta con Cuba. Historia de las negociaciones secretas entre Washington y La Habana LeoGrande, William M., y Peter Kornbluh FONDO DE CULTURA ECONÓMICA (FCE) Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba Edited by Peter Kornbluh Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader by National Security Archive (Compiler), Laurence Chang (Editor), Peter Kornbluh (Editor) Washington, D.C., January 15, 2025 - The late President Jimmy Carter, who was laid to rest last week after a state funeral in Washington, D.C., adamantly believed that the U.S. embargo on Cuba was “a deprivation of American civil liberties” and called restrictions on trade and travel “unconscionable,” according to an interview published for the first time today by the National Security Archive. The interview recorded Carter’s continuing commitment to normalizing relations with Cuba long after he had attempted, through secret diplomacy, to do so during his presidency. “I felt that it was time for us to have completely normal relations with Cuba,” as Carter reflected on his time in the White House. “And I felt then, as I do now, that the best way to bring about a change in its Communist regime was to have open trade and commerce, and visitation, and diplomatic relations with Cuba.” The Archive posted an audio file and transcription of the exclusive interview—conducted by the co-authors of Back Channel to Cuba, William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, at the Carter Center in Atlanta in July 2004—along with a revealing selection of formerly TOP SECRET White House, NSC and State Department records on the Carter administration’s back-channel efforts to negotiate better bilateral ties with Cuba. The documentation covers what one secret briefing paper described as “the extremely complex and nettlesome” issues in U.S.-Cuba relations during Carter’s tenure as president, the secret meetings between emissaries, as well as Carter’s post-presidency efforts to act as a secret interlocutor between Washington and Havana to resolve the 1994 balsero crisis. The declassified history of Carter’s focus on back-channel diplomacy remains relevant this week as the Biden administration dramatically announced its decision to remove Cuba from the list of states that support terrorism and lift several punitive Trump-era sanctions. Less than a week before Donald Trump returns to the White House, the Biden administration’s effort to improve U.S.-Cuba relations comes as the Senate Foreign Relations committee holds confirmation hearings for secretary of state nominee Marco Rubio, the leading proponent of applying “maximum pressure” on Cuba. Rubio’s nomination hearings are sure to raise questions about the wisdom of punitive measures in the wake of President Biden’s dramatic, last minute, lifting of sanctions imposed during the first Trump administration. Presidential Directive NSC-6 The Carter-Cuba Initiative “I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba,” President Carter instructed his national security team just weeks after taking office in 1977. “To this end, we should begin direct and confidential talks in a measured and careful fashion with representatives of the Government of Cuba.” Known as NSC-6, this directive marked the first time a U.S. president had formally initiated a comprehensive effort toward a rapprochement with Fidel Castro’s revolutionary regime. Declassified documents posted today include a secret, 17-page Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) on U.S. interests and challenges in attempting to normalize relations with Cuba. Among the “many compelling reasons” it listed: “Lessening of Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union,” giving Cuba “added incentives to cease its foreign adventures in Africa,” and demonstrating U.S. “support for the universalist principles in diplomatic relations and make a major gesture to the Third World which sees our posture toward Cuba as symbolic of great-power aggression.” Normalized relations would also “enable us to pursue important U.S. interests with Cuba such as human rights” and “open up trade opportunities in a relatively small but natural market for us,” according to the PRM. But “the difficulties in achieving full normalization should not be minimized,” the PRM stated with a prescient warning. “The process of resolving differences with Cuba will be difficult and tensions and problems will remain even after relations have been restored.” Initially, Carter’s directive set off a flurry of positive interaction and results. The President made a series of gestures toward Cuba, including lifting restrictions on U.S. travel to the island. Cuban and U.S. delegations held a series of meetings to sign a fishing treaty and take a major step toward re-establishing formal diplomatic ties by opening “Interest Sections” in Washington and Havana. The talks have “gone unexpectedly well,” Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher reported on progress in August 1977. But as Washington and Havana turned to thornier issues, such as Cuba’s expanding military role in Africa and Castro’s demand that the embargo be lifted as a pre-condition for serious negotiations, communications between the two countries stalled. Impatient, Carter bypassed his own national security team and sent a personal emissary, Coca-Cola CEO Paul Austin, to speak with Fidel Castro in February 1978. “I have hoped it would be possible for you and me to move toward full normalization of relations,” read a signed note from Carter that Austin gave to Castro, “and I would like to see progress made in removing the obstacles that impede forward movement.” Austin returned with a note of noncommittal appreciation from Castro to Carter. But both sides subsequently agreed to restart the back-channel diplomacy to find common ground. The Secret Negotiations Within weeks of the Austin’s mission to Havana, Castro and Carter initiated a series of secret negotiating meetings that stretched from April 1978 to September 1980. Initial meetings took place in downtown Manhattan; subsequent talks were held in Washington, D.C., Atlanta, Cuernavaca and in Havana with Castro himself. U.S. negotiators included NSC and State Department officials, notably Brzezinski’s Latin America specialist, Robert Pastor, and Under Secretary of State, Peter Tarnoff; Castro was represented by his top aide, José Luis Padron, and, at times, a military intelligence officer, Tony de la Guardia. (A State Department interpreter, Stephanie van Reigersberg, was also present at a number of the meetings and drafted the memoranda of conversations that recorded them for posterity.) Memorandum for the president Following the Castro-Austin meeting, U.S. and Cuban officials met secretly eleven times: **April 14, 1978: Deputy National Security Advisor David Aaron and NSC staff member Robert Gates met with Fidel Castro’s emissary José Luis Padrón at La Côte Basque restaurant in New York. (Gates secretly wore a wire under his clothing to record the conversation.) To revive the normalization effort, Cuba was prepared to release a large number of political prisoners, Aaron countered that Cuban military intervention in Africa was “the principal obstacle to an improvement.” **June 15, 1978: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom met with Padrón and Tony de la Guardia, a Cuban intelligence officer, at the St. Regis Hotel in New York. The talks continued to focus on a prisoner release and Cuba’s role in Africa. **July 5, 1978: Newsom and State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff met with Padrón and de la Guardia at Newsom’s home in Washington, D.C. The talks begin to focus on broader issues to be resolved, among them U.S. property claims and Cuba’s counterclaims generated by economic losses from the trade embargo. Padron reiterated that Cuba was willing to find “peaceful and negotiated solutions to the problem areas in Africa on a country-by-country basis.” Newsom told him that the United States would admit released prisoners, but he was not authorized to discuss the embargo. **August 8, 1978: Newsom and Aaron met with Padrón and José Antonio Arbesú, from the Communist Party Central Committee staff, at a hotel in Atlanta, Georgia. At this meeting, Cuba’s calls for Puerto Rican independence at the United Nations became a point of contention, and Carter’s negotiators reiterated U.S. objections to Cuba’s military presence in Africa. Padrón replied that Cuba would always support independence for her “sister nation” and reminded Aaron that Cuba was in Africa at the invitation of “legally constituted governments.” When Padrón tried to raise the issue of the U.S. embargo, the U.S. side refused to discuss it. **October 28-29, 1978: Newsom and Aaron met with Padrón and Arbesú at the Hotel Villa del Conquistador, Cuernavaca, Mexico. The U.S. offered a new proposal of incrementally lifting the embargo: Aaron said that the United States was willing to remove restrictions on food and medicine if Cuba would withdraw from Angola and Ethiopia. Padrón repeated that Cuba’s role in Africa was not negotiable but he urged that their next meeting be in Havana so that Fidel Castro himself could participate. Letter from Carted to Castro **December 2-3, 1978: Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff and NSC Director for Latin America Robert Pastor met with Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Communist Party Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs Raúl Valdés Vivo, Padrón, and Arbesú at the Palace of the Revolution, Havana, Cuba. The talks focus on a proposed prisoner swap—several CIA agents imprisoned in Cuba in return for four imprisoned Puerto Rican nationalists in the U.S. (In September 1979, Carter commuted the sentences of the Puerto Ricans and Castro released the CIA agents.) Tarnoff reiterated U.S. concerns about Cuba’s role in Africa, and Rodríguez reiterated Cuba’s support for negotiated settlements to the conflicts there but stated that Cuba would never accede to U.S. demands. **December 3-4, 1978: Tarnoff and NSC Director for Latin America Robert Pastor met with President Fidel Castro, for more than five hours at the Palace of the Revolution, Havana, Cuba. Castro began by crediting President Carter who had “created a favorable atmosphere” for dialogue. But then “someone got the idea of fomenting agitation in regard to the presence of Cuban military and civilian personnel in Africa,” Castro complained. He refused the linkage between lifting the embargo and withdrawing Cuba’s troops in Africa. “We have never discussed with you the activities of the United States throughout the entire world,” Fidel pointed out. Perhaps it is because the United States is a great power, it feels it can do what it wants…. Perhaps it is idealistic of me, but I never accepted the universal prerogatives of the United States. I never accepted and never will accept the existence of a different law and different rules.” In his report to President Carter summarizing the meeting, Brzezinski wrote that “Castro was clearly speaking directly to you and he decided that this was the time for him to vent twenty years of rage which had been bottled up inside of him.” **January 16-17, 1980: Tarnoff, Pastor, and Wayne Smith, chargé d’affaires at the U.S. Interests Section, meet with Fidel Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Padrón, at the Palace of the Revolution, Havana, Cuba. After a yearlong hiatus in direct talks, U.S. officials revisit the dialogue with Castro. Most of the discussion centered on the deteriorating international situation—especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. delegation urged Cuba to denounce the invasion, but Castro refused, arguing that Soviet aid had been “a matter of life and death” for Cuba’s survival. The participants discussed Africa once again and Cuba’s support for revolutionary movements in Central America. Castro expressed Cuba’s willingness to withdraw Cuban troops from Angola if there was a negotiated peace settlement in Angola and Namibia. As the meeting concluded, Castro complained that the U.S. was encouraging boat hijackings by limiting legal migration and never prosecuting hijackers. If this continued, he advised, he would be “free of any obligation to control those who want to leave illegally”—a stark warning of the Mariel boatlift to come. **June 17-18, 1980: Tarnoff, Pastor, and Smith meet with Padrón, Arbesú, and Vice-Minister of Foreign Relations Ricardo Alarcón, at a Cuban government protocol house, Havana, Cuba. After several months of the Mariel boat lift, the dialogue has entered a crisis stage. Tarnoff opens the meeting affirming Washington's desire to “eventually normalize relations,” but the “pressing issue” of the Mariel migration crisis had to be resolved first, and improvement in relations would still depend on Cuba responding to U.S. concerns about its relationship with the Soviet Union and its role in Africa and Central America. Padrón expressed “dissatisfaction and frustration” that the U.S. would only discuss the issues it was interested in and not Cuba’s, especially the embargo. The talks made no progress toward resolving Mariel. When Pastor and Tarnoff return to Washington, they report to Carter that the dialogue with Cuba has reached a “dead-end.” **September 3, 1980: Carter sends his personal emissary, Paul Austin, back to Havana with a concrete proposal to end the Mariel boatlift in return for a promise of comprehensive talks after the U.S. elections take place in November. But unbeknownst to Carter, Austin has developed Alzheimer’s disease and is no longer a trustworthy interlocutor. Instead of presenting the proposal, Austin tells Fidel that there should be a summit between Carter and Castro and that Carter is ready to lift the embargo before Christmas. **September 12, 1980: Tarnoff met with Fidel Castro and Padrón in Havana, Cuba. Tarnoff began by explaining that proposals made during the September trip by Coca Cola CEO J. Paul Austin did not represent U.S. policy. President Carter, Tarnoff said, would be willing to open a broad dialogue with Cuba on the embargo and normalizing relations if the migration crisis could be resolved. President Castro responded that he would take Carter’s word “on good faith” and would close the port of Mariel without a “formal commitment” on broader talks, which he subsequently did. Post Presidency Diplomacy The planned revival of talks to restore relations after the election never took place because Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan, a strident cold warrior who opposed normalization of ties to Cuba. In the interview with Kornbluh and LeoGrande, the former president expressed his frustration at the lost opportunity. “I think in retrospect, knowing what I know since I left the White House, I should have gone ahead and been more flexible in dealing with Cuba and established full diplomatic relations,” he reflected. Former President Carter visits Fidel Castro in March 2011 Former President Carter visits Fidel Castro in March 2011. But during his long and active post-presidency, Carter remained engaged in diplomacy with Cuba. In August 1994, amidst another mass exodus known as the balsero crisis, Castro reached out to Carter to be an interlocutor with the Clinton White House to bring an end to the dangerous flow of small, flimsy rafts and boats carrying Cubans fleeing the island in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. For five days, Carter played the role of secret intermediary, and mediator, between Washington and Havana. But after he spoke to President Clinton and suggested “minimum concessions” to key Cuban demands, Clinton unceremoniously removed the former president as a go-between, as a letter he wrote to Castro posted today reveals. “My hope is that you and American officials will be successful in finding some common ground on which to resolve the present crisis,” Carter’s message concluded, “and to prepare for a future resolution of long-term differences.” Eight years later, in May 2002, Carter became the first U.S. president since the revolution—former or sitting—to visit Cuba; Castro met Carter on the tarmac, welcomed him with a red carpet as a Cuban band played the American national anthem. While in Cuba, Carter gave a nationally televised speech on human rights and democracy. “And later, to my surprise,” he recalled in the interview posted today, “they printed the entire text of my speech, and also the questions and answers, some of which were very deleterious to Castro, in Granma. It took [up] the whole paper. And the day after that, as we traveled around in Cuba, it was amazing how many people had a copy of that in their hand or in their pocket. So that was one thing that [Castro] did that I thought was very nice.” Carter returned to Cuba in March 2011 for an exploratory effort to obtain the freedom of imprisoned USAID subcontractor Alan Gross. He was allowed to meet with Gross; and also met with the wives of the “Cuban Five”—five Cuban spies who had been incarcerated in the United States for over 13 years. During a press conference in Havana, he called for the release of the spies—and Alan Gross. He also publicly denounced the U.S. trade embargo as “a serious mistake that my government continues to make” and called for U.S. economic sanctions to be lifted “immediately.” Then 86 years old, Carter remained committed to using his unique stature as the 39th president of the United States to pursue a goal that dated to the beginning of his presidency—a rapprochement with Cuba. “My dream is to see this issue resolved before I die,” Carter told his Cuban hosts during a private meeting in Havana. “I don’t know if that will happen.” The Documents ebb 882 doc 1 Document 1 Interview with Jimmy Carter on Cuba, The Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia, July 23, 2004 [Transcript and audio recording] Jul 23, 2004 Source Peter Kornbluh and William LeoGrande meeting with Jimmy Carter In an interview with the authors of the book, Back Channel to Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter recalled his motivations and intentions in attempting to normalize relations with Cuba. “I felt that it was time for us to have completely normal relations with Cuba,” he told the authors. “And I felt then, as I do now, that the best way to bring about a change in its Communist regime was to have open trade and commerce, and visitation, and diplomatic relations with Cuba.” Carter also criticized the then restrictions imposed by the George W. Bush administration on travel and trade with Cuba as “restraints on American civil liberties.” He made it clear that he believed the embargo should be lifted: “Why can’t I sell my peanuts to Cuba?” he asked. “Why can’t my Sunday school class take an unrestricted visit to Cuba?” Audio file ebb 882 doc 2 Document 2 CIA Intelligence Information Cable, “Cuba Desire to Begin Direct Negotiations for Renewed Relations with the United States as Soon as Possible,” Secret, February 22, 1977 Feb 22, 1977 Source Source Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XXIII One month after Carter’s inauguration, the CIA reports that Fidel Castro is ready for direct talks with the United States to normalize diplomatic and economic relations. Based on information obtained from a Cuban military attaché in Latin America, according to the CIA cable, “the Cuban hierarchy is in unanimous agreement that negotiations with the U.S. should begin as soon as possible.” ebb 882 doc 3 Document 3 State Department, Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC17, Cuba, Secret, March 8, 1977 Mar 8, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Pursuant to a request from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the State Department drafts a comprehensive 17-page overview of the interests, issues and implementation for pursuing normalized relations with Cuba. The document, which serves as a basis for a Policy Review Committee meeting the next day, covers the advantages and disadvantages of the “extremely complex and nettlesome” process of normalizing ties. Among the advantages it lists: “Lessening of Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union,” giving Cuba “added incentives to cease its foreign adventures in Africa,” and demonstrating U.S. “support for the universalist principles in diplomatic relations and make a major gesture to the Third World which sees our posture toward Cuba as symbolic of great-power aggression.” Normalized relations would also “enable us to pursue important U.S. interests with Cuba such as human rights” and “open up trade opportunities in a relatively small but natural market for us.” ebb 882 doc 4 Document 4 NSC, “Summary and Conclusions NSC/PRC Meeting—Cuba,” Secret, March 9, 1977 Mar 9, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library One week before President Carter signs a presidential directive on normalizing bilateral ties with Cuba, his top national security aides discuss a strategy of negotiating a rapprochement during a Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting. These PRC meeting minutes reflect a focus on quid pro quos and step-by-step reciprocity. “All agreed,” according to a summary by Secretary Vance, “that the United States Government should begin talks with the Cubans in a measured and careful way, keeping in mind that the chip of eliminating the embargo is the ultimate one, and we should play that one well.” ebb 882 doc 5 Document 5 Presidential Directive, Presidential Directive NSC/6, Subject: Cuba, March 15, 1977 (Secret) (Previously posted) Mar 15, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Based on the conclusions of the PRC meeting, President Carter issues an unprecedented NSC directive: “I have concluded we should attempt to achieve normalization of our relations with Cuba,” it states. Carter’s NSC directive authorizes “direct and confidential talks” with Castro’s emissaries. “Our objective,” according to the directive, “is to set in motion a process which will lead to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations…and will advance the interests of the United States….” Initial talks lead quickly to the opening of “Interest Sections” in Washington and Havana, a step short of full diplomatic ties. But the back-channel negotiations eventually break down over disagreements about Cuba’s role in Africa. ebb 882 doc 6 Document 6 White House, “President’s Meeting with Senators James Abourezk and George McGovern, Confidential, March 19, 1977 Mar 19, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library As the Carter administration gears up for talks with the Cubans, Carter meets with two liberal senators, McGovern and Abourezk, who convey Castro’s thinking to him. McGovern reports on a five-hour conversation he recently had with Castro. The meeting provides an early sense of both Castro’s position and Carter’s own focus on issues he hopes the Cubans will address to normalize ties, including the release of political prisoners and the presence of 20,000 Cuban troops in Africa. McGovern reports that Castro had “promised him that the troops were coming out and he does not envision any other military activities in Africa.” But McGovern also reports that the Cubans want the embargo at least partially lifted as a pre-condition for substantive talks on normal relations. During the meeting, McGovern asks Carter if he will support a bill McGovern is offering to lift the embargo on food and medicines. Carter replies that such an initiative, “would not cause me concern,” although in the end, he did not support it. ebb 882 doc 7 Document 7 White House, Policy Review Committee Meeting, Cuba, Secret, August 3, 1977 Aug 3, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library At this PRC meeting on the initial round of negotiations with Cuba, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher reports that the talks have “gone unexpectedly well.” He characterizes the Cuban approach as “a very businesslike manner” and relates that Cuba has given the opening for the new Interest Sections, scheduled for September 1, 1977, “high priority.” The meeting focuses on options for further negotiations that could eventually lead to lifting the embargo—“our biggest bargaining chip”—in return for a Cuban commitment to restrain its international support for revolution and anti-colonial struggles in Africa. ebb 882 doc 8 Document 8 White House, Carter Letter to Fidel Castro, carried by Paul Austin, February 7, 1978 Feb 7, 1978 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library In an effort to revive negotiations between Washington and Havana, President Carter sends a direct note to Fidel Castro, using a friend and donor from Atlanta, Coca Cola CEO J. Paul Austin, as his special emissary. “I have hoped it would be possible for you and me to move toward full normalization of relations, and I would like to see progress made in removing the obstacles that impede forward movement,” Carter appeals to Castro, asking him to use Austin to send a message back to the White House. Castro does send a message of appreciation back with Austin but remains noncommittal on the issue of advancing the talks. This is the first of three secret trips to Havana Austin takes as a special emissary for Carter. Belatedly, as President Carter revealed in his interview with Kornbluh and LeoGrande, White House officials realize that Austin is suffering from early signs of Alzheimer’s and is making unauthorized proposals to Castro about holding a summit with Carter. ebb 882 doc 9 Document 9 State Department, Memorandum from Secretary Vance to President Carter, “Contact with Castro’s Representative, Jose Luis Padron,” Secret/Nodis, June 19, 1978 (Meeting Summary attached) Jun 19, 1978 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Secretary Cyrus Vance conveys to President Carter a summary of a secret June 1978 meeting between State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Newsom and Castro emissary José Luis Padrón. The five-hour conversation was held at the St. Regis Hotel in New York City; it is the second of nine secret back-channel meetings between Cuban and U.S. officials during the Carter Administration that took place in New York, Atlanta, Cuernavaca, and Havana. The meeting covers some “broader aspects of U.S.-Cuban relations” that Padrón had discussed at his first meeting with Deputy National Security Advisor David L. Aaron in April but also focuses on the Cubans’ response to a U.S. request to release political prisoners. Padrón has lists of some 1,600 prisoners and their dependents that Castro has decided to release and allow to leave the island. (According to the meeting summary, Padrón discussed 4000 such prisoners and dependents.) In his cover memo, Vance asks the President to authorize the involvement of Attorney General Griffin Bell and the Justice Department to address processing and immigration procedures to handle so many Cuban exiles coming to the United States. He advises Carter that “we should move promptly to give the Cubans a definitive response on whether we are prepared to receive these people.” ebb 882 doc 10 Document 10 National Security Council, Brzezinski Memorandum for President Carter, “Conversations in Havana,” Top Secret/Eyes Only, ca. December 19, 1978 Dec 19, 1978 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library At the invitation of the Cuban government, in early December 1978, NSC Latin America specialist Robert Pastor and State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff traveled to Havana for “five full hours of discussions” with Castro. (The two also meet with Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.) On December 19, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski reported that the main subject of the meeting was Cuba’s military role in Africa as an obstacle to improved relations. Castro “completely understood the message which Tarnoff and Pastor had brought and he didn't like it,” Brzezinski reports. “The transcript picks up the precision of his arguments and the importance he gives to details, but it fails to convey the passion or the force which Castro, who surprisingly speaks quite softly, brought to his arguments. Castro was clearly speaking directly to you,” Brzezinski advises Carter, “and he decided that this was the time for him to vent twenty years of rage which had been bottled up inside of him.” ebb 882 doc 11 Document 11 The White House, Memorandum to President Carter from Robert Pastor and Peter Tarnoff, “Cuban Discussions, June 17, 1980 – Summary and Next Steps,” Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, ca. June 20, 1980 Jun 20, 1980 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library In this memorandum reporting on another secret trip to Cuba in the midst of the Mariel immigration crisis, Pastor and Tarnoff inform President Carter that negotiations to normalize relations have come to “a dead end.” The three years of confidential talks “have proven useful in helping us understand Cuba’s views on a wide range of issues,” they report. But after seven hours of meetings with senior Cuban officials in Havana, “we have clearly reached a dead-end in resolving problems.” The Cubans have rejected conditionality on withdrawing from Africa to move normalization forward, their summary concludes. “In our conversations with the Cubans, we held out the prospect of improved relations with us—including moves toward lifting the embargo—if Cuba moderated its behavior in several specific areas of foreign policy interest to the U.S. Castro has now indicated unequivocally that he will not accept such linkage.” ebb 882 doc 12 Document 12 State Department, Memorandum from Secretary Muskie to President Carter, “The Austin-Castro Conversation,” Secret/Sensitive/Nodis, September 8, 1980 [with attached “Talking points for Emissary to use in Cuba”] Sep 8, 1980 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library In September 1980, Carter called on his friend Paul Austin to carry another message to Fidel Castro—a negotiating proposal to end the Mariel boatlift that brought over 125,000 Cubans migrants to the U.S. The immigration crisis broke out in April after a bus commandeered by Cubans broke through the gates of the Peruvian Embassy. After the Cuban government withdrew its guards from the Embassy, some 10,000 Cubans sought asylum on the Embassy grounds, confronting Castro with a major spectacle. On April 20, he declared that all Cubans who wanted to leave could depart from the port of Mariel, where Cuban Americans could come pick them up. As hundreds of boats ferried “Marielitos” to the United States, Carter provided Austin with “talking points”—a set of proposals to Fidel to halt the boatlift, in return for a U.S. commitment, after the 1980 election, to “conversations…that could be broad enough to cover all aspects of our bilateral relationships, and our mutual concerns.” Secretary of State Edmund Muskie met with Austin only a few days after he returned from Havana; after debriefing the Coca Cola chairman, Muskie sent this troubling report to President Carter. Austin seemed to have ignored his instructions on Mariel, instead telling Castro that Carter wanted to hold a summit before Christmas and “that President Carter was prepared to proceed with the lifting of the embargo against Cuba and to make available a wider range of American medicines to Cuba by the end of the year.” U.S. officials, Carter would later acknowledge, realized that Austin was showing symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease that had compromised his mission. Almost immediately, the State Department dispatched Peter Tarnoff to Havana to deliver the original proposal to halt the Mariel boatlift and warn Cuban officials to disregard what Austin had said because his visit had been “a private undertaking.” ebb 882 doc 13 Document 13 White House, “Situation Room Checklist” [Summary of Peter Tarnoff Talks with Fidel Castro], Secret, September 13, 1980. Sep 13, 1980 Source Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, p. 268 Peter Tarnoff’s report on his “most positive” meeting with Fidel Castro on September 12, 1980, is summarized in this White House Situation Room “checklist.” According to the report, Castro has offered a series of gestures to address U.S. concerns about over 100 Cubans who have taken refuge in the U.S. Interest Section and has agreed to finally shut down the Mariel boatlift. With the 1980 Presidential election between Carter and Ronald Reagan approaching, “Castro concluded by asking that the President be told that he was taking these steps as part of a gradual, deliberate process to reduce tensions. These measures were unilateral and unconditional. Castro did not expect any direct reciprocity or firm commitment from the U.S.” ebb 882 doc 14 Document 14 Jimmy Carter, Letter to Fidel Castro Concerning Role as Secret Intermediary During the Balsero Crisis, Confidential, August 28, 1994 Aug 28, 1994 Source William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana, UNC Press, 2015, p. 288 On August 23, 1994, Fidel Castro reached out to Jimmy Carter to serve as a mediator/ interlocutor with the Clinton White House to resolve the massive exodus of Cubans known as the “balsero crisis.” Carter agreed to help, obtaining authorization from Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff to facilitate back-channel talks to find a way to end the immigration crisis. A unique phone tree chain of communication was established between Castro’s office, key members of the exile community in Miami, Carter and the White House; for five days messages flowed back and forth between Washington and Havana. On August 26, Carter spoke directly to Clinton to outline the issues that the Cubans wanted to discuss and resolve, and suggesting what Carter called “minimum concessions” to successfully move forward; the next day he spoke to Castro directly to set up a meeting in New York between U.S. and Cuban negotiators to negotiate a solution. But on August 28, Vice President Al Gore called Carter to tell him that “an alternative communication channel had been established” and told the former president to “refrain from further participation.” Carter then sent this letter to Castro, via the Cuban mission at the United Nations, explaining that he could no longer serve as a mediator. “My hope is that you and American officials will be successful in finding some common ground on which to resolve the present crisis,” Carter’s message concluded, “and to prepare for a future resolution of long-term differences.”

Bolivia Is Fighting To Get Out Of An Economic And Political Crisis

Sink or Swim Bolivia A community of ethnic Aymara shamans in Bolivia called amautas, or “wise ones” in the indigenous Quechua language, are refusing to abandon their cliffside homes. Called “suicide shacks,” these huts in the Andean city of El Alto sit a few feet from the edge of a steep cliff. Heavy rains and other weather phenomena threaten to erode the few feet between them and oblivion. Officials are now determining whether they should force the shamans out to save their lives, the BBC reported. The situation could be a metaphor for the precarious situation in the South American country, as Bolivians debate who should lead them out of their current economic and political crises. Former Bolivian President Evo Morales is seeking to return to office by running in the August 2025 presidential election on the campaign pledge of making the country great again. An ethnic Aymara who was the country’s first elected indigenous president, Morales held office for 14 years. He pursued a leftist agenda that redistributed the country’s vast mineral and other resources, spreading prosperity – at least temporarily. But Morales resigned from office in 2019 after protests over a disputed election and his attempts to circumvent term limits. He claimed he was ousted in a coup but wanted to tone down the violence from protests arising from allegations that his rival had meddled in the election. Morales then went into exile in Mexico. He has since returned to the country and now faces charges of statutory rape that he says are politically motivated. Bolivia’s top court has ruled that he can’t run for office again, Al Jazeera reported, but he appears to be preparing to try. “They don’t want me to be the candidate because they know I’ll win,” Morales said in an interview with the Associated Press. “We’re in a state of total siege, morally, legally, and politically.” Meanwhile, Morales’ former protégé, President Luis Arce, who is running for reelection, is struggling to improve the country’s dismal economy, Reuters explained. Inflation is at a 10-year high, natural gas exports are decreasing as old fields have dried up and new ones remain unexplored, the central bank is bereft of foreign reserves, and fuel imports are up. The fuel crisis is becoming especially destabilizing, noted Voice of America. Protests have been breaking out between Morales and Arce supporters who both claim their man should lead the country, the New York Times added. Perhaps most importantly, the country’s socialist government lacks the revenues it would like to parcel out to the people. Since Arce served as Morales’ economy minister, both are responsible for the situation, which is spiraling, argued Global Americans. “Shortages and price increases; falling purchasing power and rising poverty; deterioration of the social mood,” Gabriel Espinoza, a former director at Bolivia’s central bank, told the Economist. “The question is when and how this will morph into conflict in the streets.”

Four Young Boys Killed in Ecuador

Guayaquil Grief Ecuador Ecuadoran officials identified four charred bodies as the remains of four boys who went missing in early December near a military base, in a case posing a challenge to President Daniel Noboa and his war on criminal gangs, the Guardian reported. The boys, all of them Black and between the ages of 11 and 15, were residents of Las Malvinas, a poor district of the country’s largest city, Guayaquil. The children were returning from playing soccer on Dec. 8, when they were allegedly beaten and taken into custody by soldiers from the nearby Taura air base. After being apprehended, the four were allegedly released 26 miles away, late at night, in an unfamiliar area. Their remains were found on Christmas Eve. The Ministry of Defense, which initially denied involvement, later said the boys were apprehended because of their involvement in a robbery, a claim prosecutors say lacks evidence. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense has also suggested that the boys could have been victims of organized crime after being released by the military. Public prosecutors are now investigating whether the military is responsible for the deaths. More than a dozen soldiers are in custody. The incident has led to widespread outrage in Ecuador, where kidnapping, extortion, and murders have become commonplace, CBS News reported. Hundreds of people have protested, demanding the soldiers be prosecuted. This incident comes amid attempts by Noboa to defeat criminal gangs that have gained in power and have been terrorizing the country over the past few years. However, analysts say the case is a test of the president’s hardline policies – he came to power last year on a pledge to bring security back to Ecuador.