Fidel Castro's Victory-From The Russian Archives

Fidel Castro’s Victory Tour: New Evidence from Russian Archives Fidel in The USSR poster Poster in honor of Fidel Castro's first visit to the USSR. Photo: E. Artsrunyan Khrushchev Eager to Mend Relations with His Favorite Revolutionary after the Cuban Missile Crisis Castro Toured Soviet Union for almost 40 Days in 1963; Visited Uzbekistan, Georgia and Ukraine Castro-Khrushchev Conversations and Khrushchev’s Report to the Presidium Published for First Time Published: Apr 29, 2024 Briefing Book # 859 Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu Subjects Cold War – General Soviet-U.S. Relations Regions Cuba and Caribbean Russia and Former Soviet Union Events Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 Project Russia Programs FidelCastro and Mikoyan Reception in Murmansk [State Archive of Murmansk Oblast] Castro at a reception on nuclear powered icebreaker Lenin in Severodvinsk Castro at a reception on nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin in Severodvinsk [State Archive of Murmansk Oblast] Fidel and Khrushchev Fidel Castro with Khrushchev on Mausoleum Фото: ТАСС Fidel is giving speach Fidel Castro gave a speech at the May Day Parade. Photo: David Sholomovich / RIA Novosti Castro gave a speech to the workers of the Kzyl collective farm in a national Uzbek costume given to him Uzbekistan: Castro is trying on a traditional Uzbek robe during visit to a collective farm. Photo: L. Derzhavich / TASS Fidel and a tractor driver Uzbekistan: Castro is learning about mechanization of agriculture from an Uzbek tractor driver Photo: Vasily Malyshev / RIA Novosti Fidel and a shepherd Uzbekistan: Castro talks to a shepherd. Photo: Mikhail Kukhtarev / RIA Novosti Fidel and a fisherman Castro meeting a fisherman near Lake Baikal. Photo: Sergey Smirnov / RIA Novosti Crouds in Lemingrad Leningrad: crowds greeting Cuban leader. Photo: Sergey Smirnov / RIA Novosti According to national tradition, the guests were presented with a horn of young Georgian wine Georgia: Castro at a traditional Georgia table. Photo: Vasily Egorov / RIA Novosti Fidel with Maria Plesetskaya in Bolshoi Theater Moscow: Castro meeting Soviet prima ballerina Maya Plisteskaya at the Bolshoi Theater. Photo: Vasily Malyshev / RIA Novosti Washington, D.C., April 29, 2024 - New evidence from Russian archival sources and published today by the National Security Archive details Fidel Castro’s extraordinary April-May 1963 trip to the USSR, which Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev saw as an opportunity to mend relations that had soured after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The newly translated records from Russian state archives depict the Cuban leader touring several Soviet republics, meeting and conversing with top Soviet leaders, and, most importantly, receiving numerous reassurances that the Soviet Union would remain Cuba’s reliable partner and patron, despite how the Cuban Missile Crisis concluded, as well as promises of security and economic assistance.[1] Fidel Castro would say, in a secret, night-long 1968 speech to his top leadership, that he felt humiliated by what he saw as a Soviet betrayal when Khrushchev negotiated with the Americans behind his back on the withdrawal of the missiles that were the central focus of the Cuban Missile Crisis.[2] Castro was never fully informed about the conditions of the deal, especially the related removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy. At the same time, Castro knew that Cuba needed Soviet aid for his reform measures, both in material terms and in terms of ideological education. For their part, Khrushchev and the top Soviet leadership were willing to go to great lengths to keep their very important ally, the only successful communist revolution in the Western hemisphere. In addition to all the strategic reasons, Khrushchev had real grounds to fear a domestic political backlash for “losing Cuba” if that happened. During his November 1962 stay in Cuba, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan was taking away Soviet weapons with one hand, while with the other he was trying to give Castro every possible promise of economic aid. (see EBB 400) Then, almost three months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Premier wrote Castro a heartfelt letter explaining his motivation both for deploying the missiles and for withdrawing them in speedy fashion. He was, essentially, apologizing but also trying to take practical steps to bring Castro back into the Soviet fold. Khrushchev invited Castro to come on an extensive visit where he would see different parts of the USSR and spend time with the Soviet leadership. (see Nikita Khrushchev's letter to Fidel Castro) On April 27, 1963, Castro secretly arrived on a nonstop flight from Havana to Murmansk (landing on the third try in a very bad weather). He was greeted like a hero, with thousands of people out on the streets. Mikoyan and the Commander of the Northern Fleet. Admiral Kasatonov. were his hosts, and Nikolay Leonov translated for Castro throughout the trip (Document 1). Castro was taken to Severodvinsk to see Soviet submarines (but was not shown the ones that went to Cuba during the crisis), met with sailors, and was given a reception on the nuclear icebreaker Lenin. (see the excellent posting about the reception in Murmansk on the site of the Murmansk Oblast State Archive) After Murmansk, Castro left for Moscow where he participated in May Day celebrations with the entire Soviet leadership on top of Lenin’s Mausoleum and stayed at the state dacha in Zavidovo. At Zavidovo, the two leaders began to discuss the fate of communism in the world and especially in developing countries. Khrushchev spoke as the teacher, while Castro played the part of a dedicated student who also had his own views and often questioned the teacher. Castro was especially concerned about the situation with the liberation struggle in Africa; he asked Khrushchev “to express his opinion regarding the future political development of the African continent, noting along the way that he himself was very critical about the prospect of fast political progress in a number of African states.” Castro was planning to visit Algeria on an invitation from the revolutionary leader Ben Bella, but Khrushchev dissuaded him, saying that it would be too easy for imperialists to assassinate Castro during a stop there (Document 2). The Soviet leader gave his honest views about the complicated prospects of communist victories among the African countries, calling the leader of Guinea, Secou Toure, a “prostitute.” The discussion contrasts the two leaders’ manner of thinking about global issues: Castro’s apparently sincere belief that Marxism-Leninism will ultimately prevail and Khrushchev’s much more practical, and sometimes cynical, views, especially his assessments of individual leaders. Among their many conversations, for Khrushchev the most important subject was to explain to Castro the Soviet motivation for both deploying and removing massive Soviet forces, including nuclear weapons, from the island in the fall of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev’s main goal during Castro’s visit was to soothe any hurt feelings the Cuban leader might have from the episode and to persuade Castro that the security of the Cuban revolution was guaranteed by the USSR as a result of the “victory” they had achieved in extracting from the U.S. a pledge to not intervene in Cuba. These conversations are not included here because, at the time of this posting, they have not yet been declassified by the Russian archival authorities. However, we know that the talks took place and a lot about their substance from Khrushchev’s report to the Presidium on June 7 (Document 7) and from Castro’s recollections at a critical oral history conference organized in 1992 on the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis by the National Security Archive and James Blight and janet Lang of Brown University, which the editor of this EBB participated in. (Document 8). On May 4, 1963, Khrushchev showed Castro documents from the “confidential channel” on Soviet interactions with the United States during and after the crisis. Khrushchev read the documents to the Cuban leader with simultaneous translation by Nikloay Leonov, the Soviet resident in Mexico, who often translated for Castro and accompanied him on trips to the USSR. (Document 3) The readings and the discussion of the top secret documents took all day, during which Castro learned for the first time, apparently inadvertently, that Soviet missiles in Cuba had been removed in exchange for the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy. Castro realized that “it was the last thing that Nikita wanted me to hear. […] Withdrawing missiles from Turkey had nothing to do with the defense of Cuba.” Castro asked Khrushchev to read that paragraph again, but the Soviet leader just laughed “that mischievous laugh of his.” (Document 8) After meetings in Moscow, Castro went on a long tour of the Soviet Union. In Volgograd, he visited a tractor plant and the Soviet war memorial on Mamaev Hill. His trip to Uzbekistan was important from the point of view of agricultural reform—he met with tractor drivers, saw silk production, and was impressed that an underdeveloped country had made so much progress and had mechanized agriculture. That was the idea—Cuba could also develop quickly with Soviet assistance and tutelage. After Tashkent, Castro traveled to Irkutsk, fished with a local fisherman on Angara and saw Bratsk hydroelectric power station. In every city, at every train station, he was met with enthusiastic local people who genuinely admired the Cuban revolutionary leader. Another stop in Siberia was in Sverdlovsk (presently Yekaterinburg). From Sverdlovsk, the honored guest flew to Leningrad and then to Kiev. Back in Moscow, Khrushchev offered Castro the chance to see an ICBM, and the Cuban leader even signed his name on the body of the R-16 missile (so the American imperialists would know that it was a greeting from Cuba if it ever had to be used). On May 23, a number of Cuban-Soviet agreements were signed in the Kremlin, and Castro was honored as a Hero of the Soviet Union. After a grand event at Luzhniki stadium in Moscow (125,000 people attended), Khrushchev and Castro few to Khrushchev’s favorite southern dacha in Pitsunda, near Sukhumi. Traveling around Georgia, the two continued talking about the Cuban Missile Crisis (transcript not declassified yet, but Sergey Khrushchev mentions an argument between Khrushchev and Castro regarding how many days the Cuban revolution could have resisted an American invasion had the Soviets not negotiated with Kennedy[3]), the Cuban economy (Document 6), the situation in the socialist bloc (Romanians still possessed bourgeois nationalist sentiments and did not want to cooperate with other socialist countries) (Document 5), and Soviet specialists in Cuba (many of them are pure bureaucrats and have to be sent home) (Document 4). Castro was exposed to a full curriculum of socialist education and gained some invaluable insights into how things really worked. Castro left for Havana the same way he came—through Murmansk, and also in secret. During the entire trip he was feted as a hero, awarded the highest military honors of the USSR, and received pledges (and concrete agreements) of economic assistance in all spheres of Cuban industry and agriculture. It was truly a victory tour. Khrushchev, however, still had a job to do—to persuade the Presidium that Castro had accepted the Soviet narrative of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Castro’s subsequent secret speech to the Cuban top leadership in 1968 shows that he had not) and that he remained a loyal and reliable ally and an eager student who saw the Soviet Union, and not China, as his main teacher. Khrushchev’s report to the Presidium shows that China was a major concern of the Soviets in 1963 as well as during the Missile Crisis. Khrushchev assured the Presidium that he had explained the China issue to Castro and that he “understood our position correctly.” In doing so, it seemed that the Soviet leader was trying to persuade the Presidium—as he said he had persuaded Castro—that the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba was a victory and not a fiasco, repeating, in various forms: “we have achieved our goal, therefore, we won, we are the winners.” THE DOCUMENTS Document 1 Speech of Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral V.A. Kasatonov, delivered at the reception in hon Document 1 Speech of Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral V.A. Kasatonov, delivered at the reception in honor of Fidel Castro during his stay at the Northern Fleet Headquarters in Murmansk and response from Fidel Castro Apr 28, 1963 Source State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond R 5446, Opis 120, delo 1811 The reception for Castro took place on the nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin, the first nuclear icebreaker in the world. Kasatonov welcomes the leader of the Cuban revolution with military honors. He reminds the Cuban delegation that last fall, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Army and Navy were brought to “the highest state of combat readiness” and “filled with determination, by order of our Government, by the command of military duty, by the call of friendship, to come to your aid.” In his response, Castro raises a toast to the Soviet Navy and shares his impressions: “we were able to witness the power of modern Soviet military technology, the strong discipline, and the high moral spirit of Soviet sailors.” Document 2 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro Document 2 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro May 3, 1963 Source Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 52, Opis 1 [donated to the National Security Archive by Dr. James Hershberg] Khrushchev meets with Castro in his residence Zavidovo near Moscow. Castro consults with Khrushchev about his decision to visit Algeria after leaving the USSR on the invitation of Ben Bella, the head of the revolutionary government there. Khrushchev asks Castro not to go, citing security threats, and succeeds in persuading him to cancel the visit. They discuss the revolutionary situation in Africa and its prospects. Khrushchev laments that “the liberation of the African countries that was happening rapidly during the last several years did not always produce the desired results” (meaning that they did not all choose the socialist path) but that the USSR will keep providing them with generous economic aid while not interfering in their affairs. In his opinion, the African revolutionaries still have a long way to go and have to struggle against the development of Black bourgeoisie and “against political prostitutes like Sekou Toure [of Guinea].” Castro tells Khrushchev about the Indonesian communist leader Sukarno’s visit to Cuba, whom he regards very negatively. Khrushchev agrees with his assessment of Sukarno as “a womanizer and an actor,” but says that the Soviets had no choice: “we support and will support Sukarno as a political leader mainly because currently in Indonesia there is no one who could seriously implement the general course taken by Sukarno or to implement a more radical revolutionary policy.” Document 3 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro Document 3 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro May 4, 1963 Source Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 52, Opis 1 [donated to the National Security Archive by Dr. James Hershberg] During another meeting in Zavidovo, Khrushchev offers Castro an opportunity “to look through the latest documents that the Soviet and American sides had exchanged through confidential channels on various issues, including the Cuban issue. Transcripts and cables are read to Castro in translation, likely by Nikolai Leonov. The documents include the memoranda of conversations between Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, as well as the Khrushchev memo to the Presidium on Cuba. Document 4 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro Document 4 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro May 24, 1963 Source Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 52, Opis 1 [donated to the National Security Archive by Dr. James Hershberg] In this short conversation in the car on the way to observe some military exercises, Castro and Khrushchev discuss problems with Soviet advisors in Cuba. Khrushchev complains that some Soviet agencies send bureaucrats to Cuba who do not understand the Cuban specifics and only spend time in the offices that the Cuban government provides them. He asks Castro why they provide them offices with “telephones when none of them can speak Spanish.” The Soviet leader believes that Castro “should examine the lists of those advisers, concretely, name by name, and keep only those of them, who actually provide [Cuba] real practical help. All the rest of them should be recalled back home and the earlier the better.” Document 5 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro Document 5 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro May 26, 1963 Source Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 52, Opis 1 [donated to the National Security Archive by Dr. James Hershberg] This conversation takes place at the government summer residence in Pitsunda on the Black Sea. The Cuban leader wants to discuss some tensions within the socialist camp, in particular with the Romanian communists. Khrushchev harshly criticizes the “narrowly nationalist, limited character of the Romanian comrades” for their intransigence on the issue of the socialist division of labor and unwillingness to participate in a joint project with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR to build a cascade of hydroelectric power stations on the Danube. Along the way, the Soviet leader lectures Castro on the socialist political economy and the internal dynamics of the alliance. In the end, he concludes that “disagreements of this kind are immediately used by the Chinese and the Albanians, who try to patch together some sort of a coalition” with the purpose of splitting the socialist camp. Document 6 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro Document 6 Memorandum of Conversation between Nikita S. Khrushchev and Fidel Castro May 28, 1963 Source Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Fond 52, Opis 1 [donated to the National Security Archive by Dr. James Hershberg] This long conversation is devoted to a discussion of Soviet assistance to Cuban agricultural reform measures. It starts with a discussion of the Cuban request (Khrushchev promises to grant it in full in 1963) that the USSR provide machinery for loading cut sugar cane on the trucks. Castro laments that the manual nature of growing and harvesting sugar cane is the Cuban “eternal curse.” Khrushchev immediately offers his ideas to create a completely new sugar cane combine that would both cut and gather the sugar cane and thus free up thousands of workers. The two leaders discuss numerous issues related to agricultural reform, mechanization, and the preparation of agricultural specialists. All Cuban requests are granted, and even more is offered. Khrushchev is clearly trying to tie the Cuban leader even closer to the USSR after the cold spell in their relations after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Document 7 Khrushchev Report to the CC CPSU Presidium about His Meetings with Fidel Castro Document 7 Khrushchev Report to the CC CPSU Presidium about His Meetings with Fidel Castro Jun 7, 1963 Source Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), published in A.A. Fursenko, ed. Presidium of TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, Vol 1 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2003) pp. 720-726 This stenographic record of Khrushchev’s report to the Presidium preserves all of the colloquial expressions and the often-confusing style of Khrushchev’s unedited speech. His goal is to show to his communist colleagues that he was able to heal the split with Fidel that emerged as a result of the Soviet withdrawal of the missiles without consulting or even informing the Cubans in October and November 1962. He explains that he persuaded Fidel that the removal of the weapons was in the interest of the Cuban revolution, which he said would be at peace for up to six years while the Democrats remain in power in the United States. He presents the USSR and Cuba as the “winners” in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the United States as the “losers.” The Soviet leader also dismisses accusations that the Soviets were “cowards” during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This report provides glimpses of the conversations on security issues and the “Chinese factor” in Soviet-Cuban relations. According to Khrushchev, the issue between the Soviets and the Chinese is “nationalism, egotism”—the fact that the Chinese “want to play the first fiddle.” Khrushchev assures Castro that the Soviet Union would remain their main patron providing security assistance. However, he refuses to sign a “military treaty” saying that if he did Cuba would be seen as a Soviet satellite. In his report, Khrushchev emphasizes several times that Castro was “very happy,” that he understood the Soviet positions, and that he agreed with the Soviet reasoning. The rest of the report deals with the issue of Soviet economic assistance to Cuba and provides details about Castro’s travels around the Soviet Union. Castro commentary at the January 1992 Cuban Missile Crisis Conference, Havana, Cuba about His Trip to the USSR in 1963 Document 8 Castro commentary at the January 1992 Cuban Missile Crisis Conference, Havana, Cuba about His Trip to the USSR in 1963 Feb 28, 1992 Source Broadcast on Cuban Television on February 28, 1992, translated and published by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service. At the 30th anniversary conference in Havana, on January 11, 1992, Fidel Castro spent several hours recounting his experience during and after the missile crisis—providing his own postmortem as the last surviving leader of that historic and dangerous conflict. The CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which collected and translated foreign broadcasts, published an English version of his remarks after they were aired on Cuban television at the end of February 1992. Conference participants included leading Kennedy administration officials such as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and key Soviet officials such as the planner of the missile deployment, Gen. Anatoly Gribkov. To this highly knowledgeable audience, Castro reflected on what he called Kennedy’s “courage” to resist the pressures from his military to attack Cuba and acknowledged that hundreds of thousands of lives would have been lost if the U.S. had invaded. He also recalled the bitter sense of betrayal when Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the missiles without consulting Cuba. Instead of relief that the threat of an imminent U.S. invasion and nuclear war had receded, the Cubans, Castro stated, felt “a great indignation because we realized we had become some type of game token.” At the time, Castro did not know of the secret Kennedy-Khrushchev deal to resolve the crisis by swapping U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy for the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Towards the end of this lengthy retrospective, Castro recalled his bumpy flight to Murmansk in 1963 and recounted that, during their meetings at the Zavidovo dacha, Khrushchev inadvertently read him a document that revealed the secret swap, confirming Fidel’s belief that Cuba had been “used as an exchange token.” “Withdrawing missiles from Turkey had nothing to do with the defense of Cuba,” he remembered thinking about the Soviet rationale for installing their missiles on the island. “Cuba was defended by saying: Please remove the naval base; please, stop the embargo and the pirate [exile] attacks.” He remembered asking Khrushchev to “read that part about the missiles in Turkey” again. “He laughed that mischievous laugh of his. He laughed, and that was it. I was sure they were not going to repeat it again, because it was like that old phrase about bringing up the issue of the noose in the home of a man who was hung.” The Soviet documents published above do not include this exchange between Castro and Khrushchev, perhaps because the translator, Nikolai Leonov, was instructed not to take notes on the documents being read out loud by Khrushchev. Leonov’s memo from the meeting on May 4 at Zavidovo is only one page and mentions reading “transcripts and cables exchanged through confidential channels” with the Americans but none of the substance (see Document 3 above). NOTES [1] The National Security Archive thanks Dr. James Hershberg for donating the copies of Castro-Khrushchev conversations that he obtained from RGANI. [2] James Blight, Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007) [3] Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (Penn State University Press, 2000).

Meet Argentina's Richest Man

Meet Argentina’s richest man The boss of Mercado Libre ponders Javier Milei, self-doubt and the dangers of wokery Portrait of Marcos Galperin. photograph: getty images Apr 25th 2024|montevideo Save Share Give Listen to this story. Enjoy more audio and podcasts on iOS or Android. Even billionaires ponder the path not taken. At 17, Marcos Galperin had returned from a tour playing competitive rugby in Australia and New Zealand, two egg-chasing powerhouses, when he was offered a place at the University of Pennsylvania to study business. “I had to make a choice,” recalls the 52-year-old founder of Mercado Libre, Latin America’s dominant e-commerce and payments firm, from his office in Montevideo, Uruguay’s capital. But old dreams die hard. “If I were to be born again I would definitely go for a sports career,” says Mr Galperin. Still, being a billionaire has its compensations. Last year he bought the Miami Sharks, a rugby team in the United States. Argentina’s rugby team could have used a handy fly-half in the 1990s, but both Mr Galperin’s home country and Latin America are much better off for his choice of business. It is hard to overstate Mercado Libre’s impact. In a region of 670m people, the firm counted 218m active users last year. They buy and sell goods online, and use Mercado Pago, the firm’s payments arm, to pay for everything from roadside snacks to football tickets. Mr Galperin is the mega-star of Latin America’s technology scene. With a net worth of over $6bn he is one of the region’s wealthiest men. Already powerful in business, he is increasingly outspoken on social media. Mr Galperin was born into traditional Argentine wealth: a family-owned leather empire. Excited by the internet, he made the classic moves of an aspiring tech mogul, attending Stanford Business School and starting a business in a garage. That was in 1999. Today Mercado Libre has a market capitalisation of some $70bn, making it the second-most valuable publicly traded company in the region after Petrobras, a Brazilian oil giant. After battling sluggish service and frequent price rises from postal companies, Mercado Libre built its own vast delivery network, boasting planes and the continent’s biggest fleet of electric vehicles. Mercado Pago processed payments worth $183bn last year and provides credit cards and loans to some 15m people, 60% of whom had never had a loan before, says Mr Galperin. As a young man he had lashings of self-confidence. “To be honest, we thought we were going to get here much faster,” he quips. Yet he also admits to having doubts about whether Mercado Libre would make it, and underlines luck as an element of his success. “All these years I had all this anxiety…You have your balance in the bank coming down every month. It’s a horrible feeling.” Breaking even in 2005 was not a moment of celebration, but of relief. In keeping with this, in 2014 he complained about bosses using their firms as a route to fame. Mercado Libre was different, he said. “We want the company to be famous. The lower our personal profile, the better.” This, however, has changed. Today he is outspoken, particularly about Argentina, where his social-media posts regularly make waves. The Argentine economy is like a sports player who was once the best in the world, he says. “Now he’s obese, a drug addict, has cancer, aids and is an alcoholic.” Like many Argentines, Mr Galperin has been radicalised by years of economic chaos. In 2019 he called himself a Bill Clinton Democrat. Today he backs Argentina’s president, Javier Milei, a self-described “anarcho-capitalist”. When Mr Milei was elected in November, Mr Galperin posted a photo of doves breaking out of chains with one word: “Free.” Mr Milei has had an impressive start, he says, pointing to monthly budget surpluses, falling inflation and growing market confidence. “They took away the alcohol and drugs, but that’s also very painful,” he says, referring to the recession prompted by deep spending cuts. There is a long way to go: “The patient still has cancer and aids and is obese because for that to change you need to reform a lot of things.” Despite this bleak analysis, Mr Galperin reckons the odds of Mr Milei succeeding at reforming the economy are improving. Argentina’s story shapes his other views, too. He is bullish about bitcoin, which can be bought and sold on Mercado Pago, because he claims it is a better store of value than dollars, euros or yen. “Coming from Argentina, I know what happens when you have permanent deficits: your currencies devalue,” he says, skating over bitcoin’s own gyrations. His scepticism of government runs wider. “There is no innovation in Europe,” he claims, blaming excessive regulation. He loves Israel, by contrast, because it shows “the triumph of capitalism”. In Argentina too many people argue about capitalism rather than doing it, he suggests. And he frets about the influence of woke thinking, a prominent feature of Argentina’s last Peronist government; he draws a straight line from wokery to socialism and dictatorship. “It all starts with a really nice speech about equality and it ends up in authoritarianism and poverty,” he says. Success is the best revenge Mr Galperin is at his most strident on X, a social-media platform, where he tangles with public figures and random accounts, mocking critics with memes, kiss emojis and questions about whether they own shares in Mercado Libre. A secular Jew, he is vociferous in his support of Israel in its war in Gaza. He waves away the possibility that his outspokenness might pose a risk to Mercado Libre. Few outside Argentina care what he says, he argues, before insisting that he is in fact not that outspoken. Mercado Libre is certainly booming. On April 17th it said it would hire another 18,000 people, taking its total workforce to 76,000. That is perhaps the most telling riposte to his leftist online critics. ■ Sign up to El Boletín, our subscriber-only newsletter on Latin America, to understand the forces shaping a fascinating and complex region. Explore more Argentina

The University Of Buenos Aires Is In Danger Of Collapsing

The Director’s Cut ARGENTINA Hundreds of thousands of Argentines took to the streets this week in the largest protests since President Javier Milei came to power, criticizing the libertarian leader’s funding cuts to the country’s public universities as part of a string of austerity measures, Reuters reported. Students and professors gathered with union representatives and left-wing political parties on the streets of the capital, Buenos Aires, and other major cities on Tuesday to express their support for public education. Argentina’s universities have been a symbol of the nation’s social progress over the past decades. Now, they are facing an existential crisis. President Milei, describing them as bastions of socialism, accused them of “brainwashing” the young and therefore would be subject to drastic budget cuts. In a move to reduce spending and stop deficit spending, Milei has been crusading against cultural centers and state-funded facilities. Having received less than 10 percent of its total budget since last June, the prestigious University of Buenos Aires (UBA) barely has the money to pay its electricity bills. Last week, lights went off in some of its buildings. This crisis could mean closure for the UBA, an institution with a rich history that has produced five Nobel Prize winners and 17 presidents. Without a recovery plan, the school said it could shut down in the coming months. The UBA’s warning has shocked Argentines, who consider free university tuition a civil right. The rallies were joined by conservative politicians, right-wing personalities, and private university directors, signaling an increasingly broad backlash against Milei’s policies. Ahead of the protests, the government said it would provide $24.5 million to help universities cover maintenance costs, adding that “the discussion is settled.” University administrators insisted this was still not enough. Argentina spends 4.6 percent of its gross domestic product on education. The country offers free higher education to locals and internationals alike, drawing students from across the Americas. Critics have said foreign students should start paying tuition fees. Earlier this week, Milei insisted the sacrifice caused by austerity measures was worth it, announcing the nation’s first quarterly fiscal surplus in more than 15 years.

Colombia Corruption Circa 1977

Jimmy Carter’s Colombia Blacklist Revealed Rosalynn Carter meets with President Alfonso López Michelson First Lady Rosalynn Carter meets with President Alfonso López Michelson of Colombia, June 10, 1977. Mrs. Carter was the first in a series of presidential emissaries to deliver a tough message to López on drug corruption in the Colombian government. (U.S. National Archives) National Security Archive Publishes “Ultra Secret” 1977 Narco Dossier for First Time “Unprecedented” Intelligence Briefing for Colombian President Detailed Corruption Among Top Officials Carter to Staff: “Do not send helicopters - Give me CIA info” Published: Apr 15, 2024 Briefing Book # 856 Edited by Michael Evans For more information, contact: 202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu Subjects Crime and Narcotics Regions South America Project Colombia Carter and Lopez President Jimmy Carter and Colombian President Alfonso López Michelsen at the White House, September 6, 1977. (Still from YouTube video; a transcript is available from The American Presidency Project) Peter Bensinger Peter B. Bensinger, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration from 1976 to 1981, participated in the July 22, 1977, intelligence brief of President López. (DEA) Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, Colombia’s minister of defense from 1974 to 1978, is one of the more prominent names on the list of corrupt Colombian officials. (Camera Press London) Griselda Blanco Several Colombian officials on the list are linked to the narcotics network led by Griselda Blanco, who was then the head of a Miami-based narcotics smuggling operation and is now, 20 years after her murder in Colombia, the subject of a Netflix series. (Metro Dade Police Department) Ford and Lopez U.S. President Gerald Ford meets with Colombian President López at the White House on September 25, 1975. (U.S. National Archives) Washington, D.C., April 15, 2024 – A highly sensitive blacklist of allegedly corrupt Colombian officials assembled by the U.S. government and presented to Colombian President Alfonso López Michelsen in July 1977 as a way of gaining leverage over Colombian drug policy is the focus of a new Electronic Briefing Book published today by the National Security Archive. Located among records that were temporarily removed from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library for security review but later returned, the full text of the secret intelligence dossier, including the names of some three dozen officials believed to have ties to the drug trade, is published here today for the first time. James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, who will be one hundred years old in October, is known around the world as the president who negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel, reached a major arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, signed the Panama Canal treaty, faced daunting foreign policy challenges in Iran and Afghanistan, and who has engaged in numerous acts of charity and goodwill in the 43 years since he left office. Less well known is President Carter’s personal involvement—and that of his wife, First Lady Rosalynn Carter—in for the first time focusing U.S. policy toward Colombia on narcotrafficking and its corrupting influence among government officials, an issue that would come to define the relationship. The episode culminated in Carter’s authorization of what the CIA called an “unprecedented” briefing for President López in which he was presented with a dossier of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement information that linked “ministerial and judicial officials, military and law enforcement personnel, and other high-level figures” to the drug trade. Key officials named in the document include the defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, the minister of labor, Óscar Montoya Montoya, and Col. Humberto Cardona Orozco, then the head of INDUMIL, a military weapons manufacturer run by the Colombian government (See Document 29). The most serious allegations—those against Varón, Montoya and presidential candidate Julio César Turbay, who became president later that year—were revealed in an April 1978 broadcast of the CBS television show 60 Minutes, which had obtained a copy of a June 1977 White House memo sent to President Carter by Peter Bourne, his chief narcotics adviser. Bourne had urged Carter to hold up the sale of three military helicopters to Colombia and attached a one-page summary of Colombian officials believed to be involved in cocaine trafficking, which was the focus of the 60 Minutes report. (See Document 11). While a number of key documents from the episode have been declassified previously, including in the State Department’s 2018 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volume, today’s posting features several top-level documents from the Carter White House that have never before been published, including frank policy recommendations from key advisers. Some of the memos bear President Carter’s own handwritten annotations advocating for tougher drug policies and a more confrontational approach on corruption. These include the extraordinary decision to assemble and deliver an intelligence briefing to the Colombian president.[1] Some of these records were part of the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) program at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. The RAC was a security review activity dating back to 1995 during which the CIA, National Archives, and other U.S. agencies scanned hundreds of thousands of records from Presidential Libraries for sensitive material and, in many cases, provided declassified copies. The Carter RAC files were later obtained in bulk by the National Security Archive when the Carter Library made a large tranche available in digital form. More than 2,500 additional high-level memos from the Carter White House, mined from the RAC collection, are now available in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Carter Years, 1977-1981: Highest-Level Memos to the President, the most recent collection added to the Digital National Security Archive series from ProQuest, part of Clarivate. Highlights from today’s posting include: The full text of the long-secret intelligence dossier delivered to President López by three top U.S. officials on July 21, 1977. (Document 29) President Carter’s handwritten annotation on White House drug adviser Bourne’s memo recommending linking the delivery of promised military helicopters to corruption: “Do not send helicopters - Give me CIA info.” (Document 13) White House drug adviser Peter Bourne’s briefing memo for Rosalynn Carter’s meeting with the Colombian president, including a one-page summary of “Colombian Officials Allegedly Profiting from Cocaine Traffic” that months later would be leaked to members of the international news media. (Document 11) A State Department memo citing the “possible narcotrafficking activities” of Alfonso López Caballero, the son of President López, who went on to have a long career as a diplomat and policymaker and to hold top positions in a number of Colombian presidential administrations, serving most recently as ambassador to Russia from 2016-2022. (Document 35) A memo from NSC Latin America specialist Robert Pastor indicating that “the President was so much stronger” than his staff on the Colombian corruption issue and was the person who most wanted to include the names of corrupt Colombian government Cabinet officials in his letter to López. Carter himself said “that it was curious that he should be bolder than his advisors,” according to Pastor. (Document 25) U.S. Embassy speculation that Defense Minister Varón “may decide to be especially helpful and cooperative in [narcotics] matters in order to help disprove the allegations against him” in the narco dossier. (Document 37) Chargé d’affaires Robert Drexler’s cable complaining that the López government had done the “bare, protocolary minimum in hosting Mrs. Carter’s visit” in June 1977, treating it as a “ladies-only social event.” (Document 10) * * * * * U.S. concern about high-level drug corruption in Colombia emerged early in the Carter administration, and a key moment occurred in late April 1977 when the President was apprised of intelligence on the rapidly increasing pace of Colombian cocaine smuggling. Carter’s response, according to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s April 27 memo to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, was that the U.S. “should raise this officially and strongly with the Colombian Government.” (Document 4) President Carter’s reaction set off a chain of events that after several months of preparations resulted in what the CIA said was an “unprecedented” high-level intelligence briefing in which the U.S. confronted the Colombian president, Alfonso López Michelsen, with information linking top Colombian officials—including two of his cabinet members, a leading presidential candidate, and ranking members of the security forces—to drug trafficking. (Document 29) Revealed here for the first time, the long-hidden memo is a summary of information acquired by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement sources on narcotics corruption in the Colombian government and seems to address the Colombian president personally.[2] López is told that narcotics traffickers and their operations “are greatly facilitated by the cooperation and protection of influential Colombian officials” and that “further investigation by your Government would most valuable,” especially in cases of “high-level figures.” The document lists some three dozen Colombian officials thought to have links to the illegal narcotics business, including prominent figures from political, judicial, law enforcement and military circles. The most well known person on the list, Julio César Turbay, who would go on to win the next election and serve as president from 1978-1982, is linked to narcotrafficking through his nephew, Anibal Turbay Bernal, who the report says is linked to narcotics traffickers who believed they would “be able to choose the heads of the Colombian law enforcement agencies should Julio Cesar Turbay become president.” Top Colombian officials named in the report include two members of López’s cabinet: the Colombian defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, who the report says had “received narcotics and contraband payoffs,” and the minister of labor, Óscar Montoya Montoya, who is said to “have discussed illicit traffic in cocaine and coffee” with a known narcotics trafficker. Another key military official singled out in the report is Col. Humberto Cardona Orozco, then the head of INDUMIL, a military weapons manufacturer run by the Colombian government, a position that “lent itself to narcotics-related corruption,” according to the intelligence briefing. The former police intelligence chief in Cali, Capt. Harold Lozano Jaramillo, is said to be “operating a [cocaine] laboratory in his residence in Cali,” among other charges. The briefing also says that the former chief of the National Police, Gen. Henry García Bohórquez, used “his influence to facilitate the activities of several important Colombian narcotics traffickers.” While some of the information in the dossier is derived from DEA investigations, other information would have come by way of the CIA, explaining why one of the Agency’s top officials for Latin America, Lawrence "Larry" Laser, participated in the López briefing. In a later interview, Robert Drexler, the Chargé d’affaires who led the U.S. Embassy during much of this period, described an early CIA counternarcotics operation that relied on “a very small number of trusted Colombian law enforcement officials” who the U.S. “could monitor closely” and through which the U.S. “collected intelligence on the contacts between the drug traffickers and high-level Colombian officials.” The intelligence was “horrifying,” Drexler recalled in an oral history interview with the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, “because it detailed the rapid spread of corruption.” Whatever its exact origin, the alarming intelligence that sparked Carter’s heightened interest in Colombian corruption arrived at a transitional time for the U.S. Embassy in Colombia, amid what Drexler describes as a chaotic Embassy environment and growing diplomatic tensions over the naming of a new U.S. ambassador. The previous ambassador, Philip Sanchez, who was appointed by President Gerald Ford, left the post on April 5, leaving Drexler in charge of the embassy. Sanchez, a Republican political appointee, was “a disaster” who “did virtually nothing,” according to Drexler. “[W]hile we could not get our act together, the Medellin Cartel did get its own act together.” The budding narcotics syndicate had begun to acquire “sophisticated equipment, planes, telecommunications, money, organization, and made better use of Colombian officials for their purposes than we could for ours,” Drexler recalled of his time working under Sanchez. On top of that, Sanchez had simply assumed that Carter, as the new president, “would keep him on because he was a Latin.” Drexler said that Sanchez “finally had to be ordered out of Bogota” by the State Department. Meanwhile, narcotraffickers grew in strength, numbers, and capabilities. “[A]s we got into 1977, they were well advanced in the cartelization of the supply side, and we were way behind in even recognizing, to say nothing of meeting[,] the problem.” Carter’s first replacement for Sanchez, José A. Cabranes, a political appointee with personal ties to Secretary of State Vance, was “another slap in the face” to López, who for months refused to issue him credentials, and by the time he finally did so, Cabranes had withdrawn himself from consideration. It was thus left to Drexler, as Chargé d’affaires, to run the U.S. Embassy, as he put it, “for about 10 months in 1977” during “a formative period for the drug cartels.” As the ranking official, Drexler was a participant, notetaker and eyewitness as the Carter administration’s emissaries attempted to gain Colombia’s cooperation in narcotics enforcement by pressuring the Colombian president to clean house.[3] Carter’s hands-on approach to López during this tumultuous time combined an apparent gesture of goodwill—Carter was sharing highly sensitive information from U.S. narcotics investigations with the Colombian president—with an intimidating show of strength—the U.S. was building law enforcement dossiers on corrupt officials in the López government. The Carter administration made clear that U.S. cooperation on other issues important to Colombia—the delivery of promised military helicopters; a favorable U.S. decision over disputed Caribbean islands—was contingent on the U.S. receiving assurances from López that Colombia was serious about taking on drugs. Just as unprecedented as the presidential intelligence briefing was the role of First Lady Rosalynn Carter in setting the stage for the President’s confrontational approach to drug corruption in Colombia. The idea of employing Mrs. Carter to deliver a “substantive” message to López during her seven-country tour of Latin America in June 1977 seemed to surprise the Colombians during preparations for her visit, irking Drexler, who, in a cable to Washington, accused the López government of doing the “bare, protocolary minimum” for the First Lady’s planned stop in Bogotá and for treating her visit it as a “ladies-only social event.” (Document 10) In fact, Mrs. Carter’s talks with López covered a wide range of policy issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, U.S. relations with Cuba, and a new U.S. approach to foreign relations, emphasized by President Carter, that for the first time made human rights a factor in national security policymaking. (Document 15) But her most important message to the Colombian president was about the alarmingly widespread nature of drug-related corruption at senior levels of the Colombian government and the need for López to act if he wanted to improve U.S.-Colombia counternarcotics cooperation. Mrs. Carter encouraged López to meet the following month with the head of the White House drug control office, Peter Bourne, and Mathea Falco, the State Department’s senior narcotics official, to discuss the matter further. It’s not clear from the available U.S. records whether Mrs. Carter mentioned—as López later claimed—that the U.S. emissaries would deliver him a dossier on narcotics corruption. The available evidence suggests not.[4] In any case, it is clear that corruption was a central focus of her meeting with the Colombian president, and that she told López to expect a more detailed briefing from the President’s emissaries soon. Coming in the first few months of the Carter administration, the First Lady’s visit set the stage for a transformative period in U.S.-Colombia relations, as the new U.S. focus on human rights coincided with increasing U.S. pressure for Colombia to crack down on drug trafficking and narcotics-related corruption. But while Colombia’s human rights record at the time looked pretty good compared to some other countries, reports of widespread narcotics-related corruption in Bogotá made it necessary, in Carter’s view, to extract certain commitments from the Colombian president before the security relationship could resume. At the time, the focus for Colombia was on three military helicopters promised by President Ford but held up by Carter as his administration reviewed the appropriateness of U.S. security commitments around the world. Narcotics had not been an important issue in U.S.-Colombia relations during the Ford administration, though the two countries did reach an initial agreement for the U.S. to provide the helicopters with the expectation that they would help Colombia find and destroy narcotics-related sites. In a September 1975 meeting with Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, it was President López who brought up the subject of narcotics, lamenting how The New York Times had “blamed us” for the narcotics problem, while admitting that, “because of our situation, we are the center of traffic.” He said that Colombia was a “small country” that had been “invaded by people with and without passports, by planes, boats, etc.” and that were “heavily financed from within the U.S.” Throughout that year, the Times had published a four-part series on the international drug trade with Colombia as a primary focal point.[5] “We don’t have the materials to fight back,” López said, leading Ford to ask, “How can we help?” The Colombian president did not hesitate: “We could use technology and economic help. We could use helicopters to find where the planes land. We catch them all the time.” Previous anti-narcotics aid had been too little, López said, noting that $900,000 from the U.S. was nothing compared to millions of dollars in bribes handed out by the traffickers. “The drug operators are worldwide,” said López. “You can’t deal with the problem by just dealing with it in the U.S.” (Document 1) The next day, Ford told López that there would be $1.3 million in narcotics aid to Colombia in 1976, which he called “a huge increase,” and that his administration would also “look into the purchase of helicopters if necessary.” (Document 2) Records from the first months of the Carter administration reveal that Carter took an active role in the initial decision to hold up delivery of the helicopters until they were confident that the Colombian government would crack down on corruption. Documents found in the RAC collection indicate that the issue came to a head during the first week of June and that Bourne, in particular, helped push the President to strike a more confrontational posture. Bourne’s June 2 memo to the President on “Cocaine trafficking in Colombia” provided talking points on the matter for the First Lady’s upcoming meeting with President López and pleaded with Carter to use the helicopter issue, “one of the only points of leverage we have,” lamenting that, “Some people at the State Department are willing to just give them the helicopters to avoid conflict.” Attached to Bourne’s memo was a one-page summary of “Colombian Officials Allegedly Profiting from Cocaine Traffic.” In the margins Bourne’s memo, Carter wrote: “Do not send helicopters - Give me CIA info.” (Document 13) Around the same time, on June 3, the President asked the CIA director “if the Columbians [sic] were using the helicopters we gave them to run drugs,” according to a June 10, 1977, memo from Sayre Stevens, the Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA.[6] (Document 16) The First Lady thus arrived in Colombia just as the Carter administration’s new tougher approach to Colombia, including a halt in the delivery of promised security assistance, was taking shape, and her trip was seen as a moment to begin a frank dialogue about corruption. In a reporting cable, the U.S. Embassy under Robert Drexler complemented Mrs. Carter’s diplomatic skills, saying that the First Lady “was especially effective in the manner in which she raised with Lopez and [Foreign Minister Indalecio] Lievano, firmly and forcefully, the [U.S. government’s] concern over corruption in the [Colombian government] … while not offending the thin-skinned Lopez’s sensibilities, which could well have caused a curtailment in [the Colombian government’s] cooperation in narcotics interdiction.” Drexler’s comment no doubt reflected his concern, expressed in an oral history, that taking too hard a line with the Colombian government on corruption could have derailed the entire U.S. counternarcotics effort there. (Document 17) Several other documents from the RAC program published here for the first time show that the President continued to be personally involved in Colombia policy decision-making as the Intelligence Community prepared to brief López about narco-corruption in the Colombian government. Peter Bourne’s memo to Carter ahead of a June 20 Cabinet meeting on Colombia said that the group—consisting of officials from the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP), DEA, NSC, CIA and the Department of Justice—should consider what kinds of pressures the U.S. could apply toward Colombia and what “guarantees” the U.S. should “extract from the President of Colombia before releasing helicopters and other support.” Bourne noted that “Colombia has been a particular problem” with respect to “the lack of government effort in controlling narcotics and widespread corruption.” (Document 18) One meeting participant, William Luers, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (ARA), wrote in a memo that “the discussion centered around corruption: which ministers and high officials are involved and how much does Lopez Michelsen know himself.” Luers’ notes indicate agreement that Carter would send a “not timid” letter to López saying that “the President has knowledge of high level corruption” and warning that “the good name of Colombia” could be “damaged.” The letter, which would be hand-delivered to López during the upcoming visit of Bourne and Falco, would propose “the establishment of a high level joint commission to develop maximum cooperation and exchange intelligence information on trafficking and corruption.” (Document 20) Later that day in his “Evening Report,” NSC Latin America adviser Robert Pastor noted how it had been Carter, at the June 20 Cabinet meeting, who had “asked us [Pastor and Falco] to revise the letter which Peter Bourne will deliver to President Lopez Michelsen on Wednesday.” The President wanted the letter and his emissaries “to make clear to Lopez that the President is aware of the degree of corruption in the Colombian Government and feels that further cooperation between our two governments will depend on whether President Lopez addresses this issue effectively.” According to Pastor, it was Carter who had wanted to name the Colombian defense minister. “[T]he President was so much stronger on this issue than the rest of us,” Pastor wrote in a June 27 memo, “that Mathea [Falco] and I thought we should include it.” According to Pastor, Carter himself thought “that it was curious that he should be bolder than his advisors.” (Document 19) But Brzezinski was concerned that the letter drafted by Pastor and Falco and desired by Carter was too inflammatory, noting, in a June 21 memo to the President, that it made “a very serious accusation … but without any convincing proof.” The National Security Advisor shared his “strong reservations about the desirability of pointing so directly at a minister in President Lopez’s Cabinet,” recommending instead that Carter “state the proposition that we have cause to believe that ‘a number of high officials in the Colombian Government may be benefitting from the drug traffic, and go on to indicate that we are in a position to provide such information.” Brzezinski suggested that Bourne “could then point the finger more directly, and hopefully with greater effect.” (Document 21) Dated June 21, the letter signed by Carter and later delivered to the Colombian president did not mention any Colombian officials by name, instead referring to “information which has come to my attention indicating that a number of high officials in the Colombian Government, and several important political figures, may be benefitting directly or indirectly from the illicit drug traffic” and offering him “a complete briefing” on the matter. During their subsequent trip to Colombia, presidential envoys Bourne and Falco delivered the toned-down version of Carter’s letter to López (which he “immediately opened and read”) and told him that “President Carter has a list” of high-level Colombian officials involved in trafficking and “would be happy to arrange a private briefing” for López by “representatives of the Intelligence Community in Washington.” (Document 22) Accepting the offer, the Colombian president, who was well aware of the Carter administration’s new emphasis on international human rights, seemed to draw a distinction between Colombia and the military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina that were increasingly at odds with the Carter administration over its new emphasis on morality and justice in foreign policymaking. López explained that “if Colombia were a military dictatorship, action could be faster, but Colombia cannot move as easily as a country where there is no rule of law.” Interestingly, in his report to President Carter on the meeting, Bourne observed that the Colombian president “made no move to demand large amounts of money, as we thought he might” but it is not clear what sort of request they were expecting from López. In any case, the Carter administration was pleased enough with the the outcome of the Bourne/Falco visit to approve delivery of the long-pending U.S. helicopters and several other items that had been held up while Carter sought the Colombian president’s assurances on narcotics corruption.[7] Some of these appear to be related to intelligence, including discussions of a “regional communications project” that got underway shortly after the Bourne/Falco visit, and the idea to include in the briefing for López additional intelligence on opium cultivations. The latter, according to Drexler, was “in the spirit of Bourne/Falco offers of intelligence sharing, would enlist necessary support at highest level for effective enforcement action,” and would prepare the way “for necessary political and bureaucratic decisions for cooperative development of further intelligence and for eradication efforts.” (Documents 24, 26 and 27) The intelligence briefing was given to López on July 21 in Bogotá by Bourne, Bensinger, and Lawrence “Larry” Laser of the CIA. Bensinger told the Colombian president “there is no question that traffickers are helped and protected by some influential GOC officials,” adding that the U.S. government “wanted to share with President Lopez information which we had developed on such corruption, knowing that his sincere interest in attacking [the] narcotics problem will lead him to make further investigations of his own into these matters.” Bensinger then handed the Colombian president “information on about thirty cases which exemplified narcotics-related corruption involving ministerial and judicial officials, military and law enforcement personnel and high-level figures,” according to the Embassy’s cable on the meeting. (Documents 29 and 31) Bourne’s memo to Carter on the López briefing said the Colombian president “did not flinch at any of the information” they gave him but that he pushed back on allegations against the defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, who, as Bourne noted, “was the one person on the list he could not move against directly.” Regarding the “F-2” police intelligence directorate, the subject of various corruption allegations in the briefing, López called it “a nest of criminals” and promised “to move aggressively against these people.” Bourne characterized López as “a tired embattled old man depressed by his failure to accomplish more than 20 per cent of his administrations [sic] original program, who is not particularly popular with the people, and who was badly stung by accusations that his sons were involved in illicit financial transactions.”[8] López “had planned to drift through his remaining year in office,” according to Bourne, who credited Carter with reenergizing the Colombian president. “[T]he interest you and Rosalynn have taken in him has lighted a fire under him and given him the energy, clear goals and inspiration to try to redeem himself in the time he has left,” he said, adding, “We have also placed in his hands some powerful weapons.” (Document 32) The news media and U.S. lawmakers continued to spotlight Colombia’s growing role in the international drug trade throughout 1977, and early the next year, first Le Monde and later 60 Minutes published stories in which they revealed the identities of several people named in the list that had been given to López, including presidential candidate Turbay and defense minister Varón. The leak prompted an exchange of letters between the U.S. Embassy and the two officials and considerable embarrassment for all involved. 60 MInutes correspondent Harry Moses said the episode “may turn out to be the Carter administration's biggest diplomatic blunder in Latin America,” and at least some of Turbay’s supporters thought the revelations may have actually boosted their candidate’s chances in the upcoming election. By then, the U.S., with a new ambassador finally in place, had eased the pressure on Colombia, hoping to start fresh with Turbay, whose victory, by that point, seemed certain. (Documents 37-42) For his part, Drexler said he had come to regret being among those who had tried to tone down the Carter administration’s tougher approach to Colombia and corruption, fearing that a confrontation on the issue would jeopardize what progress they had made in focusing Colombia on the narcotics problem. Referring to Rosalynn Carter’s visit, Drexler said he had “pleaded with her to not follow her husband’s instructions “to take a very hard line with Colombia” and felt that, in the end, he had successfully persuaded the First Lady to downplay the issue: “She met with the President, she touched on the subject of corruption lightly, and went on with confirming that the helicopters would come, as they did.” “Later I regretted this,” Drexler continued, “and I think I made a mistake, that they were right all along in Washington, that they should have drawn the line then, that it would have been better to have a confrontation with Lopez at that point.” After receiving the helicopters, Drexler said he “was immediately invited on a joy ride with the Colombian Military high command, who it was clear to me thought that they were getting some marvelous new toys, and that they were likely going to divert these helicopters to their own pursuits, rather than have them used for drug interdiction.” THE DOCUMENTS Document 1 Memorandum of Conversation between President Gerald Ford and President Alfonso López Michelsen, Sep Document 1 Memorandum of Conversation between President Gerald Ford and President Alfonso López Michelsen, September 25, 1975, Secret/Nodis/Xgds, 13 pp. Sep 25, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Library President Gerald Ford begins his 1975 Oval Office meeting with President Alfonso López Michelsen of Colombia by noting that, “We have already agreed that we have no problems.” President López agrees that the two countries “have no problem at all.” Almost before they are seated, the two leaders have neatly captured the state of U.S.-Colombia relations in the mid-1970s. For years the U.S. had poured money into Colombia, much of which was managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) mission, which, in addition to development projects, ran a wide-ranging “public safety” program that reorganized and revamped Colombian police and intelligence forces. “[W]ith your AID we have decided that we don’t need your help any more [sic],” López says. “You can use the funds for needy countries.” Ford replies, “We readily appreciate your cooperation,” citing “experiences where countries having no obvious need keep on asking” for aid. After a brief discussion, it is López who raises the issue of narcotics in Colombia, which had been the subject of several articles that year in The New York Times, with reports of widespread corruption damaging Colombia’s reputation as a democratic haven in Latin America. “It is a worldwide problem,” he says, “but because of our situation, we are the center of traffic.” Colombia is a “small country,” López says, that had been “invaded by people with and without passports, by planes, boats, etc., heavily financed from within the U.S. We don’t have the materials to fight back.” Ford asks: “How can we help?” López asks for “technology and economic help.” Helicopters would be especially useful, he says, to “find where the planes land.” When Kissinger says the U.S. had given them “$900,000 for that,” López compares that to some $250 million in bribes that the narcotraffickers had handed out: “It is too little.” Kissinger says that he had asked Brent Scowcroft “to look into the possibility of helicopters.” Ford asks: “Are helicopters the best way?” López replies: “Yes, to locate airfields and boats.” Document 2 Memorandum of Conversation between President Gerald Ford and President Alfonso López Michelsen, Sep Document 2 Memorandum of Conversation between President Gerald Ford and President Alfonso López Michelsen, September 26, 1975, Secret/Nodis/Exgs, 8 pp. (includes handwritten notes of meeting) Sep 26, 1975 Source Gerald Ford Library On September 26, Ford and Kissinger meet with Colombian President López in the Oval Office for the second time in two days. Returning to a topic from the previous meeting, Ford says he “had a check made on the narcotics,” telling López they would appropriate $1.3 million for the coming year, which he says “is a huge increase” that “gives us an opportunity to charter boats and aircraft.” The President adds that his administration would “look into the purchase of helicopters if necessary.” Document 3 Memorandum for Deputy Executive Secretary, CIA, from [Deleted], “Briefing of Mrs. Carter,” class Document 3 Memorandum for Deputy Executive Secretary, CIA, from [Deleted], “Briefing of Mrs. Carter,” classification unknown, April 20, 1977, 25 pp. Apr 20, 1977 Source CIA CREST database A CIA memo encloses notes and 8x10 slides for use in briefing Rosalynn Carter on the mission and functions of the CIA and the broader U.S. Intelligence Community, reflecting the First Lady’s keen interest in foreign affairs. The fascinating briefing notes show the extent to which the Agency tried to reassure Mrs. Carter about its mission and operations in the wake of major disclosures about CIA involvement in assassination plots and other illegal acts. Document 4 Memorandum from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, “ Document 4 Memorandum from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, “Colombian Drug Traffic,” April 27, 1977, Top Secret, 1 p. Apr 27, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Brzezinski informs Vance that President Carter had “noted a recent intelligence item” about Colombian cocaine exports, adding that, “the President stated that we should raise this officially and strongly with the Colombian Government.” Carter also wanted the head of the White House Office on Drug Abuse Policy, Peter Bourne, who is copied on Brzezinski’s memo, involved in the issue. Document 5 Memorandum from Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, to the Deputy Director for Document 5 Memorandum from Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, “Proposed Briefing for Mrs. Carter,” classification unknown, April 28, 1977, 1 p. Apr 28, 1977 Source CIA CREST database Director of Central Intelligence Adm. Stansfield Turner, the head of the CIA, tells his deputy to “stay in touch with” First Lady Rosalynn Carter’s staff “so we can provide her adequate support” during her trip to Central and South America. Document 6 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to President Carter, “Colombian Cocai Document 6 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to President Carter, “Colombian Cocaine Traffic,” Secret, April 30, 1977, 2 pp. Apr 30, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program The Deputy Secretary of State tells President Carter that the State Department is “taking action on the disturbing reports that official corruption in Colombia is contributing to traffic in cocaine.” Christopher describes a series of steps, beginning with an approach by Terence Todman, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, on May 9. Todman’s meeting would be followed by the visit of Vance’s narcotics adviser, Mathea Falco, after which the Embassy would propose “specific actions [Colombian President] Lopez can take to deal with the problem.” Until then, the Department would “hold up delivery of three helicopters scheduled for shipment to Colombia under our narcotics program.” In the margin, Carter’s handwritten annotation reads: “ok”. Document 7 DEA report, [Narcotics-related Corruption in Colombia], Secret, Undated (ca. Jan-Apr 1977), 3 pp. (m Document 7 DEA report, [Narcotics-related Corruption in Colombia], Secret, Undated (ca. Jan-Apr 1977), 3 pp. (missing attachments) Apr 30, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program An undated three-page memo, apparently produced by the DEA in the first few months of 1977, reports awareness of “several levels of corruption in Colombia fed by tradition, socioeconomic pressures and the availability of large amounts of cash.” Corruption is found among “high level” political officials, “all agencies of law enforcement at all levels,” and in the judicial system. Most of the political allegations “converge on one figure in particular,” Julio César Turbay, a leading Liberal Party figure who would be elected president in 1978. Although this document includes significantly fewer names than the July 15, 1977, blacklist, several members of the security forces, including Capt. Harold Lozano Jaramillo, the police intelligence chief in Cali, customs agents, members of the DAS intelligence group, Colombian naval officers, judicial officials, and others. Document 8 U.S. State Department cable, “Helicopters and Corruption Issue,” Secret/Exdis, May 7, 1977, 3 pp Document 8 U.S. State Department cable, “Helicopters and Corruption Issue,” Secret/Exdis, May 7, 1977, 3 pp. May 7, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases “A decision has been made to hold up, at least temporarily, delivery of the helicopters pending demarche on the high level corruption issue,” according to this cable from the State Department to the U.S. Embassy in Colombia. The issue is to be discussed during the upcoming visit to Colombia of State Department narcotics official Mathea Falco. Document 9 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “Monthly Narcotic Report #3,” classification unkn Document 9 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “Monthly Narcotic Report #3,” classification unknown, May 14, 1977, 2 pp. (Stamp on first page indicates “THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.”) May 14, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library In his “Monthly Narcotic Report” to President Carter, Bourne says that his office is “devoting considerable time and effort to formulating an appropriate strategy for dealing with Colombian cocaine traffic and the pervasive government corruption,” adding that he would like to “discuss this issue with Rosalynn before she leaves” on her trip to Latin America. Document 10 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Visit of Mrs. Carter to Colombia,” May 19, 1977, Secret, 4 pp. Document 10 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Visit of Mrs. Carter to Colombia,” May 19, 1977, Secret, 4 pp. May 19, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases Regarding difficulties it has had in making arrangements for Rosalynn Carter to meet with Colombian President López, the Embassy says that, “frankly, we were not prepared for Lopez’ decision to do no more that [sic] bare, protocolary minimum in hosting Mrs. Carter’s visit. Moreover, the ladies-only social event, like [the] decision to have Mrs. Lopez go to the airport, apparently reflects president’s idea that this visit is to be treated outwardly at least as a wives’ affair, despite our emphasis on its substantive purpose.” On the corruption issue, Drexler says that, “Added care … should be taken in handling the narcotics/corruption issue, if it has to be raised. And I think it would be better not to raise it now.” Document 11 Director of White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy Peter Bourne memorandum to President Carter, “ Document 11 Director of White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy Peter Bourne memorandum to President Carter, “Cocaine trafficking in Colombia.” Secret, 3 pp., June 2, 1977 (includes Secret/Exdis attachment, “Colombian Officials Allegedly Profiting from Cocaine Traffic,” June 1, 1977) Jun 2, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Attached to White House drug policy director Peter Bourne’s memo about priorities for Rosalynn Carter’s visit to Colombia is a highly redacted copy of a document titled “Colombian Officials Allegedly Profiting from Cocaine Trade.” Unredacted names on the list include the leading presidential candidate at the time, Julio César Turbáy (“cocaine traffic involvement”); the National Police commander in Magdalena Department (“Colonel Salazar”), who is said to own a marijuana plantation; and Capt. Harold Lozano Jaramillo, the commander of National Police forces in Cali, who is said to run a cocaine lab. Following up on the matter discussed in his May 14 “Monthly Narcotic Report #3,” Bourne lists four things that First Lady Rosalynn Carter should stress in her upcoming meeting with President López: 1) that the President and the First Lady were “seriously concerned about drug abuse,” 2) that Colombia has a serious problem with narcotics-related corruption, 3) that the U.S. wanted “a closer collaborative relationship” with Colombia, including high-level discussions; and 4) that helicopters promised to Colombia would not be delivered until Colombia makes a credible commitment to attacking the drug trade. Bourne writes that, “Even with commitment I doubt drug crop substitution programs will work because cocaine will grow easily almost anywhere in these countries.” Document 12 Secretary of State Vance memorandum to President Carter, “Helicopters for Colombia,” Secret, 2 p Document 12 Secretary of State Vance memorandum to President Carter, “Helicopters for Colombia,” Secret, 2 pp., June 3, 1977 Jun 3, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Noting the continuing delay in delivery of three helicopters promised to Colombia by the previous administration, Vance reminds the President that the holdup “was occasioned by recent intelligence reports indicating that Colombian government officials are extensively involved in cocaine trafficking and that corruption is proving a serious obstacle in the narcotics interdiction effort in that country.” Vance recommends, and Carter agrees (see his handwritten annotation), “to withhold deliver of the helicopters” pending the outcome of an upcoming visit by White House drug chief Peter Bourne and State Department narcotics adviser Mathea Falco. Document 13 National Security Advisor Brzezinski to Secretary of State Vance and Director of Central Intelligenc Document 13 National Security Advisor Brzezinski to Secretary of State Vance and Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, “Cocaine Trafficking in Colombia,” Secret, 1 p., June 6, 1977 (with attachments) Jun 6, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Attached to this memo is President Carter’s annotated reaction to Bourne’s June 2 memo recommending that Carter link the delivery of promised military helicopters to “highly specific commitments” by President López, “including vigorous moves against those in government who are known to be involved in the trafficking.” In the margins of Bourne’s memo, Carter has written: To: Cy [Vance] Stan [Turner] Do not send helicopters - Give me CIA info. J.C. Document 14 U.S. State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff memorandum to Brzezinski, “Cocaine Traffic Document 14 U.S. State Department Executive Secretary Peter Tarnoff memorandum to Brzezinski, “Cocaine Trafficking in Colombia,” Secret/Exdis, 6 pp., June 9, 1977 (includes attachments) Jun 9, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program The State Department acknowledges “the President’s reaction to Dr. Peter Bourne’s memorandum and his decision not to deliver the helicopters promised Colombia under our international narcotics program.” Secretary Vance has “reconfirmed the decision he made on May 3 to withhold delivery pending the outcome of a visit to Colombia by Dr. Bourne and Ms. Mathea Falco” in June. Document 15 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Mrs. Carter’s Meeting with President Lopez,” Confidential/Exdis, Document 15 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Mrs. Carter’s Meeting with President Lopez,” Confidential/Exdis, June 10, 1977, 9 pp. Jun 10, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases; another copy of this cable was released in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV, South America (2018), Document 240. The First Lady’s talks with Colombian President López cover a wide range of policy issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, Panama Canal treaty negotiations, U.S. relations with Cuba, and the new U.S. approach to foreign relations that emphasized respect for human rights. López told Carter that the U.S. should not “act as a ‘protector’ of human rights” in Latin America, since this was something under the purview of the OAS and UN. Speaking of efforts by Southern Cone military governments “to form a bloc countering US efforts on behalf of human rights,” López assured Carter that “Colombia had not been welcome as a participant.” Regarding narcotics, López told the First Lady “that there were few things that had disappointed him as much as his experience with the [U.S. government] with regard to narcotics control. He said the question was whether Colombia was corrupting the US or vice versa,” and complained that the U.S. had delayed for three years the delivery of three helicopters promised by President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Carter told López that “it was impossible to confine responsibility in such a matter to one country” and “went on to observe that the narcotics trafficking had had a corrupting influence on the [Colombian government].” The Colombian president and his foreign minister, Indalecio Liévano, “entirely agreed with Mrs. Carter,” but said that Colombia “does not have the resources to fight back against the traffickers and that the promises [U.S. government] help had never come.” Carter again emphasized “that corruption was limiting the effectiveness of Colombian enforcement action” and encouraged López to meet and discuss the matter with Peter Bourne, head of the White House Office on Drug Abuse Policy, and Mathea Falco, the State Department’s top narcotics official, during their upcoming visit to Colombia. Document 16 CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Sayre Stevens memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, � Document 16 CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence Sayre Stevens memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, “Query Regarding Colombia Use of US-Supplied Helicopters to Smuggle Drugs,” June 10, 1977, Secret, 5 pp. Jun 10, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program In response to a query, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Sayre Stevens, reports to the Director of Central Intelligence that the CIA had “no intelligence information suggesting that Colombian helicopters are, or ever have been, involved in narcotics smuggling” and that “US AID Mission advisors” had found “no evidence of any misuse by Colombia of AID funds and commodities.” Document 17 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Mrs. Carter’s Visit to Colombia, June 9-10,” Confidential, 5 pp. Document 17 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Mrs. Carter’s Visit to Colombia, June 9-10,” June 4, 1977, Confidential, 5 pp. Jun 14, 1977 Source U.S. U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases First Lady Rosalynn Carter raised “a number of substantive issues of high priority to the US” in her meeting with Colombian President López, according to this cable from the U.S. Embassy. Although the Colombians had initially “tended to downgrade the importance of the visit,” this “tendency was gradually overcome as reports arrive of Mrs. Carter’s high-level reception at previous stops” on her tour of Latina America. “Mrs. Carter bore down most heavily on the [U.S. government’s] concern over drug abuse in the US, its corrupting influence in the [Colombian government], and in particular, that corruption’s impact on the effectiveness of the [Colombian government’s] enforcement program.” Agreeing with the First Lady, López said that Colombia needed “more and better equipment” that had been promised but never delivered by the previous U.S. administration and which was now being held up by Carter. “She was especially effective in the manner in which she raised with Lopez and Lievano, firmly and forcefully, the [U.S. government’s] concern over corruption in the [Colombian government] with regard to Colombian narcotics enforcement action, while not offending the thin-skinned Lopez’s sensibilities, which could well have caused a curtailment in [Colombian government’s] cooperation in narcotics interdiction with USG agencies.” Document 18 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “3:45 P.M. Meeting, June 20, 1977, Cabinet Room,” Document 18 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “3:45 P.M. Meeting, June 20, 1977, Cabinet Room,” classification unknown, 2 pp. Jun 20, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library This briefing memo for President Carter comes ahead of a Cabinet meeting on “the narcotics environment in Colombia” and “ways to improve” Colombian counternarcotics efforts. Noting that “Colombia has been a particular problem” in term of “the lack of government effort in controlling narcotics and widespread corruption,” Bourne suggests the group consider what kinds of pressures the U.S. could apply toward Colombia and determine what “guarantees” the U.S. should “extract from the President of Colombia before releasing helicopters and other support.” Interestingly, Bourne mentions how U.S. “efforts in Colombia have been hampered by an ongoing conflict between CIA and DEA over the collection of intelligence data”—a conflict that would not soon be resolved. Document 19 Robert Pastor, National Security Council, “Evening Report - Monday, June 20, 1977,” Secret, 2 pp Document 19 Robert Pastor, National Security Council, “Evening Report - Monday, June 20, 1977,” Secret, 2 pp., June 20, 1977 Jun 20, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Pastor writes: “The President asked us [Pastor and Falco] to revise the letter which Peter Bourne will deliver to President Lopez Michelsen on Wednesday, to make clear to Lopez that the President is aware of the degree of corruption in the Colombian Government and feels that further cooperation between our two governments will depend on whether President Lopez addresses this issue effectively.” Document 20 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (ARA), William Luers, to U.S. Secr Document 20 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (ARA), William Luers, to U.S. Secretary of State, “Colombia: Cocaine and the Corruption Issue,” Secret/Exdis/Eyes Only, June 21, 1977, 4 pp. Jun 21, 1977 Source U.S. U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Luers provides a summary of a White House meeting focused on narcotics-related corruption in Colombia and the U.S. approach to Colombian President López. “Much of the discussion centered around corruption: which ministers and high officials are involved and how much does Lopez Michelsen know himself.” It was decided that President Carter would send a “not timid” letter to López telling him that “the President has knowledge of high level corruption,” warning “about the prospect of the good name of Colombia being damaged,” and proposing “the establishment of a high level joint commission to develop maximum cooperation and exchange intelligence information on trafficking and corruption.” The letter would be hand-delivered to López during the upcoming visit of Bourne and Falco. Document 21 Letter from President Carter to President López-Michelsen of Colombia, June 21, 1977, 7 pp. (includ Document 21 Letter from President Carter to President López-Michelsen of Colombia, June 21, 1977, 7 pp. (includes attachments) Jun 21, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Carter’s letter to the Colombian president, which was hand delivered to López by Bourne and Falco during their June 24 meeting in Bogotá, says that his administration had decided to make “international drug abuse control a high priority.” Carter asks the Colombian president for information on “the involvement of United States citizens in the drug traffic” and says he wanted to provide López with “some information which has come to my attention indicating that a number of high officials in the Colombian government, and several important political figures, may be benefitting directly or indirectly from the illicit drug traffic.” Carter offers López “a complete briefing” on the matter. Carter says he is “concerned that future cooperation between our two countries will be jeopardized” by the corruption problem and proposes a “joint commission” to “share information” on “the illicit drug traffic.” Attached here is a revealing June 21 memo to Carter from Brzezinski, who tells the President he has “strong reservations about the desirability of pointing so directly [in the draft letter] at a minister in President Lopez’s cabinet,” presumably referring to the minister of defense. Noting “the question of the reliability of our information” and also “Latin American sensitivity to U.S. interference,” Brzezinski thinks Carter’s letter should simply refer to “a number of high officials in the Colombian Government” who “may be benefitting” from the drug trade and say that the U.S. was prepared to provide López with the details in a follow-up “briefing” by top officials. Document 22 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Bourne-Falco Meeting with President Lopez,” Secret, June 24, 1977, Document 22 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Bourne-Falco Meeting with President Lopez,” Secret, June 24, 1977, 6 pp. Jun 24, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases The memcon from Bourne and Falco’s meeting with President López follows an initial summary provided the previous day and that is published in FRUS. This more-detailed readout of the meeting indicates that the lead item on the agenda was the delivery of President Carter’s letter on high-level narcotics corruption in Colombia, “which Lopez immediately opened and read.” López lamented that previous “constructive ideas in the narcotics field” had “come to nothing,” and that the U.S. continued to delay the delivery of long-promised helicopters. López also noted Carter’s new policy on human rights, saying, according to the memcon, “if Colombia were a military dictatorship, action could be faster, but Colombia cannot move as easily as a country where there is no rule of law.” After discussing other matters, Bourne “called attention to the involvement of persons at high levels in the [Colombian government] in trafficking,” adding that “President Carter has a list of such individuals and he would be happy to arrange a private briefing” for López by “representatives of the Intelligence Community in Washington.” Document 23 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “Meeting with President Lopez-Michelsen.” June 24 Document 23 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “Meeting with President Lopez-Michelsen.” June 24, 1977, Secret, 7 pp. (includes cover memoranda from President Carter and others) Jun 24, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program In a memo to President Carter, with copies to First Lady Rosalynn Carter and National Security Adviser Brzezinski, the director of the White House Office on Drug Abuse Policy, Peter Bourne, credits First Lady Rosalynn Carter with laying “the ground work” for an “extremely successful” recent meeting with Colombian President López. “He immediately read your letter,” said Bourne, and “responded very favorable to it.” The Colombian president agreed to a number of bilateral steps to deepen anti-narcotics cooperation and, “most importantly he suggested that he would assign a narcotic liaison officer to their embassy here in Washington to work exclusively on the drug issue.” Bourne also relayed Carter’s “concern over corruption,” telling López that Carter was “aware of information on many people in high positions in Colombia benefitting from the drug traffic.” López “immediately accepted” Carter’s “offer to provide him a confidential briefing” on the matter. Bourne told the President he was arranging for DEA Administrator Peter Bensinger and CIA deputy director E. Harold Knoche (“Hank Knocke”), who had served as acting CIA director during the first two months of the Carter administration, to take the lead on the corruption briefing for López and that they would provide “specific names.” Interestingly, Bourne reported that the Colombian president “made no move to demand large amounts of money, as we thought he might.” Document 24 U.S. State Department cable to U.S. Embassy Bolivia, Colombia, et al., “Regional Communications St Document 24 U.S. State Department cable to U.S. Embassy Bolivia, Colombia, et al., “Regional Communications Study,” June 24, 1977, Unclassified, 2 pp. Jun 24, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases Not long after the “positive outcome” of the Bourne/Falco visit with President López, the State Department in this message approves the visit of another U.S. official to discuss the “regional communications project.” Document 25 National Security Council staff member Robert Pastor to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinsk Document 25 National Security Council staff member Robert Pastor to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Gedda Story and U.S. Policy to Chile,” June 27, 1977, Personal and Confidential, 6 pp. Jun 27, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program A comment included at the bottom of this memo to Brzezinski from NSC Latin America staffer Robert Pastor sheds some light on how Carter’s letter to López was crafted, revealing that it was Carter himself who favored a tougher, more confrontational approach with the Colombian president. At the bottom of a memo that is mostly about Chile, Pastor tells Brzezinski about something he overheard at the State Department. Upon reading a draft of the proposed Carter letter to López on narco-corruption, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William Luers had said “I don’t think we should mention the Minister of National Defense,” referring to intelligence linking the Colombian defense minister to narcotrafficking, “but that seems to have been the President’s wishes [sic].” Indeed, Pastor tells Brzezinski that “the President was so much stronger on this issue than the rest of us … that Mathea and I thought we should include it, and if he had second thoughts, it would be easier for him to delete it than to rewrite it in order to add it.” Carter himself had said “that it was curious that he should be bolder than his advisors,” according to Pastor. Brzezinski seems to have been unaware that the defense minister’s name would be included in the draft, since Pastor adds, “If you had called me to ask, I would have be glad to tell you … [B]ut it was finished at 10:00 p.m., and you were gone.” Document 26 U.S. State Department cable to U.S. Embassy Colombia, “Bourne/Falco Visit: Helicopters,” June 27 Document 26 U.S. State Department cable to U.S. Embassy Colombia, “Bourne/Falco Visit: Helicopters,” June 27, 1977, Limited Official Use, 2 pp. Jun 27, 1977 Source U.S. U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases After a briefing from Bourne on the “successful outcome” of their meeting with President López, “The President has authorized the delivery” of long-awaited helicopters to Colombia. Document 27 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Opium Cultivation in Colombia,” July 6, 1977, Confidential, 2 pp. Document 27 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Opium Cultivation in Colombia,” July 6, 1977, Confidential, 2 pp. Jul 6, 1977 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases The U.S. Embassy, under Chargé d’affaires Robert W. Drexler, recommends that the U.S. also provide President López U.S. intelligence related to “opium cultivation” during the upcoming intelligence briefing on official corruption to help push “for elimination of opium cultivation in Colombia.” This would be done “in the spirit of Bourne/Falco offers of intelligence sharing and would enlist necessary support at highest level for effective enforcement action.” The Embassy “strongly recommends that forceful presentation be made directly to President Lopez” on Colombian opium production to set the stage “for necessary political and bureaucratic decisions for cooperative development of further intelligence and for eradication efforts.” Document 28 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “Monthly Narcotic Report #5,” July 11, 1977, Conf Document 28 Memorandum to the President from Peter Bourne, “Monthly Narcotic Report #5,” July 11, 1977, Confidential, 6 pp. (includes cover memo dated July 15, 1977, and Carter’s handwritten annotations) Jul 11, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Bourne’s Monthly Narcotic Report to President Carter says, “We are scheduled to provide the promised briefing to President Lopez-Michelsen in Bogota on July 21, 1977. It will be conducted by Peter Bensinger of DEA, a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency under State Department cover and myself.” “The material to be presented has been prepared with exceptional care,” Bourne indicates in the memo, adding that, “consistent with your instructions we will carefully qualify the information we provide making it particularly clear the degree of certainly we attach to it.” Evidence shared with the Colombian president would also include “photos of opium poppies” growing in Colombia, as suggested in the Embassy’s July 6 cable. Bourne also says they will recommend that López “set up, with our help, an Internal Security Division to further investigate corruption.” Document 29 DEA report, S-IGI-77-0042 (2) [Official Corruption in Colombia], July 15, 1977, Secret, 12 pp. Document 29 DEA report, S-IGI-77-0042 (2) [Official Corruption in Colombia], July 15, 1977, Secret, 12 pp. Jul 15, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program This untitled report, found among the RAC documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, appears to be the text of the intelligence briefing on official corruption in Colombia that was delivered to President López during his July 21 meeting in Bogotá with DEA head Peter Bensinger, White House drug policy chief Peter Bourne, and Lawrence “Larry” Laser of the CIA. While some of the more prominent allegations in the briefing would come to light in a 1978 broadcast of 60 Minutes—which had obtained a copy of Peter Bourne’s June 1 memo (see Document 11)—the full López corruption briefing document, as far as this author knows, including the identities of some three dozen allegedly corrupt officials, has never before been published. The text of the López briefing even somehow evaded the finely honed searches of the State Department’s history staff, who reported the list as “not found” in their 2018 volume covering Latin America during the Carter presidency. One reason for this could be that the document was removed as part of the RAC program at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and then later returned. The memo is a summary of information acquired by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement sources on narcotics corruption in the Colombian government and seems to address the Colombian president personally.[9] Noting President López-Michelsen’s “sincere interest in attacking the narcotics problem,” the Colombian president is told that the “extent of official corruption in Colombia, especially in the law enforcement and judicial sectors, renders effective enforcement and legal action in the narcotics field very difficult.” Narcotics traffickers and their operations “are greatly facilitated by the cooperation and protection of influential Colombian officials,” without which “they would find it very difficult to operate.” The briefers inform the Colombian president that the information they are sharing is derived from “law enforcement and criminal intelligence activities in the United States as well as those conducted by foreign governments” and “ranges in quality from solid and detailed to somewhat sketchy” and suggest that “further investigation by your Government would most valuable,” especially in cases of “high-level figures.” The document lists some three dozen Colombian officials thought to have links to the illegal narcotics business, including prominent figures from political, judicial, law enforcement and military circles. The most prominent person on the list, Julio César Turbay, who would go on to win the next election and serve as president from 1978-1982, is linked to narcotrafficking through his nephew, Anibal Turbay Bernal, who the reports says, “belongs to the narcotics network of Jose Manuel Parra Urrea.” The report says that Turbay’s presidential run “is anticipated by Parra’s organization,” which, as a result of its “multi-million peso investment in Anibal Turbay,” believed it would “be able to choose the heads of the Colombian law enforcement agencies should Julio Cesar Turbay become president.” Top Colombian officials named in the report include two members of López-Michelsen’s cabinet: the Colombian defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, who the report says had “received narcotics and contraband payoffs,” and the minister of labor, Óscar Montoya Montoya, who is said to “have discussed illicit traffic in cocaine and coffee” with a known narcotics trafficker. Another key military official singled out in the report is Col. Humberto Cardona Orozco, then the head of INDUMIL, a military weapons manufacturer run by the Colombian government. Cardona, the former head of the Uniformed Customs Police had been “removed” from that position “for narcotics-related corruption,” according to the briefing, which said that Cardona “took bribes from many of Colombia’s leading narcotics smugglers with who he was personally acquainted.” The new position at INDUMIL also “lent itself to narcotics-related corruption,” according to the intelligence briefing, Other Colombian officials included in the report are: Harold Lozano Jaramillo, the former police intelligence chief in Cali, who is said to be “operating a [cocaine] laboratory in his residence in Cali and supplying cocaine hydrochloride at night, traveling in uniform and escorted by his F-2 [police intelligence] bodyguards.” Lozano is said to have been involved in protecting another lab near Cali and to have arranged the release of detained narcotraffickers. The former chief of the National Police, Gen. Henry Garcia Bohorquez, who used “his influence to facilitate the activities of several important Colombian narcotics traffickers.” Another F-2 official, Capt. Marcos A. Bonilla, who “owned a finca in Florencia where a cocaine laboratory was operating,” according to the report. Another police F-2 commander, Lt. Jorge Eliecer Arroyave Zapata, who is said to be “one of the biggest traffickers in Tumaco.” Fidel Duarte Sotelo, “a Justice Ministry official” and “brother of Hilda Duarte Sotelo de Robayo,” a known narcotrafficker. Arcesio Sánchez Ojeda, a member of congress from Nariño Department who went on to serve as senator and later governor of Nariño. Sánchez “was involved in cocaine trafficking with his brother, Lt. Carlos Vicente Sanchez Ojeda,” a Customs Office official in Buenaventura. DAS intelligence officials around the country had been “identified as being directly involved in narcotics trafficking or in supplying information to traffickers,” including Samuel Gutierrez, the DAS chief in Nariño. Orlando Ceballos Pineda, the city comptroller of Santa Marta. Orlando Noguera, brother-in-law of the governor of Magdalena Department. Several Colombian officials who are said to have facilitated the release of narcotrafficker Norberto Moreno Carrillo, including Minister of Defense Varón Valencia, Henry García Orozco, a Supreme Court magistrate in Cundinamarca Department, Martín Suarez Sarabia, a senate official, and Gilardo Ospina, a colonel in the National Police. A number of judicial officials accused of having taken bribes from narcotraffickers. A naval officer behind a purported scheme to smuggle some 48 kilos of cocaine aboard the Colombian naval training vessel Gloria. Document 30 CIA report, International Narcotics Developments, “Colombia: Strengthening Narcotics Control Effor Document 30 CIA report, International Narcotics Developments, “Colombia: Strengthening Narcotics Control Efforts,” July 20, 1977, Secret, 27 pp. Jul 20, 1977 Source CIA CREST database The CIA says that U.S.-Colombia drug control relations have strengthened “as a result of last month’s meeting between First Lady Rosalynn Carter and President Lopez.” The U.S. has agreed to $3.7 million in security assistance, including the long-awaited helicopters, “to try to curb the flow of cocaine and other drugs to North America.” For his part, Lopez “agreed to a meeting this week with high-level officials from Washington to discuss the sensitive issue of drug-related corruption in his government.” Document 31 U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, “Meeting of Dr. Bourne and Mr. Bensinger with President Lopez,” July Document 31 U.S. Embassy Bogotá cable, “Meeting of Dr. Bourne and Mr. Bensinger with President Lopez,” July 22, 1977, Secret, 3 pp. Jul 22, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program The Embassy cable on López-Michelsen’s meeting with DEA Administrator Bensinger, White House drug chief Bourne, and Lawrence Laser of the CIA, says the Colombian president was “receptive, candid and forthcoming,” pledging to “set up an elite civilian law enforcement unit to cope with crime and corruption, replacing the F-2 (detective) unit of the National Police.” Bensinger told López-Michelsen that narcotics problems “must be solved jointly by producer and user nations” but that “such cooperation is threatened by narcotics-related corruption,” adding, “[T]here is no question that traffickers are helped and protected by some influential GOC officials.” For that reason, Bensinger said, the U.S. government “wanted to share with President Lopez information which we had developed on such corruption, knowing that his sincere interest in attacking [the] narcotics problem will lead him to make further investigations of his own into these matters.” Bensinger handed the Colombian president “information on about thirty cases which exemplified narcotics-related corruption involving ministerial and judicial officials, military and law enforcement personnel and high-level figures.” For his part, López-Michelsen “acknowledged that the problem was very bad and indicated that his own reports and information general supported the thrust of the briefing,” though he expressed doubts that the allegations about his defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, chalking them up to “attempts by Varon’s enemies to blacken his reputation and standing with the president.” Still, López-Michelsen admitted that, in Colombia, they were essentially “fighting crime with criminals,” singling out the National Police intelligence directorate (F-2), a key focus of the U.S. dossier, as especially corrupt. The F-2 was “directly involved in murders and kidnappings,” according to the Colombian president, sharing with his U.S. interlocutors his plans to disband the unit and fold its functions into the DAS intelligence organization, which responded to the president, not the military, as was the case with the National Police. Document 32 Peter Bourne, Director, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy, to President Carter, “Briefing of Document 32 Peter Bourne, Director, White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy, to President Carter, “Briefing of President Lopez-Michelsen,” July 23, 1977, Top Secret, 6 pp. (includes cover memoranda) Jul 23, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Peter Bourne’s memo to President Carter on the López-Michelsen briefing says the Colombian president “did not flinch at any of the information we provided” about narcotics-related corruption in Colombia but pushed back on allegations against the defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia. Bourne says he “had the feeling” that López-Michelsen “not only wanted us to know that he knew a great deal more about Varon than we did, but that this was the one person on the list he could not move against directly.” Regarding the F-2 police intelligence directorate, López-Michelsen called it “a nest of criminals.” Bourne tells Carter, “It is clear also that he plans to move aggressively against these people.” The Colombian president, according to Bourne, “is a tired embattled old man depressed by his failure to accomplish more than 20 per cent of his administrations [sic] original program, who is not particularly popular with the people, and who was badly stung by accusations that his sons were involved in illicit financial transactions.” Bourne says he thinks that López-Michelsen “had planned to drift through his remaining year in office,” but credits Carter with reenergizing the Colombian president. “[T]he interest you and Rosalynn have taken in him has lighted a fire under him and given him the energy, clear goals and inspiration to try to redeem himself in the time he has left,” adding that, “We have also placed in his hands some powerful weapons,” probably referring to the promised military helicopters. Document 33 President Carter letter to President López-Michelsen of Colombia, July 26, 1977, 6 pp. (includes co Document 33 President Carter letter to President López-Michelsen of Colombia, July 26, 1977, 6 pp. (includes cover memorandum and attachments) Jul 26, 1977 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program In a short letter to President López-Michelsen, Carter says that Bourne has told him of “the considerable progress that we have been able to accomplish together,” since the visit to Colombia of First Lady Rosalynn Carter in June. Carter says that López-Michelsen “can be proud of the aggressive steps” he had taken on dealing with narcotrafficking and expresses a “desire to continue to work closely with you” on narcotics. Document 34 CIA report, Latin America; Regional and Political Analysis, “Colombia: Narcotics Meeting with Pres Document 34 CIA report, Latin America; Regional and Political Analysis, “Colombia: Narcotics Meeting with President Lopez,” August 4, 1977, Secret, 4 pp. Aug 4, 1977 Source CIA CREST database “President Carter’s offer to provide President Lopez with evidence compiled by US agencies on official corruption in Colombia was unprecedented,” according to this CIA analysis. His meeting in July with a U.S. delegation about the matter was a sign of “steadily improving relations in joint drug control efforts,” according to the report.” For instance, the report notes that, “after hearing information on cases involving ministerial and judicial officials, military and law enforcement personnel, and other high-level figures, Lopez stated that he planned to set up an elite civilian law enforcement unit to cope with crime and corruption in Colombia.” But ultimately the Colombian president’s effectiveness against drugs will be limited by political constraints, according to the report. The same article appeared in the August 6, 1977, edition of the National Intelligence Daily. Document 35 U.S. State Department memorandum, Louis G. Fields, Jr., Assistant Legal Advisor for Special Function Document 35 U.S. State Department memorandum, Louis G. Fields, Jr., Assistant Legal Advisor for Special Functional Problems, to Mathea Falco, Director for International Narcotics Control Matters, “Colombia: Status of Judicial Assistance Cases,” September 8, 1977, Secret, 5 pp. (includes cover memoranda) Dec 31, 1969 Source In a memo to the top State Department narcotics official, State Department assistant legal adviser Louis Fields describes recent U.S. efforts to gain Colombia’s cooperation in the pursuit of Colombians indicted in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. Among the items listed are the “possible narcotrafficking activities” of the son of President López-Michelsen, Alfonso López Caballero, who was believed to be working at the United Nations in New York City. Fields says that federal prosecutors were being careful with the case, and that, “No indictment will be sought in EDNY [Eastern District of New York] or further action involving this individual without prior consultation” with key officials in the State Department. Also listed are “Griselda Blanca”—which is almost certainly a reference to Griselda Blanco, the infamous, Miami-based narcotrafficker—and her husband Alberto Bravo, who are said to be “sources and financiers” of the drug trade. The memo also references so-called CENTAC cases that stem from the DEA’s Central Tactical investigations program, established in 1973 to mount conspiracy investigations against groups “at the top of the criminal hierarchy.” Document 36 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Meeting with Liberal Party Pre-Candidate Turbay,” Secret, January Document 36 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Meeting with Liberal Party Pre-Candidate Turbay,” Secret, January 21, 1978, 6 pp. Jan 21, 1978 Source U.S. U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases Having eventually reached a modus vivendi with the lame duck President López-Michelsen, the U.S. was soon faced with the harsh reality that a candidate with widely rumored ties to narcotraffickers, Julio César Turbay Ayala, would become the next Colombian head of state. The analysis from the newly installed U.S. ambassador, Diego Asencio, is both reassuring with respect to Turbay—“he is probably an honest politician operating in a corrupt milieu”—and bleak on the general outlook for Colombia—“It seems more likely … that the social and political milieu of Colombia has developed to a point that it is vitually [sic] impossible to organize a political group that would not contain elements associated with traffickers.” The situation was “not all bad,” according to the Embassy, as “the fact that traffickers have enormous liquidity and are becoming politically active … is scaring any number of traditional politicians.” The U.S. ambassador said he was “inclined to believe that [Turbay] is basically a sound individual, functioning pragmatically in a corrupt milieu.” Document 37 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, [Conversation with Vice Admiral Melendez on Varon Allegations], Februar Document 37 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, [Conversation with Vice Admiral Melendez on Varon Allegations], February 13, 1978, Secret, 5 pp. Feb 13, 1978 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases After the foreign and Colombian press reported on allegations that the U.S. had given López-Michelsen a list of corrupt officials that included Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, the defense minister, the U.S. Embassy’s deputy chief of mission, Robert Drexler, was approached by the prosecutor general of the Colombian armed forces, Vice Admiral Melendez, who said that Varón was “obviously innocent” based on a supposedly strong record against narcotraffickers. According to Melendez, López-Michelsen had told Varón that he had first learned about that allegations about him in a report from a U.S. congressional delegation (“the CODEL Wolff report”), but a subsequent story in Le Monde had indicated that there was another report, presumably the secret report given to López-Michelsen by Bourne and Bensinger in July 1977 (but erroneously assumed by Varón and Melendez to have been delivered earlier by Mrs. Carter). After learning of the second report, “Varon went to see the president again,” according to the cable, and “Lopez acknowledged that the [U.S. government] had given him further information (in addition to the Wolff report)” but told the defense minister that “he did not take [the allegation] seriously and that Varon should not worry about it.” Melendez suggested that the U.S. might allow López-Michelsen to make the intelligence report public “so that the flimsiness of the charges against Varon would be revealed.” The DCM replied that the “quality and the reliability of the data naturally varied and it had to be held closely to protect innocent people, to safeguard sensitive sources and also to avoid compromising ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions,” but that, ultimately, “It was up to President Lopez himself to decide how to handle any information and reports that we had provided him personally. This particularly applied to their dissemination to other Colombian officials.” In the “Comment” section, the Embassy notes that Varón is unlikely to let the matter go and further that “Ambassador needs to consult with Varon on several issues,” including “military cooperation in bilateral narcotics control efforts,” adding that, “Varon himself may decide to be especially helpful and cooperative in these matters in order to help disprove the allegations against him.” Document 38 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Text of Presidential Aide Memoire,” February 16, 1978, Secret, 6 p Document 38 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “Text of Presidential Aide Memoire,” February 16, 1978, Secret, 6 pp. Feb 16, 1978 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases In an aide-mémoire to the U.S. government, forwarded in this Embassy cable, President López-Michelsen outlines his concerns about revelations in Le Monde and in the Colombian media of the existence of a secret U.S. list of Colombian officials corrupted by the drug trade. Here the Colombian president’s message is being forwarded on to the State Department with copies delivered to Mathea Falco (State Department narcotics adviser), Peter Bensinger (DEA administrator) and Peter Bourne (White House drug adviser). López-Michelsen opens his message with what appears to be a vague threat. Recalling First Lady Rosalynn Carter’s June 1977 visit, the Colombian president notes that she was the first person to tell him that the U.S. was preparing to share with him a list of Colombian officials linked to narcotrafficking. “It should be noted,” he adds, that Mrs. Carter had also asked him “to accelerate the judicial processes against American citizens involved in such crimes,” including “a person with connections to an influential North American senator, a friend of President Carter.” Citing “limitations proper to the separation of powers,” López-Michelsen implies that there is little he can do to help Carter’s friend. The rest of the document explains the Colombian president’s concerns about specific allegations in the “ultra secret document” that had been given to him by Carter’s representatives the previous year and in a report issued later by a U.S. congressional delegation. Noting the allegations against Gen. Varón Valencia and the son of presidential candidate Julio César Turbay Ayala, López-Michelsen upbraids the U.S. government for giving “the appearance of truth to gossip picked up in Bogota,” saying that the U.S. “has limited itself to delivering to the government of Colombia possible clues on narcotics traffickers in some cases, and in others, political stories that have circulated for some time and have been collected without any analysis.” Saying that “the good name of Colombia has been compromised by the publication of these reports,” the president ends by noting that “the Communist Party” was “the principal beneficiary of the speed with which such unfounded reports have been leaked”—reports that make it appear that the so-called ‘establishment’ and the government itself is a syndicate of delinquents.” Document 39 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “President Lopez’ Complaint of Leak of Narcotics Information,” Fe Document 39 U.S. Embassy Colombia cable, “President Lopez’ Complaint of Leak of Narcotics Information,” February 16, 1978, Secret, 9 pp. Feb 16, 1978 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases In a cable directed to Bourne, Bensinger, Falco, and others, U.S. Ambassador Diego Asencio evaluates the impact of news stories based on leaked information revealing that the U.S. had given President López-Michelsen a secret list of corrupt Colombian officials. The Colombian president had given Asencio “a personally drafted and closely held aide memoire, which is a species of defense of the GOC’s position in the matter and which he intends to use if further disclosures are forthcoming.” Asencio characterizes the aide-mémoire as “a slipshod document refutable on any number of points and drafted for the sole purpose of creating a political impact.” Ambassador Asencio nevertheless sees the downside of freezing out the minister of defense, Gen. Varón Valencia, whose name had appeared in the recent news stories. To do so “would risk the current narcotics program which is now beginning to show promise after a sometimes difficult gestation period. The present cooperative framework would probably disappear. We would abandon our objective of building a viable narcotics unit, now with potential to survive presidential elections.” Asencio says that he intends “to meet with the minister of defense privately and encourage him and his agency to become more active participants in the narcotics program as a means of demonstrating his bona fides.” Document 40 Peter Bourne Memorandum to White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, “Memo to the President on Drug Tra Document 40 Peter Bourne Memorandum to White House Counsel Robert Lipshutz, “Memo to the President on Drug Trafficking in Colombia,” February 21, 1978, Confidential, 3 pp. Feb 21, 1978 Source Jimmy Carter Library through the Remote Access Capture (RAC) program Bourne is concerned about news circulating in Washington that the 60 Minutes television program was planning a story on corruption in Colombia. The story is to be based in part on leaked copy of Bourne’s June 2, 1977, memo to President Carter, which included a one-page summary of some of the more notable names on the longer list that was eventually given to López-Michelsen. Bourne here describes it as “a list of high ranking individuals in Colombia whom we knew to be involved in drug trafficking.” The 60 Minutes story would ultimately air in April 1978. Bourne is worried about the White House’s handling of classified information, recalling that he had previously raised with Lipshutz “the problem of xeroxed copies of classified memos circulated for comment in the White House ending up in the agencies,” as he thinks happened in this case. Bourne incorrectly assumes, however, that the memo, one copy of which even bears Carter’s handwritten annotation, “was circulated only to the NSC” and not to the President. Document 41 U.S. Embassy cable, “‘60’ Minutes TV Program: Allegations About Involvement of Julio Cesar Tur Document 41 U.S. Embassy cable, “‘60’ Minutes TV Program: Allegations About Involvement of Julio Cesar Turbay in Narcotics Trafficking,” April 6, 1978, Confidential, 3 pp. Apr 6, 1978 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases After leading presidential candidate Julio César Turbay and the defense minister, Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, published letters to and from the U.S. ambassador about charges of drug corruption that had aired the previous day on the 60 Minutes TV program, U.S. Ambassador Diego Ascencio met with his “own kitchen cabinet” of Colombian political operatives who were divided over whether the allegations hurt or helped Turbay’s campaign. Asencio also reports that he spoken with Varón “and berated him mildly for violating the terms of our agreement,” presumably to not react in a way that would upset U.S.-Colombia relations. Document 42 U.S. Embassy cable, “Drug Traffic: Text of Letters from Presidential Candidate Turbay and Minister Document 42 U.S. Embassy cable, “Drug Traffic: Text of Letters from Presidential Candidate Turbay and Minister of Defense Varon to Ambassador, and from the Ambassador to Varon Regarding CBS Program’s Corruption Charges,” April 11, 1978, Unclassified, 7 pp. Apr 11, 1978 Source U.S. National Archives - Access to Archival Databases This cable reproduces an exchange of letters between U.S. Ambassador Diego Ascencio and two individuals named in a recent 60 Minutes television program about narcotics corruption in Colombia: the leading presidential candidate Julio César Turbay and Gen. Abraham Varón Valencia, the minister of defense. Turbay and Varón had made the letters public on April 6, the day after the program aired. NOTES [1] A footnote in the relevant FRUS volume indicates that the text of the intelligence briefing was “not found” in the files reviewed by State Department historians. [2] At one point, the document reads: “It is for this reason that we want to share with you the following information that we have developed on narcotics-related official corruption in your country, knowing your sincere interest in attacking the narcotics problem will result in an investigation of your own into this matter.” [3] The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Robert W. Drexler, Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date: March 1, 1996, Copyright 1998, ADST. [4] In a press conference held on a plane en route from Bogotá to Caracas, Venezuela, Mrs. Carter told reporters only that she had “very serious” talks with López about the narcotics problem and that Bourne and Falco would soon be dispatched to Colombia for further discussions about the issue. (See “Drug Traffic, ‘Very Serious,’ Mrs. Carter Tells Colombia,” The Washington Post, June 10, 1977) [5] See Nicholas Gage, “Latins Now Leaders Of Hard-Drug Trade,” The New York Times, April 21, 1975; Nicholas Gage, “Drug‐Smuggling Logistics Bizarre and Often Fatal,” The New York Times, April 22, 1975. [6] Stevens said there was no evidence that any of the 72 U.S.-supplied helicopters, which were in the hands of the Colombian Air Force, had been used to smuggle drugs. (See Document 16) [7] “U.S. to Aid Colombia Stop Flow of Drugs,” The Washington Post, July 8, 1977. [8] Earlier that year, the Colombian media revived previous allegations about the sons of President López citing evidence that Juan Manuel López Caballero had been involved in possibly illicit real estate transactions. [9] At one point, the document reads: “It is for this reason that we want to share with you the following information that we have developed on narcotics-related official corruption in your country, knowing your sincere interest in attacking the narcotics problem will result in an investigation of your own into this matter.”