December 28, 2011 4:32 pm

Drug gangs strike back in Rio’s ‘pacified’ slums

By Joe Leahy and Samantha Pearson in Rocinha, Rio de Janeiro

Members of the special police unit Bope during a raid on a favela in Rio de Janeiro

The staff at Ricardo Eletro were pulling down the shutters on their electronics store after a frantic day serving pre-Christmas shoppers when the gunmen appeared.

Thiago Marinho, manager of the store, which is on the main road of Rocinha, one of Rio de Janeiro’s most notorious favelas, or slums, stood by helplessly as the five bandits stole money, mobile phones and other electrical goods.

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This kind of attack was not meant to happen any more. Paramilitary police invaded Rocinha in November, driving out the armed drug traffickers who had controlled the area for decades. “They weren’t even wearing hoods,” says Mr Marinho of his assailants. “Rocinha is huge. There just aren’t enough police now to look after the place. Two other little shops were robbed, too.”

A sprawl of shacks on a mountain overlooking Rio’s posh Ipanema and Leblon beach districts, Rocinha is the latest favela to come under the city’s “police pacification unit”, or UPP, programme. Aimed at recovering the large areas of Rio controlled by drug gangs with names such as Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends) orComando Vermelho (Red Command), the scheme is seen as crucial to Rio’s plan to host the football World Cup final in 2014 and the Olympics two years later.

Thanks partly to the UPP programme, murders have fallen from 35 per 100,000 inhabitants in metropolitan Rio in 2008 to an estimated 26.7 last year – close to the national average, according to the Sangari Institute, which tracks homicides in Brazil.

“This is a policy that society itself has adopted,” Rio’s state governor Sérgio Cabral recently told Brazil’s O Globo news network. “Once society has adopted a policy, no politician can roll it back.”

But even Mr Cabral knows that rooting out Rio’s entrenched “narco-dictatorships” is a gargantuan task.

The problem dates from the 1970s, when Brazil’s former military rulers jailed common criminals and leftwing guerrillas alongside each other. On their release, the criminals adopted guerrilla-style tactics and began occupying territory. “The idea was to have this red wave to take over the city and set up an alternative state – but then cocaine came into the picture,” says Pedro Henrique de Cristo, consultant to the UN-Habitat programme aimed at reintegrating Rio’s favelas.

According to a study by Mr Henrique de Cristo, 16.6 per cent of Rio’s population, or more than 1m people, live under the drug warlords outside the control of the government. Their average income is about one-third of that of regular neighbourhoods, murder rates are nearly twice as high and teenage pregnancies are five times higher.

“When you are a teenager, between 12 and 15 years old, you have two choices here – continue your education or join the traficantes [traffickers],” says Leandro Lima, a local journalist and native of Rocinha. “Soldiers” in the drug gangs can earn $1,000 a week, a small fortune compared to what most youths earn, he says.

There is also a racial divide. More than half of the population of the favelas is black, compared with less than 7 per cent elsewhere. Activists allege favela residents receive worse treatment from the Rio police, who killed one person for every 23 they arrested in 2008 – compared with one for every 37,000 in the US, according to Human Rights Watch.

Conditions improve markedly after the favelas are pacified. The scheme first caught global attention a year ago when Rio’s elite paramilitary force, the Police Special Operations Battalion, or Bope, was filmed driving gangsters from Rio’s giant Complexo do Alemao favela.

While local populations still distrust the police, Mr Henrique de Cristo says they support the presence of the UPPs – police posts set up in pacified slums and occupied by officers trained in community policing after Bope has pulled out.

The challenge is how to expand and sustain the UPP scheme. Bope says it has pacified only 19 out of 130 gang-controlled favelas and is aiming to get to 40 by 2014. But some question whether Rio has the resources: by some estimates, the city would need to increase its police force by more than half to occupy all the drug lords’ territory.

The strains of not deploying enough police are already visible in Rocinha, the locals claim. Although the state governor says Rocinha will receive a UPP next year, for the moment it will have to make do with patrols by Bope.

Residents claim life was more secure under the ADA, the gang that ruled Rocinha and which prohibited theft. Fabiana França, the six-months-pregnant owner of a small clothes shop down one of Rocinha’s dark alleyways, says a neighbour was recently assaulted and had her Christmas bonus stolen.

“Safer? No, it’s less safe! All the police go home about 8pm or 9pm,” she says. “I’ve now put up bars on my windows where I live.”

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Paraty-An Undiscovered Brasilian Jewel

December 16, 2011 9:57 pm

Southern gem

By Lucia van der Post

Surrounded by rainforest on the Brazilian coast, Paraty has a sleepy appearance that hides a buzzing social scene

Charming: A church in Paraty, seen from the water

You’d be unlikely to go all the way to Brazil specially to spend time in Paraty, unless you had a house there or were extraordinarily well clued up, but if you’re heading that way you’d be very foolish to give it a miss. For Paraty is special. It’s a little gem that has survived as an almost perfectly preserved colonial town entirely because of the wayward turns of history.

Paraty had the good luck to have had a short period of great grandeur during the 18th century when all the gold from the inland mines had to pass through its sheltered harbour and all its glorious villas and splendid churches were built. The gold route, the remains of which can still be seen and are worth visiting, followed the old Indian trails down from the mining towns to the port.

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Then the indigenous Indians began to attack the gold carriers on the mountain trails and soon a new route had to be built linking the old mining towns of Minas Gerais directly to Rio. Paraty’s moment of glory had passed and modern life, with its attendant high-rise buildings and over-development, passed it by. Until the late 1950s the only way to reach it was to walk or go by boat. During the 1950s and 1960s it was discovered by new age hippies and in the 1980s and 1990s well-heeled Brazilians and foreigners who fell in love with it began to restore the houses.

Which is why Paraty is still a perfectly preserved 18th-century colonial town. Much of its charm lies in the homogeneity of the architecture, which contrives to give it an air of great tranquillity and “settledness”. “And, best of all,” as Simon Clift, the owner of the house I stayed in, puts it, “it hasn’t been sterilised through mass foreign tourism like so many European towns, which may have gained three red stars in the Michelin guide but in the meantime have lost their soul. Paraty ... remains a vibrant town with real people living in its midst.”

It lies in lovely country on the coast 160 miles west of Rio and three to four hours by car from São Paulo (though on Fridays the air buzzes as fashionable Paulistanos and Cariocas with weekend houses or parties to go to fly in by helicopter or private plane). The rainforest comes right down to the edge of the town and Paraty looks out across a watery heaven, a usually blissful sea and 300 small islands around which the tourist is free to wander. There are two tropical fjords in Brazil and both are in Paraty. These days it is a Unesco world heritage site and it is said to be the hardest place in Brazil, outside the Amazon, to get planning permission to build.

Go when the weather is great (much of the time but particularly in the Southern hemisphere’s summer, between October and May), spend your days wandering round the islands, messing around in boats, swimming when you feel like it and, then by night, drop back into your pousada or, best of all, into one of the enchanting houses that are available to rent.

You must stay awhile to get the measure of the place. It has a languorous air, as if nobody is in too much of a hurry. The streets are cobbled, cars are forbidden and at high tide some of the sea washes in. The streets are lined with elegant looking houses but the real charm lies behind the closed doors.

Open them and you like as not enter an enchanted garden – fruit trees heavy with avocados, mangos, pawpaws, bougain­villea lending colour to the bright green of the jungly plants and hummingbirds darting in and out. There might well be a pool and often a fountain. Many of these wonderful houses are owned by foreigners who came, saw and fell in love. Now they rent them out when they’re not in town. Liz Calder, the co-founder of Bloomsbury Publishing, for instance, bought a house there and founded a literary festival that happens every year in July and bringing a whole different crowd to enjoy the charms of this small seaside town.

Historic: A typical street in the historic town of Paraty

The houses to rent vary but the best of them come complete with every kind of service. The one I stayed in, The Colonial House, had been beautifully put together; a grand main bedroom and huge ensuite bathroom, and three other good bedrooms. If you were a big party you could ask to take over one of the other houses owned by Clift (who was chief marketing officer at Unilever before leaving London last year to spend more time here). He is known to have the best cook in the town and she and her team look after everything from breakfast out on a terrace filled with flowers, trees and birds eating the tropical fruits, to dinner parties (you might feel obliged to return some of the hospitality you will undoubtedly be showered with), boat trips, massages at the local spa, sorting out the chauffeuring, the internet connections, music and all the rest.

You could also rent the house of the pretender to the Brazilian throne, Prince João de Orleans e Bragança. It is right on the sea front, a wonderfully elegant, though not enormously grand, house that his father bought after falling in love with Paraty. It is filled with the faded relics of another, long gone age, grand portraits, sepia photographs, fine furniture with an elegaic beauty of its own. It comes, as all the best houses do, with help and cooks, and, if you want them, with concierges who will fix everything from boats to picnics.

Out in the tropical fjord are wonderfully grand and beautiful houses to rent on the waterfront, where you have peace, privacy, exquisite views and usually a boat and a boatman who will take you back to the town as well as all round the coastline. Though they’re not cheap (prices vary from about $4,000 to $11,000 a day), if you divide it between lots of friends it is surprising value, for they come with every comfort and one can’t overestimate the beauty of the place. All around is blissful, unpolluted sea and glimpses of other islands.

Across the water from the fjord, looking over to the mainland, lie rolling hills and mountains covered in rainforest. From time to time a fisherman’s boat comes by. There are hundreds of other islands to explore, some of them have restaurants, some are nature reserves inhabited by tamarind monkeys, yet others have private houses.

All along the harbour are colourful boats that can be hired, with a boatman, at prices from about £100 for a small rough boat up to about £220 for a big, beautifully equipped vessel. Food and drink is extra. Clift’s adopted son Cleberson has a very luxurious schooner, the Dona Geralda, which will take you to quiet, unvisited beaches, and on which you will have smashing food.

You should spend one day going by boat to the traditional village of Juatinga, where fishermen’s families have lived their simple maritime life for generations. If you were energetic you could hike there and arrange to be picked up by boat for the journey back. You should spend another going to see the gold trail and the remains of the cobbled route that the Portuguese laid over the Indian trails.

Paraty lacks a beautiful beach – but Lopes Mendes, on Ilha Grande (the biggest island in the bay), is a beauty and a short car journey away are two famous surfing spots, Trindade and Praia da Fazenda. You should take lunch at one of the simplest but loveliest restaurants in the world – Restaurante do Ostra, in the first fjord. Here Dadico Valdir, who’s lived there all his life, grilled us fish he’d caught that morning accompanied by manioc chips (very delicious) and for pudding he pulled down a fruta pão (breadfruit) from a nearby tree. All for about £10 a head with a caipirinha (Brazil’s national drink, made from cachaca, which is a sugar cane rum, sugar and lime) included.

And then, though the town itself has plenty of cute little restaurants, don’t miss out on the Bistro Amigos, another enchanting little eatery, up in among the tropical jungle, a 10-minute journey by car from the town, to which Clift took me and some of his friends one night. Run by a local garden nurseryman, there are just two tables for six set under an awning in what seems like a green bower. The chef brings you what he’s cooked that day – delicious little parcels of fish and vegetables and he always finishes off with cinnamon-coated, deep-fried bananas. Flowers bedeck every dish and the bill (about £20 a head) comes in a basket with an orchid.

Behind the closed doors, too, there’s an active and surprisingly sophisticated social life. You really need to get to know Clift, who these days devotes his post-working life to a new young adopted Brazilian family, educating by my count something like 15 young children in the town, funding houses for his extended adopted family, supporting schools and heavens knows what else. He knows everybody and everybody knows him. I had the great good luck firstly to be renting his lovely house and secondly to bump into him in the harbour, where he took me under his wing and introduced me to his exotic playmates – ex-models from Paris, poets, artists, duchesses and princelings with mittel-european titles, people from around the world who spend three or four months a year in Paraty.

In Paraty meeting people doesn’t take long and so before you know it you know half the town. Just make sure you bump into Clift along the harbour wall.

.......................................................................

Details

Lucia van der Post was a guest of Cazenove and Loyd (www.cazloyd.com), which offers seven nights at The Colonial House in Paraty from £2,915 per person, including breakfast and transfers (or £3,765 including flights from London to São Paolo)

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The Peruvian President's Balancing Act

The Peruvian President's Labor Balancing Act

December 2, 2011 | 1230 GMT

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ERNESTO BENAVIDES/AFP/Getty Images

Andean people protesting the Conga mine in Cajamarca, Peru, on Nov. 24

Summary

Peru’s president might not attend various regional summits so that he can focus on a mining dispute at home. The dispute over the Conga gold mining project is just one of many labor disputes in negotiation between Lima and the largely poor, indigenous masses. The president’s challenge will be to find a middle path between placating his supporters — thus scaring off foreign investment — or cracking down on the protesters, which would alienate his base.

Analysis

Peruvian President Ollanta Humala might not attend a summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean states in Caracas on Dec. 2 or the Pacific Alliance meeting in Mexico City from Dec. 4 to Dec. 5, Peruvian Foreign Minister Rafael Roncagliolo said Dec. 1 as he left for Caracas. Instead, Humala may stay in Peru to take part in ongoing negotiations with the communities of Cajamarca, whose violent protests have halted the $4.8 billion Conga gold mining project. Despite the suspension of the project by U.S. mining company Newport, the major investor in the Yanacocha consortium in charge of the proposed mine, the protesters have vowed to continue until the government formally ends the project.

The failure of the Conga project is an ominous sign not only for Humala’s capacity to contain his base, but also for the precedent it sets.

Locals object to the consortium’s plan to use three different lakes in the area for drainage and processing. Lima approved the plan in 2010 despite its expected environmental impact; local communities were not heavily involved in the planning process. The Cajamarca/Conga protests began Nov. 3, halted Nov. 9 per a 15-day suspension agreed to with the government, and heated back up Nov. 24. After six days of violent protests, Newport announced its withdrawal Nov. 30, citing the Peruvian government’s failure to meet its obligations. Protests have continued in Cajamarca and Celendin (near the mine), and protesters have said they will expand the protests to the cities of Arequipa, Cuzco and Puno, which was wracked with violence in the lead-up to Humala’s election.

The cancellation of the Conga project is not particularly unusual given Peru’s often-volatile relationship with foreign investment. Still, it represents a significant shift in the political conditions Peru’s left-wing president faces. Since his June 5 election, Humala has worked to reassure foreign investors that, despite his place on the political spectrum, he values the economic growth foreign investment brings to Peru. Humala has not only sought to reassure investors, but to maintain credibility with Peru’s substantial right-wing political parties, which together hold a majority in the legislature. Without the help of parties like Alejandro Toledo’s Peru Posible, Humala’s Gana Peru party lacks the votes to pass initiatives.

To his base, largely consisting of poor, indigenous Peruvians, Humala has urged patience and advocated expanding social aid and encouraging investment. But as the protests in Cajamarca and elsewhere in Peru seem to demonstrate, Humala’s base has grown tired of waiting, and Humala seems to have lost substantial credibility. Without significant leverage over protesting communities, it will be difficult for Humala to negotiate in good faith.

(click here to enlarge image)

In fact, Humala finds himself in much the same position as his predecessor, former Peruvian President Alan Garcia. Under Garcia’s watch, protests forced the government to suspend the license of Southern Copper Corp.’s Tia Maria project in May. Given his platform of income redistribution and catering to the indigenous masses — which typically constitute the bulk of protesters — Humala had the potential to change the government’s relationship with these communities, but this is now in doubt. More ominously for Humala’s efforts to reassure foreign investors, the protesters’ success at stopping the Conga project demonstrates to communities across Peru — where hundreds of active and dormant disputes simmer — that violent protest is an effective means of forcing change. It also establishes that Humala is incapable of stopping them or of offering sufficient incentives to peaceful negotiation.

So far, Humala appears to have adopted a strategy of seeking to prolong or delay negotiations, while personally staying away from the majority of the action. In the lead-up to Newport’s decision, Humala said he would not meet protesters until they already had decided they would compromise with the government. Humala has instead relied heavily on his council of ministers, particularly Peruvian Prime Minister Salomon Lerner, to negotiate with community leaders. Though this may keep him above the fray, the strategy’s failure makes him appear distant, uninvolved and unable to control his base.

Humala is trapped between two difficult choices. On the one hand, he could capitulate to his supporters and risk losing control of the country’s legislative agenda and hampering the foreign investment currently projected at $50 billion in mining alone over the next decade. On the other hand, he can resort to the hard-handed tactics of governments before him, alienating his base altogether. And more than the mining sector will challenge Humala. Port workers, cocaleros (growers of coca, the precursor of cocaine), natural gas workers and labor groups in general appear poised to challenge him over various grievances.

Though the Cajamarca protests are the most significant at the moment, more than 200 conflicts are in negotiation between local communities and various economic interests. These include:

Apurimac: Farmers in Apurimac have been protesting the activities of wildcat miners, claiming the miners are polluting local water sources and damaging crops. The protest began Nov. 3 and continued through Nov. 14. A government delegation traveled to Andahuaylas city Nov. 9-10 to negotiate with community leaders, but the negotiations failed when Peruvian Agriculture Minister Miguel Caillaux Zazzali refused to agree to a blanket ban on mining in the region. The city erupted into riots that left dozens injured. The protests have cost the region $145 million, according to regional Chamber of Commerce Vice President Augusto Fernandez-Cabero, who also alleged that the protests have been infiltrated by outside interests, including supporters of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) and the Peru Teachers Union. Apurimac Regional President Elias Segovia said Dec. 1 that an extremist wing of the District Board of Irrigation Users of Andahuaylas is likely to renew violent protests, an outcome that appears likely in the absence of a comprehensive agreement.

Puno: The situation in Puno is quiet at the moment. However, the city was the center of massive unrest over the summer until Humala came into office. Humala met Oct. 18 with the Puno regional president for more than five hours to discuss development projects in the region. The meeting seems to have calmed issues but the city remains in a delicate balance. If protesters in Cajamarca are serious about reaching out to people in Puno, there is a significant risk of unrest.

Ancash: The San Marcos community in the Ancash region experienced protests Nov. 11 that resulted in eight people being injured. Protesters are demonstrating against pollution caused by local mining operations. Earlier in November, protesters temporarily invaded a mining duct pumping station outside Antamina, one of the world’s top copper-zinc mines. Protesters also tried to occupy roads, one day after police fired tear gas to clear blockades on major highways.

Wildcat Miners: Wildcat miners also have issues at stake in the region. Growing pressure against illegal mining has pushed various miner groups to stage their own protests, pressuring the government to allow them to mine freely. These protests range in size and frequency. An estimated 4,000 miners protested Dec. 1 against a government crackdown on illegal mining in Puerto Maldonado, Madre de Dios region. That same day, 700 miners from Caramarca, Palpa and Otoca, in Peru’s Huancavelica region, blocked the southern Pan-American Highway in Nasca, in the Ica region, near the 440-kilometer (273-mile) point.

Given the political dangers he faces on all sides, Humala probably will continue to seek a middle way between cracking down on unrest and capitulating to the left. Though this will allow him to avoid serious political pain in the short term, it will embolden protest and encourage unrest throughout Peru for years to come.

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Two Americans Murdered 38 Years AgoIn Chile-The Murderers Are Brought To Justice!

CHILEAN JUDGE REQUESTS EXTRADITION OF U.S. MILITARY OFFICIAL IN "MISSING" CASE Capt. Ray Davis Indicted in Chile for alleged role in murder of Charles Horman, Frank Teruggi Declassified U.S. Documents Used Extensively in Court Indictment Archive Posts Documents cited in Indictment, including FBI Intelligence Reports Containing Teruggi's Address in Chile National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 366 Edited by Peter Kornbluh and Erin Maskell Posted - November 30, 2011 For more information contact: Peter Kornbluh - 202/374-7281 peter.kornbluh@gmail.com

The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and AccountabilityBy Peter Kornbluh A Los Angeles Times Best Nonfiction Book of 2003

Washington D.C., November 30, 2011 – Thirty-eight years after the military coup in Chile, a Chilean judge has formally indicted the former head of the U.S. Military Group, Captain Ray Davis, and a Chilean intelligence officer, Pedro Espinoza for the murders of two American citizens in September 1973. The judge, Jorge Zepeda, said he would ask the Chilean Supreme Court to authorize an extradition request for Davis as an "accessory" to the murders of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi.Both Horman and Teruggi were seized separately at their homes in Santiago by Chilean soldiers and subsequently executed while in detention. Their murders, and the seeming indifference of U.S. officials, were immortalized in the Oscar-award winning movie "Missing" which focused on the search by Horman's wife and father for him in the weeks following the U.S.-supported coup. The indictment accused the U.S. MilGroup of passing intelligence to the Chilean military on the "subversive" activities of Teruggi that contributed to his arrest; it stated that Davis "was in a position" to stop the executions "given his coordination with Chilean agents" but did not do so. In his indictment, Judge Zepeda cited a number of declassified U.S. government documents as the basic foundation for the case-although none of them tie Davis or Espinoza to the crimes. "These documents are providing the blocks for building a case in these famous killings," said Peter Kornbluh who directs the Chile Documentation Project at the Archive, "but they do not provide a smoking gun." To successfully advance court proceedings as well as a successful extradition request, according to Kornbluh, the judge will have to present concrete evidence of communications between U.S. and Chilean military officers regarding Horman and Teruggi prior to their detentions and their deaths. The Archive today posted a number of the documents cited in the indictment, including key FBI memos that contained Frank Teruggi's Santiago address, as well as other records relevant to the Horman and Teruggi case. The documents derive from an indexed collection: Chile and the United States: U.S. Policy toward Democracy, Dictatorship, and Human Rights, 1970-1990. The collection, just published this week by the Archive and Proquest, contains over 180 documents on the Horman and Teruggi case. Read the Documents: Document 1 Department of State, SECRET Memorandum, "Charles Horman Case," August 25, 1976 This memo by three state department officers implies that the U.S. government could have prevented the murder of Charles Horman. The memo, written after a review of the files on the case, explains that there is "circumstantial evidence" to suggest "U.S. intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman's death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia." When this document was initially declassified pursuant to a FOIA lawsuit filed by the Horman family, this critical passage was blacked out. The document was released without redaction in 1999. It was not cited in Judge Zepeda's indictment, but appears to reflect the judicial argument he is pursuing. Document 2 Department of State, SECRET, "Charles Horman Case: Gleanings,"(Undated but written in August 1976) This detailed chronology, based on a review of files available to the State Department, contains key information on what the U.S. knew and did in the case of Charles Horman. It also evaluates the possible role of the U.S. in the murder. The document cites the admissions of a Chilean intelligence agent, Rafael Gonzalez, who told U.S. reporters the story of Horman being interrogated in General Augusto Lutz's office and then killed because "he knew too much." Gonzalez claimed there was an American in the room when the interrogation took place, but decades later he would recant that story. In January 2004, he was indicted by Judge Zepeda in the Horman case as an "accessory to murder" for his role in the interrogation, death and secret burial of Charles Horman. Document 3 United States Embassy, Unclassified Notice, "Missing United States Citizen," October 9, 1973 This document cited in the indictment, states that the U.S. government has received a note from the Chilean Foreign Office dated October 3, 1973, recording that Charles Horman was detained at the National Stadium on September 20 for a curfew violation but had been released on September 21 for "lack of merit." The document includes a photograph of Horman, his date of birth, address in Chile, and fingerprint classification. Horman was actually detained at his home on September 17, 1973. Document 4 Department of State, Memorandum (classification excised), "Film by Charles Horman," April 12, 1974 In this memo to Assistant Secretary Harry Shlaudeman, State Department officer George Lister describes the film work of Charles Horman. A film that he apparently worked on before the coup was completed after the coup by friends titled "Chile: With Poems and Guns." (The document leaves the impression that Charles "made" the film, but clearly he did not work on it following the coup.) The film describes Chilean history, and the achievements of the Allende government, along with alleged atrocities of the coup and U.S. involvement. Lister goes so far as to imply that Horman's film making in Chile could have been what "led to his death." Document 5 Chilean Armed Forces, Memorandum, "Antecedentes sobre Fallecimiento de 2 ciudadanos norteamericanos," Octobeer 30, 1973 Chief of Chilean Military Intelligence Service General Augusto Lutz reports on the death of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi. He asserts that Horman and Teruggi were political extremists attempting to discredit Chilean junta. While he acknowledges that they were both detained by the Chilean military, he maintains that they were later released and that the Chilean military was not involved in their deaths. The document is the only information known to have been provided by the Chilean military to the U.S. embassy after the disappearance of Horman and Teruggi. Document 6 U.S. Military Group Chile, Memorandum (classification unknown), "Case of Charles Horman," January 14, 1975 Ray Davis forwards a list of documents on the interactions of the U.S. Military Group in Chile with Charles Horman to be provided to the General Accounting Office. The documents raise the issue of the role of embassy officials in the disappearance and death of Horman, and make "certain allegations and statements about members of the Navy Mission, in Valparaiso; comments about a ride given by COMUSMILGP, Captain Davis." Document 7 Department of State, CONFIDENTIAL Memorandum, "Horman Case," April 20, 1987 This memorandum of conversation reports on an informant who has appeared at the Embassy to give testimony on the death of Charles Horman. According to this informant, Horman was seized by Chilean intelligence units and taken to the Escuela Militar for questioning. He was then transferred to the National Stadium, where they determined he was an extremist. He was forced to change clothes, shot three times, and his body was dumped on the street to appear he had died in a confrontation. The informant said that "the person at the stadium who made the decision on who was to die was Pedro Espinoza, of later DINA fame." The document is the first to tie Pedro Espinoza to the Horman case. He was involved in military intelligence and detainees at the time of the coup. However, the commander of the National Stadium at the time was another military officer named Jorge Espinosa Ulloa. Document 8 United States Embassy Santiago, CONFIDENTIAL cable, '[Excised] Reports on GOC Involvement in Death of Charles Horman, Asks Embassy for Asylum and Aid,' April 28, 1987 In a report on the informant's information, the Embassy cables Washington with his account of Horman's death. Horman was picked up in a routine sweep, the informant suggests, and was found in possession of "extremist" materials. He was then taken the National Stadium where he was interrogated and later executed on the orders of Pedro Espinoza. Embassy officials note that his story "corresponds with what we know about the case and the [Chilean government] attempt to cover up their involvement," suggesting that the informant is probably telling the truth. In later cables, the Embassy begins to question the credibility of the informant who is never identified. Document 9 FBI, SECRET Memorandum, [Frank Teruggi's Contact with Anti-War Activist], October 25, 1972 This FBI report cites information provided by "another U.S. government agency" on Frank Teruggi's contacts with an anti-war activist who resides in West Germany. The report also contains his address in Santiago. The document was generated by surveillance of a U.S. military intelligence unit in Munich on an American anti-war dissident who was in contact with Teruggi. The FBI subsequently decides to open a file on Teruggi. This series of FBI documents were cited by Judge Zepeda in his indictment which infers-but offers no proof-- that intelligence from them was shared with Chilean military intelligence in the days following the coup. Document 10 FBI, SECRET Memorandum, "Frank Teruggi," October 25, 1972 This FBI memorandum requests investigation of Frank Teruggi and the Chicago Area Group for the Liberation of Americas of which he was a member nearly a year prior to his death following the Chilean coup. Document 11 FBI, SECRET Memorandum, "[Excised] SM- Subversive," November 28, 1972 This FBI document again requests investigation on Teruggi based on his contact with a political activist in West Germany. The document mentions that Teruggi is living in Chile editing a newsletter "FIN" of Chilean information for the American left, and that he is closely affiliated with the Chicago Area Group for the Liberation of Americas. Document 12 FBI, Memorandum (classification unknown), "Frank Teruggi," December 14, 1972 This FBI memorandum demonstrates ongoing efforts to gather information on Frank Teruggi in the year proceeding the Chilean coup. Here, the FBI reports on his attendance at a conference of returned Peace Corps volunteers and his membership in political organizations supporting socialism and national liberation movements in Latin America.

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New Undersea Cable To Link Latin America To The Rest Of The World

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New undersea cable to connect Africa with three continents

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By: Natasha Odendaal

25th November 2011 

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A new Atlantic Ocean undersea fibre-optic cable project to connect Africa, South America, North America and Europe, has been launched.

Wasace Cable Company Worldwide will build and operate the new undersea cable, which was said to be the first trans-Atlantic system to deploy the next generation 100 G technology - ten times the capacity of previous systems.

The Wasace project, which comprised a total fibre length seven times the earth’s circumference, would enable access to a previously unavailable quantity of affordable Internet communication capacity. It would also connect the rapidly growing markets of Africa and Latin America with the commercial markets of North America and Europe, through the first-ever high-capacity cable to span the South Atlantic.

The new, diverse cable routes included Wasace North, connecting Europe to North America; Wasace South, connecting South America to Africa; Wasace America, connecting South America to North America; and Wasace Africa, connecting Nigeria, Angola and South Africa.

Private equity investment firm VIP Must would provide Wasace's financing and marketing and media strategy, as well as institutional support. Other investors included the African Development Bank and a number of Brazilian groups.

US-based international communication systems development group David Ross Group has been elected to manage the project development.

Wasace Cable Company Worldwide Holding, led by chairperson and CEO Ramón Gil-Roldán y Sansón, was formed to meet the rapidly evolving needs of developing markets in the Southern Hemisphere.
 

Edited by: Mariaan Webb